215. Memorandum From Robert H.
Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0
Washington, December 18,
1961.
SUBJECT
Attached is a paper I have prepared on West New Guinea. I have read and taken
account of the latest message from Sukarno.1 Though the last paragraph of that message could
be read as a veiled justification for authorization of an attack tomorrow, I
read it as part of his general effort to pressure us into action and of his
particular effort to get us to pressure the Dutch to suspend their program
for establishing a Papuan regime.
I propose that my paper be sent, along with State’s memo of yesterday,2 to
the President in preparation for a talk this week between the President and
Secretary Rusk. Although I think that the State paper is quite good and
represents an advance, it would be useful, I believe, if the President could
also read my paper which deals with some subjects that are difficult to
treat forthrightly in a coordinated State paper and which carries the
argument another step further forward—beyond the point which would be
accepted by EUR.
I believe very strongly that, if the President is to have a discussion with
the Secretary early this week, the discussion would be more fruitful if he
had a chance to read the papers in advance. They will provide him with the
basis for suggesting alternatives to the relatively conservative line the
Secretary is likely to favor.
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I have been unable to establish whether the Secretary read the State paper.
It was sent into the Secretary’s office to Harlan
Cleveland for clearance while the latter was talking with the
Secretary Sunday afternoon.3
It seems likely that they discussed it, but whether the Secretary read it,
only he and Cleveland seem to
know.
I would also hope that the discussion between the President and the Secretary
would take place before we dispatch any answer to Sukarno’s new letter.
Carl Kaysen has seen my paper in draft
and agrees that it would be desirable to send the paper to the
President.
Attachment4
Washington,
December 18,
1961.
SOME FUNDAMENTALS WITH RESPECT TO WEST NEW GUINEA
- 1.
-
The U.S. Interest. The U.S. has a
general interest in eliminating this irritant in international
relations involving two free world countries. But its more basic
interests are two: (a) to eliminate this issue from Indonesian
politics where it has diverted the country from constructive
tasks, has been used by Sukarno as a means of frustrating opposition to
himself, and has been exploited by the large local Communist
party and by the USSR; and (b)
to avoid a military clash which would probably place us in
direct opposition to Indonesia in the UN and which might drive Indonesia into the arms of
the Bloc both because of the Bloc’s military, economic and
diplomatic support and because such a clash would probably
strengthen Communist forces within Indonesia. The loss of
Indonesia could be as significant as the loss of mainland
Southeast Asia and would make defense of the latter considerably
more difficult.
We also have, of course, an interest in maintaining friendly
relations with the Australians and the Dutch. However, the
manner in which we handle the issue is not likely to have the
same critical impact upon these
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relations as it is upon the orientation of
Indonesia. Our relations with Australia and the Netherlands are
based upon a whole network of mutual interests; in the case of
Indonesia, West New Guinea is the overwhelmingly important
issue. The Dutch have themselves agreed to give up West New
Guinea. They can hardly accuse us of forcing them out. The
Australians, as the State paper points out, would accept a
negotiated solution achieved by the Indonesians and the
Dutch.
If the above analysis is correct, we must conclude that it is in
our interests that a solution be devised which will lead to
accession of West New Guinea to Indonesia. Only in this way can
the issue be eliminated from Indonesian politics and a military
clash avoided. As the State paper says somewhat more
cautiously—“basically, we recognize that for historical,
geographical and political reasons West New Guinea probably will
tend to closer, if not complete, association with Indonesia and
our role in seeking a settlement will be to facilitate this
evolution.”
- 2.
- The Validity of the Self-Determination Principle
for West New Guinea. Luns has employed our general endorsement of the
principle of self-determination as a means of pushing us into the
Dutch corner. But how valid is the principle when applied to this
territory? West New Guinea is one of the most backward areas of the
world. The Dutch have heretofore regarded the Papuans as “stone-age”
people who can be adjusted to modern political activity only by slow
stages. The population is largely illiterate; the educational system
has been severely limited and has consisted almost entirely of
mission schools. Few Papuans are in the administration and these are
almost entirely at the lower levels. The economy is almost wholly
undeveloped. Total exports run under $10 million per year and the
annual Dutch subsidy is almost $20 million. A significant part of
the population has no contact whatsoever with the Dutch
administration. It seems unlikely that the Papuans can decide the
future of the territory in any meaningful sense for years to come.
