126. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1

2046. 1. At 10:45 am I called on Minh, pursuant to Khanh’s request, and told him how serious it would be if Ngo Dinh Can became a martyr and gave the GVN the reputation throughout the Christian world to be anti-Christian. This was not a remote contingency. I reminded him of the uproar in the United States last year when it appeared that the GVN was anti-Buddhist. If there could be a reaction like this in a country where there were no Buddhists, he could imagine what the reaction would be in a country which was predominantly Christian. A situation would arise in which it was politically [Page 266] well nigh impossible for the US Govt to support the GVN if it wanted to. I therefore requested him in clear-cut language to give executive clemency to Ngo Dinh Can.

2. After a long silence, he said in a very emotional tone as though on the verge of tears: “The Ngo Dinh family has paid enough. The coup of November 1 was not made for hatred of anybody, but for the good of the country. I still very much regret the death of Diem. It was Nhu who was bad. Can is a pathetic specimen, insufficiently educated. It was the regime which made him bad. He would not have acted as he did if he had not been the President’s brother.”

3. “Khanh should not have formed revolutionary tribunal. By its very terms, it was inevitable that it should sentence Can to death. When I was running things, I temporized and tried to give time for the people to calm down. Now the people are super-excited. I am in an extremely difficult position. I must answer yes or no in writing. Khanh sets a five-day limit on me.”

4. I interrupted to say that I understood this was the law, which Khanh had told me was the case, to which Minh replied: “Yes, but Khanh makes the law. Why does he set a five-day limit? He always tries to put me in a difficult position. I must find a solution for Can. I will be hated and denounced from one end of the country to the other if I give him clemency.”

5. I then suggested that Minh take the position that Can’s presence was essential for possible testimony and evidence in further litigation.

6. Minh said: “That’s it, I will reprieve him on the ground that he is going to be needed in other litigation in the future.” He distinguished between this procedure and clemency. He added: “I had a long talk with my family last night. We agreed that I should be prepared to sacrifice all my popularity, which is what I do if I give clemency to Can. I know I will be denounced.”

7. He then said: “I want to ask you a question about a money matter. Did Conein ever give General Don money for the November coup?”

8. I said: “Definitely not. Had he done such a thing, I would certainly have known it.”

9. Minh continued: “I am surrounded by traps. I may be accused of taking money to give clemency to Can. It is said already that Can’s friends are very rich, and that many are at large. It will be said that they are bribing me to prevent Can’s execution.”

10. “I am also very unhappy that General Khanh said that when I was in power, I had only prepared a three-page indictment which would only have given Can five days of punishment.”

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11. “What we need in this country is to have good feeling between Catholics and Buddhists. That is what I have always tried to get for national unity.”

12. I then said that I knew that General Khanh would be glad to have Minh go out on the stump and make tours in the country, and that Minh was in error in thinking that Khanh did not want him to do so.

13. Minh changed his ground. He said everything [sic] he had friends who were also friends of Generals Don and Kim, and they ask him “why have you done nothing for our mutual friends?” “They accuse me of disloyalty. It is so disagreeable that I do not want to make any trips in the country.”

Comment: A. From all this I get the impression that he will not allow Can to be executed. I am sure I have pushed him as far as I can today. I would bet that he would prevent Can from being executed. But he has not yet really signed on the dotted line in a way so that he cannot wiggle out of it.

B. Clearly Khanh is rigging matters so that Minh will bear all obligation for not executing Can.2

Lodge
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Exdis.
  2. Can was executed on May 9.