Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

359. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State ¹

Saigon , September 24, 1964—11 a.m.

938. CINCPAC for POLAD. For the Secretary. Re Deptel 707² As background to the following answers to your questions it must be noted that effectiveness of present GVN is continuing downward trend. Ministers and their subordinates are very conscious of the “lame duck” character of GVN, and other elements such as labor and Montagnards, who hitherto had been quiet, have been encouraged by success of Buddhists and students to push their demands. Having established a pattern of weakness and willingness to make temporizing concessions, Khanh has had little choice but to give in. Although both labor and Montagnards have had legitimate complaints which should have been met, by doing so now Khanh contributes further to atmosphere of weakness that increasingly surrounds him.

Following are answers to your specific questions:

1) Insofar as power is being exercised in Saigon, it is being exercised by Khanh in his combined role of Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief Armed Forces. All decisions are made by him (or they are not made) and no one else in government has emerged as a strong figure. If anyone were to seek to do so they could be certain of exciting Khanh’s already overwrought suspicions. Quat in FonOff remains relatively bright spot within his limited sphere of activity and is playing a generally constructive role. Vien, new Minister of Interior, shows some promise. He has been assigned general responsibility for the non-military aspects of pacification matters but has not yet had time to demonstrate ability to perform. Khanh still leaves technical financial matters in hands of Oanh and USOM work on budget planning and financial matters goes forward quite well. In summary, over next several weeks Khanh is still man with whom we have to deal, although with MinDef and CINC burdens now added, he is even more overwhelmed by the burdens of the job and able to apply even less attention to individual problems.

2) Although as noted above, Oanh is still continuing to function, he badly tarnished his image with Khanh by the alacrity with which he responded to Duc’s call for a meeting of the cabinet on September 13. However, there are no signs of his immediate dismissal and it is likely he will stay on during this interregnum. We should be clear that there are no signs he can play any major political role now or in the future.

Although now apparently “cleared” by Khanh of any complicity in the September 13 coup attempt, Khiem has no present role in the government beyond the nominal one as a member of the triumvirate and relations between him and Khanh are strained. It is impossible now to foresee what his role may be in a post November 1 government, but as long as he is in the country he will be an important and influential but inscrutable figure.

3) Effects thus far are minimal.

4) As noted above, labor had some justified complaints. Although a general strike was an extreme reaction and another example of national indiscipline in a time of crisis, its effect may be beneficial in preventing employers from taking excessive advantage of present situation and in some degree reestablishing Buu’s leadership which had been slipping.³ We do not at this time foresee labor putting forth major additional or extreme demands. Having made their point by the general strike they should for the time being be in a position to obtain reasonable settlements of reasonable grievances.

5) I do not foresee further serious difficulty with Buddhists, etc. during this interregnum while National Council is at work on new government provided Tri Quang and other leaders of pressure groups feel satisfied with trend of Council’s work. In period after November 1 everything will depend on whether present constituent [constitutional] machinery will be able to produce something in way of a government around which there can be a reasonable degree of national consensus. On balance renewed difficulty with some of the groups mentioned at some point seems likely. Khanh’s position has in a negative way been strengthened by fact that even though he has shown increasing weakness and inability to deal effectively with problems of the country, no one else has thus far emerged around whom there is any greater consensus. However, he has steadily lost stature as a political figure and personal zest in doing his job. He has survived only be making virtually unending concessions to every pressure group that has presented itself. There is general recognition that such a process cannot continue indefinitely and still have anything left deserving the name of a government. We are now close to that stage. As part of this problem, we must reckon with the distinct possibility of a renewed lunge against Khanh from the military before the formation of the provisional government, should they judge that Khanh is proving too compliant regarding Tri Quang and the neutralist objectives many in the military feel Tri Quang represents. After the formation of the provisional government, there is no present assurance that Khanh will remain head of government. Either he may not be chosen for the position at the end of the procedure for setting up the provisional government or, offered the position, he may decline.

6) Recent developments have demonstrated a faster rate of deterioration of governmental process than I would have predicted. Also I had not anticipated the reemergence of the Montagnard problem at this time. In combination, these recent events cast considerable doubt on the ability of the caretaker government to carry through its program as planned for establishing a provisional government. However, our only hope for an orderly transition to effective government lies in hewing to this course of action and we are putting the full mission effort behind it

Taylor

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 13 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC. A copy of this telegram was sent to the President under cover of a memorandum from McGeorge Bundy, September 24. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Aides File, McGeorge Bundy, Memos to the President)
2. Telegram 707, September 21, asked for Taylor’s analysis of the structure of the Vietnamese Government and posed six specific questions on the situation in Saigon. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 US–VIET S)
3. On September 21, the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor (CTV) called a 48-hour general strike.