Office of the Historian

363. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the President1

Washington, September 25, 1964—6:17 p.m.

CAP 64237. 1. In 2-hour meeting this morning,2 we received additional political and military steps available to us in effort to shore up government in Saigon. Dean Rusk is asking Max Taylor urgently for any additional advice as to what we can do to help on the political side.3

2. On military side, we are consulting with Souvanna about possible Laotian air action with some U.S. fighter support in Laotian corridor.4 We are also preparing plans for your later approval on possible use of South Vietnamese rangers with U.S. advisers against infiltration corridors. We have also prepared a schedule of possible marine operations by South Vietnamese torpedo boats in the coming weeks. All these actions are subject to your review and final decision next week.

3. The only action for which we now request immediate approval is a first naval patrol by South Vietnamese PT boats going 60 miles north of the boundary line, but never closer than 12 nautical miles to [Page 797] shore. This would be a probe of North Vietnamese naval reaction and, if uneventful, would be followed, with your later approval, by a second probe to the 3-mile limit. Neither probe will involve any U.S. forces or personnel. Respectfully request you call me “yes” or “no” on first probe at your convenience before Saturday noon.5

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XVIII. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A note on the source text reads: “For delivery to the President at the LBJ Ranch tonight.”↩
  2. See footnote 1, Document 361. No record of this meeting has been found.↩
  3. See Document 364.↩
  4. Telegram 275 to Vientiane, September 25, 8:11 a.m. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)↩
  5. Although no reply from the President has been found, he apparently approved, since JCS 9112 to CINCPAC, Saturday, September 26, 4:20 p.m., authorized these probes. (Ibid., Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 72 D 219, Tiger Operations)↩