97. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State0
448. Policy. Embtels 446 and 447.1 When Sihanouk’s draft project is finally presented to interested powers, we can anticipate speedy favorable reaction from bloc countries. Our own response, which not likely in nature of things be favorable, should be prompt and as constructive as possible both in order avoid charges of foot-dragging and provide reasonable alternatives which will prevent crystallization of Cambodian positions around anticipated bloc acceptance. It therefore behooves us to study in advance various constructive alternatives or changes we might propose.
Since predominant theme public discussions of project has been centered on “Laos type” accord and since Sihanouk is publicly committed to this procedure, type of alternative most likely prove acceptable as basis for negotiation would be one based on Laos agreements suitably modified to meet special characteristics Cambodian situation and, eliminating clauses unacceptable to US, such as bar against MAAG and provision for multilateral consultation. (Department will recall that study of this type alternative was suggested Embtel 209.)2 If Department considers version of Laos accord filling these criteria can be drawn up and worth considering as alternative, would be helpful if such version could be drawn up and made subject consultation with French, British, Canadians, and Indians for appropriate use in commenting on draft project when it is presented to us before favorable Soviet bloc responses become publicly known.
In event Department considers undesirable attempt follow Laos format, we suggest effort to devise different type formula with view its possible use when and if it becomes apparent RKG proposal unacceptable to Western powers in its most important aspects. Such formula might call for reciprocal assurances by Cambodia, Thailand, and South Vietnam of respect for independence and territorial integrity of each other. It should be devised as means saving face for Sihanouk and should represent conciliatory approach for Thais and SVN. It would, of course, have to provide for some kind of border control mechanism which could function on both sides of border, as in case with present UNSYG representation [Page 221] here at invitation Thai and RKG Governments. Such mechanism would preferably be under UN direction if at all possible, as this only truly neutral body available, even despite past expressions of Sihanouk’s lack of confidence in UN ability take preventive action in advance of trouble. An alternative might be commission of representatives of governments, who would cast deciding vote in event differences of views. Formula and control body along these lines should be more palatable to Thais and GVN on grounds it would not be directed solely against them but would impartially cover border areas of three countries.
Third possibility we should contemplate in specific terms, either separately or in conjunction with one of preceding alternatives, is device for submitting border demarcation questions to international body or commission. Sihanouk might, of course, be reluctant accept border demarcation effort, but, if given satisfactory assurances by Thais and SVN re territorial integrity Cambodia, he might be willing accept risk of small loss of territory in exchange such assurances. Principal danger is that, in connection with border demarcation, as in whole matter his problems with his neighbors, he would seek to have US guarantee Thai and SVN assurances, which we presumably could not do.
Thais and Vietnamese might on their side consider complying with request for assurances as loss of face for them, but this objection could perhaps be overcome on grounds that assurances in question were reciprocal and that US had recently offered, with certain provisos, give such assurances in respect of Cuba. If Thais and SVN have no designs in Cambodian territory beyond those much [which?] could be met by impartial, neutral commission, foregoing would seem not unreasonable price for preventing Cambodian drift toward Communist camp.
In last few days, repeated delays in presentation of project have given rise to speculation project may not be presented until Sihanouk returns from trips to Indonesia and Singapore (November 26-December 9) or even that it may never be presented (Embtel 446). While Embassy regards both these possibilities as small (latter almost non-existent) in present extraordinary situation they should not be [garble] overlooked. Sublimation of problem by non-presentation of project, while it may be too much to hope for, would of course be ideal solution.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.00/11–2062. Confidential. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, London, Paris, New Delhi, CINCPACPOLAD, and Vientiane.↩
- Documents 95 and 96.↩
- Dated September 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 751H.00/9–462)↩