440. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State0
1760. CINCPACniact by other means. For State and Defense. Eyes Only. From Young and Harkins. Deptel 1742.1 We saw Sarit Sunday evening. DCM and Gen Johnson accompanied us. FonMin Thanat, DefMin Thanom and top Thai mil staff present. I outlined points in reftel and added question of press treatment if RTG approved.
Sarit asked me to convey appreciation to President for his interest in Thailand’s security and for this decision. Sarit agreed to all movements in para 2 reftel. He said question of exact locations could be worked out jointly tomorrow. He requested we deploy troops to field rather than locate them in cities or towns, and take particular care to develop good relations with local people to prevent unpleasant incident and create good will on both sides. He also requested maximum use air transport to avoid burdening rails or roads or interfere with civilians. We agreed in principle with his request. Sarit assured us of full cooperation in use of facilities within above understanding.
Gen Harkins suggested and Sarit agreed we send small forward elements immediately to Bangkok to plan facilities, etc. Harkins deputized CHJUSMAAG act for COMUSMACTHAI. Recommend advanced detachment arrive as soon as possible. Gen Harkins also said his HQRS staff would be small.
Sarit told us Nam Thai affair seriously jeopardizing Thailand’s security, adding burdens in caring for refugees and moving army units to frontier, and requiring additional actions to counter any ChiCominspired insurgency or subversion in Thailand. He and Air Marshal Dawee described FAR route, lack of will to fight, and demoralization Lao troops in crossing Mekong.
I asked about additional Thai deployments along frontier but Sarit said they had not yet decided on sending more than units now deployed: inf bn at Chieng Khong, inf co at Chieng Saen, RCT hdq Chiengrai, mtn pack inf co at Pua, inf co opposite Paksane, inf co at Nakorn Panom. Parent battalions are on alert to support companies, and entire 4th Division in north also on alert.
Thais agreed on importance adequate and timely public announcement by RTG regarding US deployments, with release by USG in Washington [Page 931] same time. Sarit suggested explanation be related to Rusk–Thanat communiqué.2
But third mission, i.e., to position US forces for faster reaction time for possible further actions subject to future decision, holds important implications for RTG which Sarit and Thanat immediately seized on. They pressed me for details on US views regarding this contingency in Laos. I ducked it by stressing first two missions and USG policy press on for successful political settlement. Sarit said he is very worried about future in Laos because he concludes from his inspection of FAR Saturday3 that Phoumi’s strategy is not to fight for cities and areas in north half Laos, including Luang Prabang and Vientiane, and move south if forced to. This would be serious blow to Thailand, Sarit emphasized. He hoped USG would prevent it, and seemed assume the US forces we are now agreed to deploy to Thailand for its defense will also contribute to this objective of his. I report this point because it obviously was important consideration underlying Sarit’s approval tonight.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 792.5/5–1462. Top Secret; Niact. Received on May 13 at 6 p.m. and relayed to the White House. Repeated priority to Moscow, Saigon, and Vientiane.↩
- Document 438.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 433.↩
- May 12.↩