354. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
876. I called on Gen Khanh at the Joint Gen Staff compound this morning Sept 16, to find out his plans with regard to the officers involved in the September 13 coup. In the course of that coup, he had indicated to Alex Johnson that he intended no reprisals against the guilty officers and would be satisfied if they left the country. Today he is having after thoughts based upon the reaction against the coup leaders in the army and within the population. Also he had had time to reflect upon the serious implications of growing indiscipline within the armed forces.
Hence Khanh’s present intention is to hold a formal inquiry to determine the culprits and the extent of their involvement. Thereafter he will decide upon the course of action to follow.
I pointed out the need to avoid a drawn-out public trial which could create new divisions and dissensions and exacerbate relationships within the armed forces and between the minorities. There seemed to be every advantage in taking quick administrative action without going through the procedure of court martial since it was possible without trial to dismiss and exile the guilty officers.
Khanh conceded that speed was important and that the punishment I indicated might be sufficient. However, he felt that it was impossible to handle lightly so important a matter. In particular, the junior and middle grade officers of the army are most critical of the conduct of their superiors and they would resent any whitewashing of the guilty. Also, Khanh said that he is being charged with having engineered the coup to strengthen his own position. He could not afford to let this charge stand and felt obliged to follow normal investigative procedures in order to nullify the accusation.
We discussed the practical problem of getting Gen Phat and Col Ton to Saigon. They are presently holed up in My Tho, the headquarters of Ton’s Seventh Division. They have thus far declined to come to Saigon on the grounds that their lives would be in jeopardy. After some discussion, it was agreed that we would offer these two officers and the Chief of Staff of the Seventh Division a ride to Saigon in a U.S. helicopter accompanied by a U.S. advisor. Khanh would telephone assurance that the officers were in no personal danger but that their [Page 775] conduct would be investigated in due course. At the time of writing this cable, it is not yet clear whether these officers have agreed to come to Saigon on these terms.
I mentioned that recent events had had an adverse effect upon the execution of pacification Operation Hop Tac. Things were bogging down and required the personal attention of both of us. We agreed to hold a joint NSC/U.S. Mission Council meeting at 9:30 am Friday with Hop Tac the principal subject on the agenda.
Khanh mentioned that he intended to stay in Saigon for the next day or two and I took the opportunity to stress once more the need for his spending much more time in the capital than during recent weeks, as he moves about every night to avoid sleeping in the same place. We agreed that Gen Vien, the new Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, would be the point where we can ascertain Khanh’s whereabouts any time. Recently we have had serious difficulty in getting to him on short notice. Khanh was in the dumps today, deeply unhappy over the abortive coup which had disappointed him in the character of some of his close military associates. He complained of his isolation and of the many enemies around him. He took off in particular against Deputy Prime Minister Oanh (Jack Owen) because of his double dealings and libelous press statements. I defended Owen half-heartedly pointing out his value as an economist and technician. Khanh talks of changing all the disloyal ministers, but I get no impression he has specific replacements available. As we broke up, he said that his only consolation was that only 41 days more remained in his present tenure of office. I tried to cheer him up but this was one of his black days.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 VIET S. Top Secret, Immediate; Exdis. Also sent to CIA, Department of Defense, and the White House and repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8)↩
- On September 17, Taylor invited several Vietnamese ministers including Quat, Oanh, and Mau to the residence where he conveyed the points in telegram 654 (Document 349). The session lasted for 1 hour and 45 minutes, and Taylor concluded “disunity and lack of common sense of unity and of purpose” were all too evident among the ministers. (Telegram 887 from Saigon, September 18; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)↩