358. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1

937. CINCPAC for POLAD. Supplementing reports of current Rhade uprising in Darlac Province transmitted military channels,2 following is presentation of political aspects and background.

There has been longstanding friction between Montagnards and Vietnamese, springing largely from Montagnard resentment that Vietnamese have treated them as inferiors. During French era, French protected and isolated Montagnard highland areas from Vietnamese. However, with French withdrawal, Diem regime opened up highland areas to Vietnamese settlement through northern refugee centers and land development centers to relieve population pressures in central lowlands. These measures intensified Montagnard-Vietnamese friction as two peoples came into close contact. Montagnards saw Vietnamese taking over their lands, and local Vietnamese officialdom tended to ride roughshod over “inferior peoples”. In 1957–58 Montagnard autonomy movement developed, culminating in Montagnard revolt and jailing of rebel leaders in 1958.

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With advent of special US military assist4nce to GVN in late 1961–62, GVN agreed to [less than 1 1ine of source text not declassified] US Special Forces programs to mobilize Montagnard manpower into CIDG units, and USSF teams were placed in CIDG strike force camps, thereby injecting noticeable US presence into highland areas. Despite Diem regime’s accord with this program, Diem and Nhu were suspicious of US activities with Montagnards, fearing that US presence and aid programs would serve even further to alienate Montagnards from Vietnamese. In this connection, US advisers with Montagnard forces were and are under strict policy guidance to do everything possible to foster improved Montagnard-Vietnamese relations and to prevent transfer of Montagnard allegiance to US.

Following Khanh’s takeover last January 30, Montagnard rebel leaders in jail were released and Montagnards were appointed to positions of authority in provincial administrations in several cases. Countering this increased Montagnard participation in local government, there has been greater Vietnamese command and control in CIDG camps. Nevertheless, certain Montagnard leaders continued to promote idea of greater autonomy for their people. Within context of political turmoil and civil disorders over past two months, resulting in serious weakening of Khanh’s authority and in his capitulation to Buddhist demands, Rhade leaders probably felt moment was ripe to make own bid for greater autonomy. In effect, purpose of current Montagnard revolt is to achieve: (1) improved GVN attitude toward Montagnards; (2) appointment of Montagnard leaders to responsible positions in GVN both at local and national levels; (3) enlarged socioeconomic programs for Montagnards; and (4) substantial if not complete autonomy. GVN authorities in II Corps held two meetings with Montagnard representatives, in May and August, to discuss Montagnard aims. Montagnards, however, apparently not satisfied with GVN efforts on their behalf following these meetings and Rhade moved to direct action.

Degree of VC or other external instigation or exploitation of Montagnard rebellion difficult to assess at this time. There is circumstantial evidence (e.g., references to “imperialist Americans” in rebel tracts) suggesting VC inspiration and exploitation of rebellion.

Taylor
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Hue and CINCPAC.
  2. Late in the evening of September 19 and early morning of September 20, Montagnards seized control of four CIDG camps in Darlac Province killing several Vietnamese soldiers and taking both U.S. and Vietnamese Special Forces troops hostage. Following extended negotiations in which the United States indicated that it would not support the Montagnards, the four camps and the hostages were freed on September 27 and 28. Most of the reporting on the uprising was done over MACV channels beginning on September 20. These cables are in the Washington National Records Center, HQDA Message Center. Reel 11925.