Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

125. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State ¹

Saigon , April 24, 1964—3 p.m.

2045. Called on General Khanh at 9 am Friday.

1. I expressed concern about his health, having seen a story in the papers and also having reports from other quarters that he had been ill. He made a very full disclosure, treating me like a friend and uncle. He had been having indigestion, difficulty in sleeping. I gave him the best advice I could and told him that he had to learn to live with his responsibility and not think he could be in a perpetual state of crisis all the time. I urged him to eliminate all unnecessary activity, including superfluous American visitors, if any.

2. I said that as regards the VC victory in Long An on April 8,² it was evident to me that the VC had penetrated the GVN forces, and I suggested using a polygraph to find out who the traitors were. I also said it was apparent that in Long An there was a failure of leadership. He did not disagree and said that to remedy this would involve changing the province chief once again, and there had been too many changes already. He thought well of the province chief, but also said that he was not in good health, that there was something “in his insides which didn’t work”. In other words, he admitted that the man was not doing his job.

3. I then said that I felt he could get a great deal more value out of General Minh than he was getting, by having Minh get out on the stump, shake hands and show himself around the country. Khanh agreed and said that if Minh did not do this, it was because Minh did not want to. I said that Minh had told me that he, Minh, feared that Khanh did not want him to be conspicuous. Khanh said this was not true. I said: Can I say to General Minh that you would like to have him go around, and he said: Yes, and I will tell him so myself.

4. I then brought up the case of Ngo Dinh Can and said that I hoped he would be given executive clemency and that he not be executed, and that he be allowed to wither away and die in peace.³ Khanh agreed but said that this was one case in which Minh had a very great deal of real power. If he did nothing, Can would under the law die in five days, although there was a possibility of extending this because of Can’s involvement in other litigation. Nonetheless, it was up to Minh to act affirmatively to give Can clemency. He hoped I would speak to Minh about this, which I agreed to do.

5. Khanh was mobilizing all of the different religious groups in Viet-Nam, the Hoa Haos, the Cao Dais, etc., and the Buddhist leaders, in favor of clemency. It was going well with everyone except Tri Quang, who wants vengeance. He hoped I would see Tri Quang in view of the great favor which the US Embassy had done him, and tell him it was not good for Buddhism and not good for Viet-Nam for Can to be executed. I agreed to do this.

6. I then said that I thought Minh would be in much better humor if the cases of Generals Don and Kim could be disposed of. Khanh said I was misinformed, that the only person in whom Minh had a strong friendly interest was Tho. Actually, General Don disliked General Minh intensely. Khanh knew this to be the case as he saw Don frequently.

7. He said the case of the four Generals would be dealt with before the end of April. He was going to convene a “court of honor” and oblige all of them to justify themselves. The “court” would be composed of the commanders of troops and other officers and would number about ten. The four imprisoned Generals would be called upon to admit their misdeeds and volunteer to make amends. They would then be freed and given work to do either at home or abroad.

8. This would inevitably mean that General Don would have to explain why he signed a travel order for a man named Huan, a member of the Council of Notables, to travel to France to contact a large number of French persons interested in “neutralism”. General Don would have to state that General Minh had ordered him to do this, and this would inevitably bring Minh himself before the court. Minh would have to justify the money that he obtained with which to buy “villas” in France and would have to account for his action in sending Huan to France. It would inevitably come out that Minh was a long time friend of Tran Van Huu, the Vietnamese leader who lives in France, is General De Gaulle’s trump card, and who talks with the Viet Cong, etc. Khanh said he very much feared this would be the end of General Minh.

9. I was flabbergasted by this revelation and said that it was, first of all, important for Minh to act on Can’s clemency first, and then when the “court of honor” convened, to dispose of Don, Kim, Xuan and Dinh first. It was also vital that at no time would it appear that Khanh was taking any initiative against Minh at all. Khanh agreed and said that this would not come from any initiative of his, that he, Khanh, had gone out of his way to be nice to Minh and to bring him into the government, but that this would inevitably flow from the statements which the other Generals would make.

Comment: A. I will, of course, see Minh ⁴ and Tri Quang ⁵ as soon as possible in the interest of Can.

B. Obviously, the case of the four Generals has been hanging over us ever since Khanh came to power, and once their cases are disposed of, I hope that Khanh can devote himself to the pacification effort. It is at first blush very regrettable indeed that the proceedings involving the Generals should tear down “Big” Minh. We will have to follow the facts closely.

C. Khanh said there was much evidence that Kim was “up to his neck” in intrigues with the French.

D. Perhaps we are on the edge of getting some solid information about the French operations against the RVN of which so much has been said. Secretary’s statement to Khanh about this eventuality comes to mind.⁶ The sending of Huan looks as though it might be the clincher.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Exdis.
2. On April 8, the Viet Cong launched a company-sized attack on a training center in Long An Province. Apparently aided by agents from within the garrison, the Viet Cong killed 28 government defenders, wounded 36, and captured 112 weapons and 5 radios. (“The situation in South Vietnam,” Weekly Report, April 15; Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Vol. VII)
3. See footnote 4, Document 123.
4. See Document 126.

5. On April 25, Lodge made a special trip to Hue to talk to Tri Quang about clemency for Can. Lodge noted that Can might become a symbol of persecution of Christians in Vietnam. Lodge thought that an appeal by the Buddhist clergy for compassion in Can’s case would have a beneficial “world-wide impression.” Lodge’s report of their meeting in telegram 2055 from Saigon, April 25, reads in part as follows:

   “[Tri Quang stated] that I should realize that the Khanh government was unpopular, particularly with Buddhists. If Can were not executed it would be accepted as evidence that the old Diem crowd including particularly Catholic leaders and clergy, with all its money and weapons, were still in control. This would injure the struggle i.against the Communists which was still not going well because the people did not believe in the government’s sincerity for freedom. Clemency for Can would weaken the faith in the United States, because many would think clemency was due to US influence. If it were known that I had come to see him to intercede for Can, my popularity in Vietnam would be seriously injured.”

   “He agreed to think over what I said and stressed that he was not asking for Can’s death. (But he did not warm up to the idea of life imprisonment as an alternative. Evidently in this country you either get it or you don’t.)” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S)

6. See Document 119.