Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

201. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, November 15, 1961.

SUBJECT

• West New Guinea: One Step Forward or Two Steps Backward?

We have reached the critical juncture in UN consideration of the West New Guinea issue. The present situation has developed in large part because of encouragement that we have given to Dutch initiative to resolve this matter peacefully by UN involvement in a two-stage program. USUN’s 1600 of November 11 (Tab A)¹ recommends that the best alternative is to table a slightly-revised version of the U.S. compromise draft resolution (Deptel 1096 to USUN—Tab B).²

Review of the U.S. Role in the Present Initiative: Attitudes of the Parties

Last summer we were disturbed by indications of official Indonesian inclination to attempt to resolve the West New Guinea dispute by force, and Soviet commitments to provide Indonesia with a considerable amount of military matériel. With your approval we commenced a series of intimate discussions with the Dutch on possible means to advance from this dangerous impasse. At your suggestion, we proposed that the GON consider a UN commission of inquiry which would examine the situation in West New Guinea and make appropriate recommendations to the 17th General Assembly. After initial hesitation, the Dutch have agreed to abide by the recommendations of a U.N. commission to make recommendations on the disposition of West New Guinea, with the sole proviso that the right of self-determination of the population be guaranteed (Tab C).³

Recognizing the Dutch proposal as an imaginative and constructive decolonization scheme, we have endeavored to work out with the two primary disputants a compromise resolution which would more adequately meet the Indonesian point of view than the Dutch draft (Tab D).⁴ At the Cabinet level the Dutch have decided that our proposal as it stands, i.e., with minimally adequate reference to the principle of self-determination, would be acceptable to them in the event their draft resolution failed of General Assembly approval. They have stressed that our proposal represents their rock-bottom position.

In sharp contrast, the Indonesians have to date displayed no flexibility whatsoever. Significant concessions, meeting the Indonesians’ original objections to our draft, have been met with continued insistence that they be guaranteed West New Guinea will be turned over to them.⁵ In a final attempt to meet Indonesian demands insofar as reasonably possible, we proposed two modifications of our draft resolution: (1) the omission of all reference to sovereignty and (2) a preambular reference to the dispute. These were dismissed as not far-reaching enough.⁶

The Indonesians have again publicly threatened military action against West New Guinea unless they get their way, regardless of the degree of UN involvement. Probably their intransigence has been encouraged by Dutch willingness to leave West New Guinea, by our attempts to secure agreement to a compromise even more favorably slanted toward Indonesia, by our lack of a definitive position on the Dutch draft, and by their apparent certitude about having a blocking third on the Dutch draft.

The Indonesians contend that time is on their side insofar as Dutch domestic politics are concerned. In the considered judgment of EUR, there is very little likelihood that any foreseeable Netherlands Cabinet or Parliament would, in return for commercial advantages, abandon West New Guinea to Indonesia without a reasonably effective provision for an expression of the will of the Papuans.

Alternatives for the U.N.

Fundamentally the choice is between action which points to the relinquishment of Dutch administrative control and sovereignty in a year, and the maintenance of the dangerous status quo. Regardless of what the Indonesians may say in the current bargaining situation, the relinquishment of West New Guinea by the Dutch cannot objectively be regarded as anything but a step forward. On the other hand, if no resolution comes out of the 16th General Assembly, two steps backward will have been taken: (1) Indonesia would regard its intransigence as having paid off and might seize the excuse of non-action by the U.N. to resort to violent means to expel the Dutch. (It seems less likely that the Indonesians would launch military action against the U.N. than against the Dutch); (2) the Dutch would have learned that the U.N. is incapable of helping them to decolonize in a principled manner. Such lessons would not be lost upon other governments. The ill effects would be compounded were the United States to attempt to weasel away from its responsibilities in this specific initiative and its commitment to the principle of self-determination.

Our direct behind-the-scenes involvement in this manner was directed towards the achievement of a viable resolution, one agreed to or at least acquiesced in by both Indonesia and the Netherlands. It is now apparent that “viability” of this nature is not attainable at this time.

Because of the role we have played with regard to this item we do not think that a U.S. abstention on the Dutch resolution would be a defensible course of action. Such a position would be doubly difficult not only because the Dutch have advanced this far largely on our recommendation, but also because the substance of the position embodied in the Dutch resolution is consonant with our own policy views. If we do not support the Dutch proposal or float our own, we would appear to be compromising our adherence to the principle of self-determination to a substantial extent and in the face of at least majority support for the Dutch position. Not only the Dutch but also the Australians and the British would feel that we had failed loyal allies and sacrificed basic principles in favor of at best uncertain “neutralists”.

The only two feasible alternatives, therefore, which we see are: (a) to support the Dutch resolution, or (b) to float our own resolution (we might, for example, have Iran introduce our text). One, but not the only, important factor to be considered in this connection is whether a U.S.-initiated resolution would be more likely to be adopted than the Dutch draft.

A precise estimate of the outcome of the vote is very difficult to obtain inter alia because the position of the United States is not known and we have not attempted to influence votes. According to our present best guess, the Dutch can probably not obtain a two-thirds majority for their resolution in its present form. If we float our resolution and work for it actively, there is a reasonable chance it will obtain a two-thirds majority. The key element in this outcome will be whether the French Africans will vote affirmatively as they have indicated. (They have publicly announced that they favor self-determination for the Papuans.)

In any event, of course, U.S. sponsorship of a resolution which we can honestly say as a result of our consultations comes closer than the Dutch draft to a middle position between the two parties should be less offensive to the Indonesians than U.S. support for the Dutch resolution.

Recommendation:

That you approve the attached instruction (Tab E) to Ambassador Stevenson.⁷

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/11–1561. Confidential. