Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

385. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara⁰

JCSM–415–63

Washington, May 29, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Future Philippine Force Levels and Mix and MAP Levels (U)

1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), 1–21670/63, dated 11 March 1963, in which he requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff re-examine the missions now contemplated for the Philippine armed forces and submit recommendations as to the appropriate missions, force structure and types, and levels of MAP equipment that should be provided to the Philippines.¹

2. The most likely source of overt attack on the Philippines is from Communist China. Recent events in Indonesia have not altered this basic estimate of the threat. The present threat to the Philippines from Indonesia is from infiltration and subversion supported by exploitation of the territorial waters and air space of the Philippines, rather than from overt action.

3. A basic US military objective is to deter or deal effectively with communist attacks on the free community or areas important to its survival in conjunction with Allied and friendly forces. To attain this end, US military planning includes appropriate missions and forces for indigenous armed forces which can support the US forward strategy. Although the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Philippines provides a guarantee to the Philippines of US assistance in the event of overt attack from any source, the Philippine armed forces should be able to execute the following primary missions:

a. Maintain internal security and counter subversion, infiltration, and sabotage.

b. Defend against minor incursions into their territory, including air defense.

c. Assist in collective defense of the area, including a modest but effective contribution to SEATO.

Details of missions, force structure, and objectives are included in the Appendix to this memorandum.² Although the Philippine Air Force and Navy are small, they are reasonably effective forces which serve to augment US forces, and are capable of conducting small-scale independent operations. Development of the Philippine Army has been handicapped by organizational difficulties. This problem is currently under study by CINCPAC and the Military Assistance Advisory Group in the Philippines.

4. In consideration of the foregoing, the present dollar guidelines for MAP for the Philippines are still valid. Because of the importance of the Philippines to US objectives and strategy, future MAP dollar guidelines should remain near the currently programmed levels unless there is a major change in the situation. The major items and levels of equipment recommended for the Philippines are listed in the Appendix to this memorandum.

A detailed FY 64–69 Military Assistance Plan which will include these items will be submitted by CINCPAC in June 1963. If political necessity requires furnishing additional items requested by the Philippines, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that emphasis could be placed on furnishing heavy engineer construction equipment on a cost-sharing basis for support of President Macapagal’s socio-economic improvement program.

5. Since no need for major changes are indicated in the Philippine program, it does not appear necessary to send a planning team to the Philippines at this time. Improvements and changes that are required can be accomplished by CINCPAC and the Chief, Joint US Military Assistance Advisory Group, in cooperation with the Country Team and with Philippine officials, as appropriate.

6. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have re-examined the missions, force structure and types, and level of MAP equipment for the Philippines. In their judgment Annex J to JSOP–68,³ as amplified in the Appendix to this memorandum, reflects valid missions, force structure and force objectives; therefore, planned types and levels of MAP equipment to support the armed forces of the Philippines are considered appropriate.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

A.H. Manhart⁴
Major General, USA
Deputy Director, Joint Staff

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Philippines 200.0–680.1, 1963. Secret.
1. The memorandum was a result of Philippine Defense Secretary Peralta’s visit to the Pentagon on February 6. Peralta submitted an extensive request for military assistance including supplying equipment for five divisions. (Ibid.) Peralta discussed this question with Macapagal who sent a personal letter to President Kennedy requesting additional equipment, totaling approximately $100 million, and timely deliveries; see footnote 1, Document 379.
2. Attached but not printed.
3. Not found.
4. Printed from a copy that indicates Manhart signed the original.