362. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1
Washington,
September 25, 1964—5:48
p.m.
731. Saigon pass COMUSMACV. Joint State-Defense-AID-USIA-CIA message. Ref: Saigon’s 714, 887 and 920; joint State-Defense msg 2184.2
- 1.
- The following is transmitted only as a reflection of thoughts held here that might assist give impetus pacification program; but your comments would be appreciated.
- 2.
- Agree that two major problems now face GVN. One, to arrive at a firm stable government, and second, to pacify the countryside. Appears to us that actions necessary to arrive at a firm stable government must be taken primarily within Saigon. On the other hand, under current conditions it may be necessary to accomplish initial pacification in provinces with minimum GVN assistance from Saigon. Past experience shows that aggressive action by commanders in the field and Province Chiefs can bring at least temporary security to given areas with only general GVN guidance from Saigon. In light current situation US/GVN action program contained reftel 2184 more important than ever as basis for a centrally directed and coordinated US effort in support of decentralized GVN effort until firm stable GVN government a reality.
- 3.
- In reviewing current situation and attempting to arrive steps
which can be taken keep pacification going in provinces, certain
actions within bounds current pacification concept (Chien Thang and
Hop Tac) appear worthy of consideration and might assist those
commanders and Province Chiefs capable and willing to further
pacification.
- a.
- Decentralize control pacification to Corps and Province Chiefs to maximum extent possible and give Corps Commander fresh mandate which furnishes him greater responsibility and authority in pacification.
- b.
- Decentralize programs and functions to Corps and lower levels to maximum extent possible. Programs and functions such as psyops, funding, provision of PL 480 supplies and training of Regional Forces are examples.
- c.
- Assign US political action advisor to Corps Advisory Staff for both military and civilian political agitation, organization and motivation.
- d.
- Through US channels (e.g. USOM, MACV, CAS), provide direct support to local leaders who show leadership and willingness to develop oil spots.
- 4.
- Recognize that decentralization will pose problems, will not improve situation some areas and may be greatly resisted by GVN. Certainly we would have to maintain appearance dealing with Saigon ministries. On other hand, a certain amount of de facto decentralization may provide means for aggressive and capable leaders to improve security situation in their areas and keep pacification moving.
Rusk
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted in S/VN, cleared by AID, CIA, DOD/ISA, JCS, USIA, and FE/SEA; and approved by Forrestal. Repeated to CINCPAC.↩
- Telegram 714 is printed as Document 337. Regarding telegram 887, see footnote 2, Document 354. Telegram 920, September 22, reported that Taylor would begin weekly reports on the situation in Vietnam. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T–161–69) Message 2184, June 5, reported the decisions reached on pacification at the June 2 Honolulu conference. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)↩