Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

394. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara⁰

JGSM–971–63

Washington, December 10, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Reorganization of the Philippine Army (U)

1. Reference is made to JCSM–415–63, dated 29 May 1963, subject: “Future Philippine Force Levels and Mix and MAP Levels.”¹ In their review of the missions of the Philippine Armed Forces, wherein the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded their views on the Military Assistance Program (MAP), the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that the Philippine Army has been handicapped by organizational difficulties and that CINCPAC and the Military Assistance Advisory Group in the Philippines had the problem under study. The results of that study are now available.

2. While the authorized strength is to remain the same, the major features of the Philippine Army reorganization proposed in the study include the following:

a. An active duty Army strength of 14,560 with approximately 70 per cent of that number concentrated in two divisions and three brigades. It should be noted that the terms “division” and “brigade” cannot be equated to US units of the same designations.

b. The remaining 30 percent of active Army strength to provide for support units, including an engineer group, a signal battalion, two hospitals, ordnance and quartermaster companies, and miscellaneous administrative and support units.

c. Provision for five reserve battalions, without active duty personnel, to handle the annual reserve training load.

3. The reorganization gives promise of the following advantages over the existing organization:

a. Improved utilization of available personnel. With the present active strength of about 15,000 compared to an authorized strength of 27,000, the Philippine Army has produced only one effective battalion combat team (BCT). The reorganization represents an attempt to create an effective Army based realistically on an available strength of 14,560.

b. Improved combat capability. The reorganization would provide for eight BCTs instead of one, with an improved ratio of combat forces to support forces.

c. Improved organization of BCTs. With elimination of some organic transport and armament, the BCTs would be equipped with light equipment and would be foot mobile; they would be more closely tailored to the mission and combat environment visualized, and would have a capability for conventional or counterinsurgency operations.

d. Improved disposition of forces. The reorganization would allow more effective distribution of active Army strength throughout the Philippines rather than concentration in Luzon as now exists.

4. In reviewing the reorganization, CINCPAC has stated that it promises substantial improvement over the present organization, even though anticipated reduction in MAP funds will preclude MAP supply and support of 17 tanks and 26 armored personnel carriers proposed under the reorganization.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorse the view of CINCPAC. Annex J (Free World Forces) to the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan 1969,² which is now being staffed, will reflect the above changes. Additional details of the reorganization are attached as the Appendix to this memorandum.³

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A. H. Manhart⁴
Major General, USA
Deputy Director, Joint Staff

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 67 A 4565, Philippines 200.6 to 680.1, 1963. Secret.
1. Document 385.
2. Not found.
3. Attached but not printed.
4. Printed from a copy that indicates Manhart signed the original.