96. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State 0
447. Policy. Embtel 446.1 We have been proceeding on assumption that essential objective US seeks in Cambodia is denial this country to Communist control, either by takeover or through voluntary entry into [Page 218] Communist camp. At least as long as US is involved in SVN struggle against Communists, denial Cambodia to Communists must be overriding US consideration. It follows, therefore, that actions which work against such end should be avoided to maximum degree possible, keeping in mind, of course, that Cambodian situation cannot be looked at in vacuum but must be considered within overall framework US policies for SEA.
Greatest obstacle US faces in effort achieve its objective is relations between Cambodia and its neighbors, US allies Thailand and SVN. Needless for us to review or describe state these relations or underlying reasons. It is imperative, however, to attempt find ways reduce tensions and improve relations if, indeed, this can be done under present circumstances. We realize affront to Thais and SVN of RKG charges of aggressive designs and necessity avoiding placing US in position supporting such charges. Seems to us, however, we can work quietly behind scene to achieve our essential objective without associating US with RKG charges.
When we analyze what RKG is after, question immediately arises: How much is form and how much is actual substance? There are, of course, residual territorial claims on both sides, involving most importantly off-shore islands administered by RKG but claimed by SVN, and portions Cochin China populated by Khmer Krom2 and claimed by RKG (presumably as offset to SVN claim on islands, since Sihanouk himself has admitted publicly RKG could never hope obtain return Cochin China areas from more powerful neighbor). What RKG is seeking primarily is formal renunciation by Thailand and SVN of what it suspects, largely on historical grounds, to be ambitions of both countries to subjugate and divide Cambodia. Despite frictions and animosities, this suspicion obviously without real foundation and should be laid to rest through formal Thai and SVN assurances. Secondly, while RKG clearly has no expectation that acceptance of neutrality proposal would result in total cessation of land and air border violations, it does desire recognition by neighbors that such violations, whatever their causes, infringe on Cambodian sovereignty and cannot be casually passed off as unimportant and only incidental to broader problems preoccupying neighbors. Finally, effort of all three countries is directed toward same end—preservation of security against external threats.
In light foregoing, what appears to be really at issue is not substantive aspirations but form of relationship among three countries. Neutrality proposal represents Cambodian effort resolve this issue in manner [Page 219] consistent with it’s estimate of respects in which present relationships unsatisfactory.
Seems evident US cannot accept neutrality project provisions for “guarantees or equivalent”, RKG control over ICC operations, commitment re present borders Cambodia, ICC posers [sic] stipulated in protocol. Do not believe, however, US should put itself in position rejecting outright RKG draft as nothing could better serve purpose Communists or be better designed push Cambodia into Communist arms. Essential that US exert utmost effort concert its position with UK, France, Canada and India in order avoid being isolated in this situation. We have noted continual French reluctance to keep fully in step with US and, to lesser extent with UK, since beginning neutrality project, but it should be forcibly brought home to them that what is at stake is entire Western position here not just that of US, as they appear to consider to be case in SVN. Their position in Hanoi should give them food for thought. Hardly seems likely Burmese would be prepared give assurances Sihanouk seeks, but they unlikely take lead or associate themselves with West in parallel or concerted action.
Most likely bloc countries will accept Sihanouk’s proposals, tongue-in-cheek or with minor revisions, and we may face following situation at some stage: (1) Sihanouk may simply end his project with statement he has received satisfactory assurances from bloc but not from West and that he considers bloc assurances offer guarantees he seeks against threatened aggression. This possibility is foreshadowed in Penn Nouth’s statement to me in October (Embtel 343).3 (2) In view lack of agreement on proposal Sihanouk will repeat invitation for conference. (3) If conference invitation renewed and not accepted, he might resort to solution described in (1) above. In latter event Cambodian alignment with Communist camp and abandonment its neutrality policy would seem almost inevitable with all that means in terms adverse effect on US position SVN and Thailand, regardless whether RKG calls in ChiCom troops or not.
Conclude, therefore, that essential (1) concert with Western Allies and Indians, putting maximum pressure on French to exert their special influence here, on common approach in this situation, (2) avoid outright rejection RKG proposal and (3) consider possible alternative we might propose to Sihanouk. Some such alternatives will be put forward in separate telegram.4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.00/11–2062. Confidential. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, London, Paris, New Delhi, CINCPAC POLAD, and Vientiane.↩
- Document 95.↩
- The Khmer Krom were approximately 600,000 Cambodians living in South Vietnam. Their treatment by the Vietnamese was a constant source of friction in relations between Cambodia and South Vietnam.↩
- Dated October 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 751H.00/10–1362)↩
- Document 97.↩