360. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State 1

943. CINCPAC for POLAD. Previous Emb assessments have recorded Khanh’s preoccupation for some time with problem of consolidating his control over govt and military. Coup attempt of Sept 13 reflects deep dissatisfaction among certain elements of army with Khanh’s performance and trend of events since mid-August. Massive Buddhist-student reactions to promulgation of Vung Tau Charter and Khanh’s elevation to Presidency, and specific Buddhist-student objective of cleansing GVN of “Catholic-Can Lao-Dai Viet conspiracy” in military ranks must have persuaded Khanh that no action on his part which was opposed by Buddhists could succeed, and that as long as military elements to which Buddhists objected were in power, he would be caught in vice between these two forces. He therefore apparently made conscious decision to throw his lot in with Buddhists, thereby taking calculated risk that opposing forces would not be [Page 790] strong enough to do him in. He also probably felt that if he failed to ally himself with Buddhist elements. latter would consider him part of anti-Buddhist conspiracy.

Course of events since mid-August had convinced those elements in military, including those officers with Dai Viet and Catholic ties (who opposed and distrusted Khanh’s actions) that only drastic action could install regime to their liking. Following Khanh’s announcement on Sept 4 that Generals holding governmental positions would be removed and resumed to solely military functions, rumors and reports of coup plotting mounted. There seems to be little doubt that key Dai Viet officers (General Thieu and Colonel Ton) were in fact engaged in such plotting, as was separate group of younger officers under Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao’s guiding hand. When nothing materialized after some two weeks of rumors and reports, it was generally assumed that danger of coup had passed.

When coup attempt came on Sept 13, it failed because of inadequate prior planning and coordination, of lack of support from within military and from populace, and because of clear and unequivocal US support for Khanh govt. General Duong Van Duc, IV Corps commander and prime mover of coup attempt, had obtained support of Dai Viet Colonel Ton, commander of 7th Division, but little other support. General Lam Van Phat, MinInterior, who had been relieved from his governmental position two days before, reportedly got on bandwagon through Colonel Ton’s good offices but had little prior contact with Duc.

Duc/Phat team was uncoordinated and, despite exaggerated claims, never obtained support necessary to bring coup to successful conclusion. In fact there is considerable evidence to indicate that Duc (coup’s father) never really intended to overthrow Khanh but merely to put pressure on him in order to redress balance overweighted in Buddhists’ favor. Phat, however, went too far by announcing over radio that Khanh was traitor and was to be arrested. Other Generals—Khiem, Thieu, and others who were perhaps unhappy enough with Khanh to associate themselves with Duc’s efforts, may have hesitated to get involved with Phat’s objective of overthrowing Khanh and run likely risk of inciting Buddhists to violence. Furthermore, these Generals undoubtedly knew plan was ill prepared, and they probably had little faith in ability of unstable Duc and mercurial Phat to succeed. In any case, they could sit on fence and jump either way before it was too late.

Another group of Generals emerged to position of prominence during the coup attempt and thereafter-the younger Generals, all of whom had been promoted since November 1 and who only served to gain if coup failed. Kingpin in this group was VNAF commander Nguyen Cao Ky, who was probably loyal to Khanh throughout and [Page 791] opposed to further coupe, but who could not have afforded to stick with Khanh if coup looked like it would succeed. Other key figure in this group was 1st Division Commander Nguyen Chanh Thi, who was already so closely identified with Buddhist cause in Hue and with allied People’s Revolutionary Council that he could not afford to see coup succeed. “Young Turks” realized that Duc and Phat were not succeeding and could not obtain necessary support if they remained united, so they remained loyal to Khanh, but at same time indicated their willingness to negotiate with Duc (not extremist Phat). When curtain rang down on Sept 14, Young Turks were thus in position of having saved Khanh from downfall but at same time of being able press demands on Khanh which he could not refuse. Most urgent of these demands was removal or neutralization of “old-line” Generals and their supporters. Perhaps more important for future, events of Sept 13–14 appeared to have fairly well eliminated Dalat Generals from army and therefore as divisive factor, and to have measurably reduced influence of those Generals who have been Buddhist target.

It worth recording that many Vietnamese are giving currency to theory that coup attempt was phony, that Khanh planned and inspired it as means for discrediting and neutralizing old-line Generals and to undermine the charge that he was captive of Buddhists. Fact that there was no bloodshed, and that Duc appeared with Ky in press conf on Sept 14 appear to add substance to this theory, but there is still no conclusive proof of it and there are several factors which tend to disprove it.

Failure of recent coup attempt created situation in which Buddhist leadership, “Young Turks” in military, and central Vietnam political movement coalesced for moment on objective of supporting Khanh against old-line Generals. Durability of any Vietnamese political alliance is congenitally tenuous, and there is no reason to believe current alliance will be anything but transitory phenomenon. In fact, of “Young Turks” only General Thi seems to be solidly in Buddhist-PRC camp, and Thi’s opportunism casts doubt even on this constant over longer term.

Most immediate implication of these developments for GVN and for US is fact that present triumph of Buddhists, Young Turks and PRC has only intensified deep bitterness and resentment within Catholic circles and among remaining old-line military officers to point where they could be easily triggered into backlash of violence against those they blame for current state of affairs-Buddhists and their allies, General Khanh himself, or us. These emotions, incidentally, are spreading even to some Buddhists-primarily to educated, professional classes who suspect motives of Buddhist leadership. This situation is compounded by Buddhist readiness to demonstrate their ability to call their faithful into streets should occasion demand. Final component [Page 792] which could bring situation to flash point on any pretext is demonstrated reticence of General Khanh to enforce law and order. Thus all elements are present for major disorders which could degenerate into anarchy and chaos if not controlled.

Longer-term, but very real, implication for us is motivation of Buddhist and PRC leadership which now, with help of Young Turks on Sept 13–14, have ascendant political position. At very least, war against VC is for them secondary issue at present. Although PRC leadership repeatedly has publicly professed its devotion to “anti-Communist, anti-neutralist, anti-colonialist” struggle and their recognition of need for US help, Buddhist leadership has only been willing make similar profession in private to US officials, consistently arguing that it cannot take such position publicly. Actions both groups have strong xenophobic quality which shows some signs already of anti-Americanism. Also, political and social turbulence of last month has undoubtedly been exploited by VC, although to undetermined degree.

Big question for us is whether Buddhist and PRC leadership is actually guided, inspired, or infiltrated by Communist elements, or whether it is purely nationalist drive for govt more responsive to will of people. In addition those desperate elements described above, growing number of Vietnamese who approved of and supported Buddhist struggle against Diem regime year ago as legitimate opposition to dictatorial regime are beginning to express concern that Buddhist leadership, students, and PRC are infiltrated or at least being unwillingly manipulated by VC agitators. We have no hard evidence to support accusations that there are Communist members among Buddhists, students or PRC leaders. However, all returns are not in, and such possibility cannot be dismissed out of hand.

Taylor
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–9 VIET S. Secret: Limdis. Repeated to Hue and CINCPAC.