441. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand0
1747, Eyes only Ambassador from Secretary. Reference your 17601 and satisfactory talk with Sarit. Purpose of troop movements is to reinforce position and morale of Thailand and to send message to Moscow that major breach of cease fire could be dangerous business. Our problem is to make certain that Phoumi does not read into such moves any idea that we are prepared to back him in final analysis if he remains [Page 932] obdurate. Very important therefore that you make Sarit understand with utmost clarity that military moves should not be understood by him or by Phoumi as commitment to Laos where our policy continues to support neutral and independent Laos under coalition government.
Since timing of actual moves and public announcement2 are related to diplomatic contacts with Moscow you will receive further instructions on both points. However, we will prefer general reference to SEATO rather than specific reference to Rusk–Thanat conversations since, latter would raise spectre of secret deals which as you know did not exist apart from what was said publicly at time. This bears also upon President’s position with Congress since SEATO was approved overwhelmingly by Senate.
Please do not call SEATO meeting pending further instructions.
We shall be interested in SEATO flavor of any moves made. SEATO capitals are being informed of situation. We believe it may become important to have other SEATO flags flying in Thailand and have in mind, for example, that elements of Air Cobra may need to be returned to Thailand. You should obtain Sarit’s full concurrence to idea so that we can approach other governments.
Sarit’s attitude toward further Thai deployments to north of considerable importance. He must understand that US and Thai forces must act together if need arises for defense of Thailand. Commitments President made to Thanat of course stand. But Thai forces are far more suitable both on military and political grounds for rooting guerrillas out of villages or for types of action which could cause local population to resent actions of white foreign forces. In absence of organized enemy action, best role for US forces is in support of Thai forces. Have no doubt Sarit will appreciate force of this argument but we shall need a joint plan for defense of Thailand in near future under which both would make maximum effort in accordance capabilities and proper roles.
Regarding Sarit’s concern over possibility Phoumi following policy of de facto partition, we remain convinced that security Thailand best served by political settlement which gets all foreign military elements out of Laos. Laotians left to themselves will be little or no threat to anyone. It is impossible to predict future events but we are not supporting idea of partition which would leave northern Thailand exposed to Viet Minh or Chicoms. However, events may force upon us choice between partition and all-communist Laos, a result we are trying to avoid.
[Page 933]You are receiving info copies traffic Vientiane which bear out Sarit’s estimate incompetence and demoralization Laotian government forces. Neither he nor we can base a policy on fighting capacity or will these forces or on Phoumi’s qualities of leadership. Basic problem Laos has always been there has been so little to support. This is crucial difference between Laos on one side and Viet Nam and Thailand on the other. Sarit should not judge our determination with respect to Thailand by course of action in landlocked Laos where so little evidence of aroused people determined to fight for their independence.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 792.5/5–1462. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Harriman and Forrestal. Repeated priority to Vientiane and to Moscow and CINCPACPOLAD.↩
- Document 440.↩
- The public announcement as made by President Kennedy on May 15 is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 1094. A statement issued by Thailand, also May 15, is ibid., p. 1093.↩