214. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0
SUBJECT
- West New Guinea
UN Consideration of the Problem:
Although the debate on West New Guinea at the current General Assembly has not provided a solution to the issue, it nevertheless has somewhat increased the chances for arriving at a peaceful settlement of the problem. The Dutch realize they have no future in West New Guinea and wish to leave the territory. However, they insist that this can only take place provided that the inhabitants are given a voice in their own future. Their attempt to effectuate a withdrawal by having a UN Commission make recommendations on the disposition of the territory (with the proviso that self-determination of the inhabitants would be assured) failed because the Indonesians were able to obtain a blocking third. Basically, Indonesia, with an eye on indications of domestic dissatisfaction in the Netherlands regarding the Government’s West New Guinea policy and with the calculation that failure to achieve progress in the United Nations would increase these pressures on the Dutch Government, wished to have no resolution on this subject passed. However, Indonesia did support an Indian resolution which called for direct negotiations between the parties. This resolution was not approved by the Assembly. The United States supported a resolution sponsored by the French-African states, which we believed represented a reasonable compromise. It took account of the Dutch willingness to leave by providing for a two phased approach with a UN administration, in the initial phase, replacing that of the Dutch. This would be without prejudice to the ultimate disposition of the territory in the second phase. Indonesia would be given full access to the inhabitants under a UN administration. We regret [Page 487] that Indonesia was not able, by refraining from active opposition, to permit this resolution to succeed.
Dutch Reactions:
Dutch Foreign Minister Luns has, tactlessly, publicly portrayed the developments in the UN as having vindicated his position. United States support of the French-African resolution which contained references to the application of the principle of self-determination in West New Guinea has been interpreted by Luns as demonstrating United States support for his policies. Additionally the Dutch colonial administration in West New Guinea has, in the meantime, implemented plans to change the name of the territory to West Papua, designate a flag and install a constitution in the disputed territory. The Dutch have presumably acted on the basis that a majority of the UN members had voted in favor of self-determination.
Indonesian Reactions:
Indonesians regarded the U.S. support of the French-African resolution and opposition to the Indian resolution as not only a departure from our previous policy of neutrality on this issue but also as a failure to honor an undertaking to them that we would take Indonesian views into full account. Indonesians now appear to be convinced that only extremely strong pressure against the Dutch, including the threat of the use of force and perhaps ultimately the actual use of such force, will solve the problem satisfactorily for them. Sukarno has made a number of extremely menacing statements, has designated a special defense council under his direction to deal with this issue, and has promised to tell the Indonesian people in a speech scheduled for December 9 what he proposes to do.
Deeply aware that an outbreak of hostilities in West New Guinea would be extremely detrimental to U.S. interests in Indonesia and Southeast Asia, the President sent a letter to Sukarno in which it was reiterated that our view of the West New Guinea issue continues to be objective, that we wish to be helpful in finding a solution but that initiation of hostilities by Sukarno would make it very difficult for him to play a helpful role. Our Ambassador in Djakarta reports that this letter appears to have allayed the crisis at least temporarily, although it is probable that Sukarno’s December 19 speech will be contentious and inflammatory.
The Indonesians have been antagonized by Luns’ public gloating over the outcome of the UN debate, especially with respect to the United States role. Further, they have viewed the flag-raising at Hollandia as provocative and as setting in motion events which in the long run would tend to estrange West New Guinea from Indonesia.
At the same time, Foreign Minister Subandrio has told our Ambassador that, assuming Indonesian administration, his Government could [Page 488] acquiesce in some form of eventual “internal” self-determination in West New Guinea in which the Papuans either could reaffirm their association with Indonesia or choose some other course. Meanwhile, however, Indonesia at the very least would expect that any interim arrangement would permit them unlimited access to the territory in order effectively to influence the natives.1 The Dutch Ambassador has informally given it as his opinion that his Government would be prepared to facilitate this.2 (Indonesians demand that they be sole administrators in the interim between the departure of the Dutch and the holding of a referendum. However, it is believed that they might settle for designation of an acceptable third party or parties as interim administrator.)
