375. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
1089. CINCPAC for POLAD. Ref: Embtel 1054.2 Since dispatch reftel, we have continued our consultations with High National Council (HNC) members and others.
Johnson had lengthy conversation with HNC Secretary General Tran Van Van Thursday evening.3 At outset Johnson stressed importance US attaches successful work HNC and necessity for HNC come up with realistic and workable formula for new government. Tran Van Van said that trend thinking in HNC now pointed more firmly to single chief of state (no troika or joint chief of state body). Also general view that General Minh is most realistic candidate for this position. Van said Chief of State would then select Prime Minister as head of government, who would present his program to HNC. With approval of his program by HNC, Prime Minister would select and install his government; however, HNC would retain power to remove Prime Minister or individual Ministers after consultation with Prime Minister on the basis of large majority vote (2/3 or 3/4).
Van indicated that Council generally agreed that election of Assembly (whether direct or indirect or mixture of both) was necessary but impossible accomplish this task by October 27 deadline. Van expressed his personal view that if the Council were honest it would merely state in the draft charter that the National Congress would be elected. Elections could be set from four to six months hence and a new Chief of State could be elected at the same time. Johnson questioned necessity of electing new Chief of State 1f the government installed by end of this month were functioning effectively. Van did not argue the point, merely observing that popular election of Chief of State had some merit in getting more popular support for government. Van said HNC would perform legislative functions pending installation of National Congress and alluded to Council’s “controlling” government. Johnson cautioned any tendency install parliamentary form of government which not adapted to situation in South Vietnam or for HNC attempt “control” too closely actions of Executive.
Van said Council unanimous in its view that Prime Minister must be civilian and indicated that “Council believed” Khanh did not qualify even if he resigned from military. Van then spelled out formula for creating National Security Council to be composed of Chief of State [Page 823] (Minh), President of the HNC (personality to be determined), Prime Minister (Pham Khac Suu), and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces (General Khanh). Johnson questioned whether it would be desirable to have President of High National Council as the interim legislative body formally a member of proposed National Security Council, which is clearly an instrument of the Executive branch. Here again this would be direct intervention of legislative into an Executive function. Van did not respond to this point. Johnson continued with great stress on necessity for military to be actively engaged in the government, committed to carrying out solution developed by HNC, thereafter for closest possible cooperation to exist between the military and the civilian sides of the government. Van agreed but expressed great concern that Khanh would try to perpetuate himself in office. Van doubted that Khanh would be willing to assume a subordinate position and would maneuver for his retention as Prime Minister, using as a primary tactic support from Tri Quang and the Buddhists. Van appealed for direct US intercession with Khanh to convince him that he must step aside in the interests of the country. Van believed that Council was powerless to block a move by Khanh and only US pressure could keep him in line. In response to Van’s direct question as to whether US would intercede in this sense with Khanh, Johnson responded along the line of Embtel 1036.4
In parting Manfull asked Van if he were serious in proposing Pham Khac Suu as Prime Minister. Van laughed and said “not really” but Suu would be good “elected Chief of State”. (This may reflect Tran Van Van’s personal ambitions to be Prime Minister or President of the HNC should Suu assume another position.)
Johnson and Sullivan met Pham Dang Lam, former Foreign Minister and currently Secretary-General of General Minh’s office, Friday noon. Lam recognized need for forming government by October 27, end of two-month period, but was worried about two obstacles: 1) HNC’s terms of reference provided that Assembly should select Chief of State, but would take two or three months to form Assembly; and 2) Minh would be “embarrassed” if HNC chose him as Chief of State and not Khanh as Prime Minister because Minh chose HNC members and would be accused of plotting against Khanh. Lam spoke of forming temporary government (as opposed to provisional government) for two or three months until Assembly formed; Assembly then would choose permanent Chief of State and Prime Minister. Johnson pointed out that formation new government with probable two or three month life or prolongation present lame-duck government would only prolong present deteriorating situation. He said two or three week extension of Khanh government beyond October 27 deadline at request of [Page 824] HNC seemed manageable, but US felt strongly that present period of uncertainty should be ended as quickly as possible and that government should be formed which could get back to prosecution of war. Johnson suggested that HNC might agree now on government providing for Assembly, when formed, to be able to remove Chief of State or Prime Minister by two-thirds or three-fourths vote if replacement agreed upon at same time. Such formula, Johnson pointed out, by giving Assembly right to remove government would give Assembly voice in matter but would avoid situation in which government again “up for grabs” when Assembly formed. (Implicit during this discussion was Lam’s assumption that Minh logical choice as Chief of State.)
Lam also raised question of Khanh continuing as Prime Minister and probed US attitude. Johnson followed line in Embtel 1036. Lam expressed great concern as to whether Khanh would resign on October 27 and asked what US could do to get him to resign. Johnson stressed that there were two aspects to question: 1) Whether Khanh would resign, and 2) whether there was someone to take his place. He pointed out would be irresponsible for Khanh to resign without replacement on hand; and that it was HNC’s job to provide that replacement if they wanted change of government. Lam appeared recognize that Khanh must have place in new government but expressed great skepticism he would accept subordinate position such as MinDef, DepPriMin.
Johnson suggested that if HNC wanted to learn Khanh’s intentions, or to have Khanh in government, it would be up to HNC and in fact essential it invite him in for consultation. Johnson strongly urged that HNC sit down with Minh and Khanh to work out what happens on October 27, reiterating that initiative up to HNC in this regard. Lam seemed to agree in principle, but expressed doubt that such consultation would work out in practice. He said, “Perhaps you Americans will have to help.” Johnson’s response to this was unenthusiastic.
[Page 825]Friday evening, Johnson and Sullivan met with Pham Khac Suu, HNC Chairman, and Tran Van Van, HNC Secretary-General. During conversation it was clear Suu was only shadow of his former self and capable of playing no more than figurehead role in his country’s future. He spoke very little, expressed no ideas more complex than platitudes, but occasionally confirmed Tran Van Van’s statements. Tran Van Van predicted HNC would vote and promulgate provisional charter next Monday or Tuesday (12th or 13th). Van referred to their concern with respect to Khanh, indicating once again that HNC considering establishment of National Security Council (Chief of State, Prime Minister, Chief of JGS, and President of HNC) to find place for Khanh. National Security Council would also permit close liaison between civilian government and military forces which Van recognized as vital.
Johnson and Sullivan urged that HNC take initiative to consult with Khanh and Minh on finding governmental solution before October 27. They also stressed necessity for civilian government maintaining closest possible relations with military, and for HNC to develop well-planned information program for selling its decision to people.
In talk with EmbOff October 9, Father [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] indicated that he, along with other religious leaders, had been called to Vung Tau by PriMin Khanh October 6. Purpose of trip was attempt Khanh’s part enlist religious support for post-October 27 governmental line-up with Pham Khac Suu as Chief of State, Khanh (without uniform) as PriMin. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said that his group had no really strong opposition to such a line-up, but for moment he had refrained from registering full support. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is neither staunchly pro nor violently con-Khanh. On basis his performance week of August 23, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] considers him weak, but on other hand he feels certain Khanh not anti-Catholic. When EmbOff declared that selection Chief of State and Prime Minister was internal matter, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] protested that US should play more dominant role in formation new Vietnamese Government, added that Vietnamese had had such limited experience in self-government, firm guidance was needed. “US should have been more firm with all our leaders including Diem.”
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 372.↩
- October 8.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 372.↩