Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

361. Paper Prepared in the Department of Defense¹

Washington, undated.

POINTS FOR DISCUSSION 9/25/64

A. Estimate of the situation. The situation is deteriorating rapidly in South Vietnam, and the trend is not likely to change. (See Saigon 938:² “Recent developments have demonstrated a faster rate of deterioration of governmental processes than I would have predicted. …³ These recent events cast considerable doubt on the ability of the caretaker government to carry through its program as planned for establishing a provisional government.”)

B. Areas for US action. The United States can improve the situation in South Vietnam over what it would otherwise be (a) by efforts within that country designed to strengthen the government and to enhance pacification, and (b) by efforts outside South Vietnam designed to influence favorably North Vietnam’s behavior.

C. Actions inside South Vietnam. We have no suggestions as to new efforts which should be made within South Vietnam to strengthen the government and to enhance pacification. Ambassador Taylor appears to be pursuing the optimum course-bolstering Khanh and helping to achieve a permanent government by October 27. A plan should be prepared, however-perhaps involving extension of the 60-day mandate or, on expiration of the mandate, US “negotiations” with South Vietnamese leaders-which will apply if it becomes apparent that Khanh will be unable to put together a government before the 60-day mandate of the “triumvirate” expires.

D. Actions outside South Vietnam

1. The guiding principle. The situation in Southeast Asia can be improved over what it would otherwise be if pressure is brought to bear on North Vietnam to induce her to be satisfied with a lesser degree of direction of and assistance to the VC in South Vietnam, or at least to induce her to become amenable to a more satisfactory arrangement should negotiations take place. In order to achieve these ends, North Vietnam must be made to suffer and be persuaded that US interest in a proper solution is deadly serious, that US presence in support of that end is ominous and enduring, and that she is likely to suffer even more. The pressure must be a kind which is at least acceptable to the American people and to our allies immediately involved.

2. The recommended actions.

a. MAROPS. We should resume MAROPS immediately (the 13-day “resumption schedule”—involving two probes, a junk capture, two bombardments, a bridge destruction and two more bombardments—are on 12-hour readiness); and the first step toward legitimating the operations as a counter-infiltration “Coastal Security Service” (per Saigon 911),⁴ should be approved.

b. DeSoto Patrols. If MAROPS are postponed, deSoto patrols should resume immediately. If MAROPS are resumed, a three-day deSoto patrol should follow the 13-day MAROPS schedule with a gap of no less than two nor more than three days. The deSoto patrol should run not later than October 10. We should not announce the patrol in advance, but we should in the US lay the groundwork for a possible incident by backgrounding key people regarding the intelligence importance of the missions and the right of our ships to be there (and perhaps even the “pressure” objective?). We should of course be prepared, if an incident occurs, to retaliate appropriately.

c. Cross-border operations. We should begin a several-months’ program of cross-border operations. We should, by October 10, start ARVN ground operations in the Panhandle. The operations would be limited to the 20-kilometer-deep “middle area” (Dak Prou), US advisers should be permitted to accompany the troops, and any air support should be solely logistical (no combat air support) and by US aircraft. Authority should be given to plan for, but not to execute, operations in the other two areas (Lao Bao and Dak To). We should start air strikes immediately against infiltration targets, using Lao T–28s at the beginning (with occasional AA suppression by Yankee Team) and Yankee Team suppressive strikes (with possible VNAF participation if it can be arranged) following later.

3. Communication with Hanoi. We should seek a method to communicate with Hanoi as our program of pressures becomes effective.

1. Source: Department of State, NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, NSC Mtg 9/25/64. Top Secret. Drafted by McNaughton. Another draft of this paper, which is the same except for minor wording changes, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. XV111, Memos. Attached to the source text is a note to the Office of the Secretary of State stating that the paper was intended for a meeting with Rusk, McNamara, Ball, and others at 11 a.m., September 25. Also attached to the source text is a memorandum from Forrestal to McNaughton, September 24, which reviewed the same points, and a 2-page draft telegram to Vientiane instructing that the cross-border strikes be carried out as soon as possible.
2. Document 359.
3. Ellipsis in the source text.
4. Telegram 911, September 19, discussed various aspects of making public maritime operations (MAROPS). (Department of State, Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8)