The problem will not sit still that long.
- 3.
-
The Current Situation. Whether justified
or not, it is clear that both the Dutch and the Indonesians feel
that the U.S. has swung over to the Dutch side as a result of
the fact that we voted with the Dutch and against the
Indonesians on the Indian and Brazzaville (largely U.S.-drafted)
resolutions in the UN.5 It is
evident from his recent talk with Secretary Rusk and from other
evidence that Dutch Foreign Minister Luns is feeling very self-satisfied.6 In the self-determination
principle he has found a policy
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concept that is more generally acceptable
than colonialism and that at the same time keeps the territory
out of Indonesian hands.
The present situation is one that is moving to a military
showdown. The moderates in Indonesia are increasingly hard put
to demonstrate that there is any other way out. The Indian
attack upon Goa may be a new stimulus to Indonesian military
action. While the Dutch have stated in the past that they had no
intention of fighting alone over West New Guinea, Luns’ recent discussion with
Secretary Rusk suggests that he may possibly hope for some
outside support.
- 4.
- The Value of Negotiations. Negotiations
will serve very little purpose if we approach them in the same
spirit that has motivated some of our recent diplomatic activity on
the subject; that is, if we view the diplomatic problem solely as a
problem of playing a mediatory role in which we seek middle ground
between the two disputants. Our role must be grounded in the
conclusion that the only solution that will be lasting and that will
serve U.S. interests will be one that gives Indonesia a clear
prospect of acquiring early control over the territory.
While a way will need to be found in the actual regulations to save Dutch
face, we need now to shock the Dutch into a realization that the U.S. is
not in their corner and that they must
negotiate seriously and in good faith with the Indonesians to find a
mutually acceptable solution which will remove this issue from
international and domestic Indonesian politics.
In order to accomplish this objective we must make very clear to the
Dutch that we are not taken in by the idea that self-determination
principle has any reality when applied to West New Guinea. We must also
talk very frankly with them (and with the Australians) about the danger
of the loss of Indonesia to Communism which is posed by the West New
Guinea issue and the damage that much loss would cause to the free world
position in Southeast Asia. If we have not done so, we should make
unmistakably clear that the Dutch cannot expect U.S. military support in
the event of an Indonesian attack. Finally, as the new letter from
Sukarno to the President
indicates, we must seek to dissuade the Dutch from further moves in the
direction of establishing an independent Papuan regime.
Such a U.S. position should shock the Dutch Government (and particularly
Luns) out of present
complacency and should encourage the important forces within the
Netherlands that would like to see a genuine accommodation with
Indonesia. It is in a change in the balance of forces in the Netherlands
that the hope for a settlement must lie. If negotiations begin to offer
real promise to Indonesia, the forces of moderation within that country
(primarily the army leadership) will be strengthened and the possibility
of a military showdown will recede.
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It will not be enough for the U.S. to get the disputants to the
conference table. We shall have to continue to apply pressure to both
sides if a settlement is to be assured. But if we accept the above
analysis we shall have to apply most pressure to the Dutch for it is
from them that most concessions will be demanded. Heretofore we have
applied very little pressure on the Dutch.
The U.S. Ambassador to The Hague has suggested the possibility of
establishing a bilateral “technical” commission charged with exploring
solutions to the various outstanding problems between the two
countries.7 This approach would bypass the
pre-conditions imposed by both sides on negotiations over West New
Guinea alone. The Dutch late last week indicated a willingness to engage
in discussions with Indonesia at the UN
or outside the UN in the presence of a
third party.8 This third party might
be the Secretary General or some third country or group of
countries.
All parts of the State Department are now agreed on the desirability of
some kind of negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia. All
recognize that the U.S. must play an active and positive role. However,
the above view with respect to our relationship with the Dutch in these
negotiations, while generally acceptable to the Far East Bureau, would
be rejected by the European Bureau.
