314. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State0
590. CINCPAC for POLAD. Embtel 568; Deptel 319.1 I have just come from two hour session with Pres Sukarno and his Cabinet with [Page 684] result summarized reftel: Sukarno assured me situation was under control, promised issue public expression regret, said he “deplored” damage that had been done, assumed responsibility and would compensate victims in full. With aid Ministers Leimena, Saleh and Djuanda, he drafted statement while I was present, did not read it to me but assured me it would satisfy us. I asked him to be certain it did not “take away with one hand what it gave with the other”; he couldn’t pat his people on back for their intentions and expect his expression of regret to be taken seriously.
Sukarno, sitting with several of his Ministers, was in savage mood when I arrived at 7:00 am. There were no exchanges of courtesy. None of usual banter. Operating perhaps on theory best defense was offense, in response my question as whether situation was now under control, Sukarno entered into tirade on subject Tunku’s actions. “When did head of state ever grind his heel into state seal of another nation?” he demanded. He referred to his own photos having been torn down and stamped on. “My people are angry,” he wound up. “This is Asia, 1963. I too am boiling inside.”
We had a hot exchange for a few moments. I told him in effect two wrongs don’t make a right. Further, Brit in Djakarta could hardly be held responsible for what Tunku did in Kuala Lumpur. This kind of action and reaction made no sense among civilized human beings. He made a few remarks about Brit no longer ruling world but finally calmed down somewhat when I said I had come to see him in three capacities this morning: first, as Dean of Diplomatic Corps; second, as American Amb; third, as friend of him and his country.
I then proceeded to make all points in reftels, expanding on them as seemed useful. For example, I asked him how any members of Diplomatic Corps could feel safe if policed mob could get out of hand as mob did yesterday. He reminded me that no American property had been damaged. While acknowledging this, I took opportunity to protest painting of hostile signs on Chancery gates previously reported, said American people found this very difficult to understand when we were exerting all effort to help Indonesia. This, however, was not point. Every time govt disagreed with GOI, was its property to be damaged or destroyed?
Sukarno did not like this. He took refuge in repetition of statement his people were very angry, then quickly changed subject to President’s statement endorsing Malaysia. “Why did Pres Kennedy have to make statement so soon?” he asked. “He knows how we Indos feel.” We then had an unprofitable exchange in which I again reviewed our position on Malaysia issue, told Sukarno I had given Subandrio ample advance notice of President’s intention to issue statement. By this time, Sukarno was cooling down and by end of conversation he had recovered some of [Page 685] his usual bounce. Meanwhile, as we talked, conversation was being continually interrupted by new arrivals until all principal members of Cabinet were present except top military chiefs. Finally, Gen Umar, Djakarta Army Commander and Police Chief arrived, faces splashed with fatigue. They had been up all night. Sukarno asked them for report whereupon they certified situation was now completely under control.
Sukarno whose earlier response to my request for assurances had been, “I will do my utmost,” now apparently removed implied qualification as he turned to me and said, “You see, everything is under control now.” He then proceeded to prepare statement.
I then requested series of specific actions to facilitate evacuation, such as clearances for planes, passage through immigration of people whose documentation had been burned, guaranty my security for Brit planes evacuating personnel, both in air and on ground, etc. With entire Cabinet present, Sukarno was able to rip off instructions to official concerned on spot.
Gloomy atmosphere prevailed among Cabinet Mins throughout session, their smiles at Sukarno’s occasional sallies somewhat forced. It was obvious most of them (left-winger Sudibjo an exception) felt ashamed and disturbed at events previous day. As I left, Gen Sumarno, Gov of Djakarta, who also had been up all night, took my arm and asked me to present his deep regrets to Brit Amb for outrageous events.
Comment: I have attempted to give a little of flavor of meeting because it was good illustration of problem of dealing with Sukarno. Question remains unanswered as to Sukarno’s complicity in events. At one point during conversation, he told me he had given order to Army to stop the rioting yesterday afternoon. I replied, “Yes, Mr. President, but by time your order was issued much of the damage had been done. Why did you not issue order earlier?” Question was left hanging in midair. Also, even after order was issued, Umar was slow in response. Shell properties in suburb were burned during evening.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files; POL 25–3 INDON. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated immediate to Kuala Lumpur, London, Manila, Singapore, USUN, Canberra, and CINCPAC.↩
- On the afternoon of September 18, a mob of 5,000 burned and sacked the British Embassy in Djakarta. Indonesian police made no effort to prevent the violence and firefighters were unable to get through the crowds to put out the fire. (Telegram 563 from Djakarta; ibid.) In telegram 568 from Djakarta, September 18, Jones proposed that, as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, he should protest the hooliganism and demand assurances (“for what they are worth”) that nothing of this kind would be allowed to happen again. In telegram 319 to Djakarta, the Department concurred fully and suggested that Jones ask for a public apology, “unmodified by claptrap about aroused feelings of Indonesian populace.” The Department suggested that Jones, at his discretion, drive home the point that mobs under PKI direction were a blot on Indonesia’s reputation. (Both ibid.)↩