Positions of Australia and Great Britain:
Australia favors self-determination in the area and would accept any outcome of the application of this principle. At the same time, Australia is committed publicly to accept any solution arrived at by the Dutch and Indonesians. Thus it is believed that Australia will go along with any such negotiated solution, especially if also supported by us.
Also concerned by increased tension following the UN debate, the U.K. has suggested that we both (and possibly Australia) approach Sukarno prior to the 19th with the proposal that if his speech then can be sufficiently moderate to leave a loop-hole for serious negotiations, the U.K. and the U.S. in return will make every effort to urge the Dutch into useful negotiations providing that Indonesia will also continue to be reasonable. We have replied that the President’s letter to Sukarno has been substantially similar to this U.K. proposal and that we do not think it wise to reiterate our position at this time. However, we welcomed U.K. willingness to associate with us in a search for a solution acceptable to both sides and we urged that their Ambassador in Djakarta be instructed to approach Sukarno along the lines of their suggestion.
Present Situation:
Given the state of Sukarno’s emotions and the calculation that only sustained pressure will induce future movement, the speech on the 19th undoubtedly will be extreme in tone. However, we do not think it likely that his speech will (a) initiate immediate hostilities; (b) force him into an irreversible position or (c) close the door to further negotiation.
We have indicated to the Dutch our concern and our belief that further urgent efforts must be exerted to settle this question. We have [Page 489] pointed out to them that the Indonesians are very sensitive to such acts as the flag-raising ceremony in West New Guinea. Recent conversations with the Dutch have been disappointing in that no evidence of fresh thinking on their part has been revealed. Our Ambassador in The Hague believes that only strong pressure will move them to consideration of new ideas at this stage.3
Future Developments and U.S. Role:
It is of paramount importance to us that this question be settled peacefully. This can be done only with the cooperation and acquiescence of Indonesia. At the same time, the continued cooperation and goodwill of the Dutch Government also is an essential element. Basically, we recognize that for historical, geographical and political reasons West New Guinea probably will tend to closer if not complete association with Indonesia and our role in seeking a settlement will be to facilitate this evolution. We are in effect committed by the President’s letter to assist in efforts to find a solution in a framework that would allow the Indonesians every appropriate opportunity to achieve their objective peacefully and without undue delay.
We anticipate continued close consultation with the British and Australian Governments. In the case of the British, however, it is evident that their influence with the Indonesians is limited, whereas we do believe they can be helpful with the Dutch. This would also apply, in general but to a lesser degree, to the Australians.
We believe that the United States Government will have to play an even more active and positive role behind the scenes if there is to be a real prospect of getting the Indonesians and the Dutch to agree to a course of action which will lead to the achievement of the Indonesian aims and yet which will be politically and psychologically acceptable to the Dutch. In so doing, it would be desirable that we make clear to the Dutch that if substantive progress toward a solution has not been achieved within a reasonable time, and if, in the meantime, the danger of hostilities continues to grow, our ability to be of assistance in resolving the issue will be seriously and adversely affected.
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, West New Guinea, 12/16/61–12/20/61. Secret. The Department of State copy of this memorandum, which is dated December 17, indicates that Lindquist, Stone, and Palmer were the drafters; Cleveland and Emmons cleared; and Harriman and Tyler cleared in draft. According to a December 17 covering memorandum from Harriman to Bundy, this paper was prepared for the President in case he wished to discuss the issue at the Bermuda talks with Prime Minister Macmillan December 21–22. West New Guinea was not a principal topic of discussion at Bermuda. According to Document 215, this memorandum was sent to President Kennedy who was returning from Bogota, Colombia, to Palm Beach, Florida. Documentation on the Bermuda Conference is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 2020–2021.↩
- Reported in telegram 1047 from Djakarta, December 13; see footnote 4, Document 211.↩
- As expressed by van Roijen in a meeting with Steeves, Tyler, and Sisco on December 15. (Memorandum of conversation, December 15; Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/12–1561)↩
- Reported in telegram 437 from The Hague, December 13. (Ibid., 656.9813/12–1361)↩
- Anderson of S/S signed for Battle above Battle’s typed signature.↩