Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

119. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, April 29, 1964—6 p.m.

Secto 71. Department repeat parts to other posts as needed. From Secretary for Acting Secretary. Following were highlights my talk with Khanh, supplemented as necessary by my earlier shorter talk with Quat.

1. I stressed our complete commitment to GVN and that this based on national interest. Khanh responded that struggle vital both for area and principle and that he annoyed when “some” did not understand. (I took up this cue in dinner toast, pointing out two Senators disagreed, but 98 supported US policy and both parties did.) Khanh went on to say that this new kind of war in which aggression could not be neatly proved but in which special laws applied and should not hang on exact words. Really total Communist war, with Mao following Stalin policy of biting off small nations. First Central Europe, now Southeast Asia, later Africa.

2. I strongly urged importance decentralizing authority and giving local officials initiative, asking whether he satisfied with present province chiefs. Khanh responded no magic formula and could not change old habits of society and especially officials quickly, but that he moving to bring all groups in, to provide firm and determined leadership, and to give officials responsibility. He said much talk of dictatorship, but this not at all his way and that he doing all possible to get lower levels to act on own.

3. Khanh encouraged by Manila result. I responded Quat had been most helpful to GVN cause and that this showed importance GVN getting out and selling own case, including naming key Ambassadors who might be men who for political reasons could not be used at home. (I did not refer directly to Kim and Don, but he clearly got point.) Khanh said he recognized this weak point, hard to find people, but that he would “handle this month” (meaning Kim and Don, for what this may be worth in light previous statements similar nature).

4. GVN-French relations. I said French attitude 80 percent motivated by De Gaulle’s wish to be independent of U.S., that French had no more real power or interest in Asia and that it best to ignore them. If French individuals misbehaved, then get rid of them. Cooperation of French community in VN important, and since it seemed to support GVN effort should be made to make this clear. Khanh concurred that French here anti-De Gaulle, but went on to say that he deeply concerned that document obtained by secret means from French Embassy had shown French had specific plans to supersede us in information area. I said such document hard to interpret and that French might think badly of some U.S. information efforts in their former African areas on same lines. Khanh said he would look further into this. Note: In earlier Quat talk he had reviewed his Manila talks with Couve along lines reported separately. Quat had concluded that situation not grave and that now up to French to take initiative if they wanted to discuss restoration of Ambassadors and commercial problems. He said he recommending to Khanh they play it cool, and my deduction from tone of Khanh talk is that he agrees unless specific stronger evidence turns up of French activity against GVN. Khanh did say he on watch for such evidence and that lines ran into other countries. I did not draw him out or offer our intelligence help but obviously we should watch very closely in such places as Paris and Phnom Penh as well as here.

5. Cambodia. Khanh said France dictates Sihanouk attitudes, not necessarily through Ambassador but through French advisors. Sihanouk believes Commies will win and hence threatens to negotiate with Hanoi. He said he particularly concerned latest Sihanouk talk of dealing with both Hanoi and with National Liberation Front which of course just name for Viet Cong. If Sihanouk did this, “I will no longer be obliged to respect the frontier”. He went on to cite latest Cambodian border incidents, saying that supporting fire had come from Cambodian side of border. He thought Sihanouk might be stirring up such incidents and then planning to use them to justify dealing with NLF as party really controlling border, and repeated that if he did so he, Khanh, would be compelled to counter-attack into Cambodia. He considered the situation grave.

6. I responded that Couve had assured me that the French would press Sihanouk to work out his problems by bilateral dealings with both Thailand and South Vietnam, and that we ourselves would support such efforts strongly. I urged he hold off till after Sihanouk’s visit to France. Khanh did not seem wholly persuaded and said that they had just sent a forthcoming note to Sihanouk, but that the latter had responded badly (presumably meaning the threat about the NLF). Note: I conclude we will have to watch this one very closely and consider whether there are ways to get Sihanouk to withdraw at least his NLF threat.

7. SEATO action. Khanh said the Manila communiqué² seemed to indicate the SEATO countries were ready to move to action and asked whether the GVN should make a formal appeal to SEATO. I said that SEATO still had the rule of unanimity on military actions although the nations in fact acted under the principle of the Rusk-Thanat communiqué³ that their obligations continued even though SEATO as such did not note the action. (He at once grasped this point and showed, as throughout, great acuteness.) Thus, I said the thing was to find out what more individual nations were prepared to do, not as SEATO but under their SEATO obligations. We fully supported getting more help from such nations both for its military help and its political significance in showing GVN had many supporters. I referred specifically to the past Philippine offer of Rangers which I understood had been turned down by Diem, and urged that it be revived. I also mentioned Thanat’s suggestion about training Thai Rangers for use in Laos. Khanh asked if the use of military forces from other nations would raise international complications, and I said I thought not. (In retrospect, it occurs to me he may have had ChiNats in mind here, but I doubt if ChiNat armed forces apart from specialists are now a live issue here in light Gimo’s comments in Taipei⁴ and also fact General Khiem told me specifically at dinner last night that he had approached Gimo about possibility ChiNat military units and been fumed down flat)

8. Laos. Khanh said the Lao asking him to help in South Laos. He said that the southern corner of Laos was of special concern to them, showing on the map how the trails run from south Laos down into Cambodia and east to Ban Me Thnot. He had guerrilla forces who could move into this area to work with the FAR, and of course the Viet Cong pipeline ran through this area. (He seemed to focus much more on this area than on the Tchepone area.)

9. I responded that the GVN should focus on its own interests not on the struggle between the various groups in Laos. The important thing was to get intelligence on what the Viet Cong were doing. I then said that since the three factions were meeting and also we ourselves were pressing the Soviets for help, they should wait a few days and Ambassador Lodge should then talk further with the GVN. Khanh said that Moscow was far and Peking near, and he doubted if the Soviets could do much.

10. Action against North Vietnam. Khanh raised this topic. I will report fully on my return.⁵

11. Relations with GRC and ROK. Khanh asked what we thought of the idea of their forming a common front with these two, which would not be a military alliance but a “common moral front” to show solidarity. I said we would favor regular consultations to show sympathy, and also forms of aid short of combat forces, but that we did not encourage an alliance and believed particularly that the issue of Southeast Asia should not get mixed with the enormous issue of the basic Chinese conflict.

12. Overall. Conversation friendly throughout. He was carefully prepared, knew what he wanted to get across, and responded quickly to my points. A most impressive man.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 US–VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Passed to the White House on receipt in the Department of State at 5:48 a.m.
2. See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964, pp. 835–839.
3. For text of the joint statement issued at Washington by Rusk and Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman on March 6, 1962, see ibid., 1962, pp. 1091–1093.
4. In a discussion in Taipei, President Chiang Kai-shek told Rusk that the best way for the Republic of China to aid South Vietnam was by airdropping 5,000 to 10,000 Chinese Nationalist guerrillas into China’s southwestern province to encourage and promote an anti-Communist revolution and disrupt Chinese Communist supply lines to their allies in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma. Chiang wanted the United States to provide the planes for the airdrop. (Memorandum of conversation between Rusk and Chiang Kai-shek, April 16; Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330)
5. See Document 118.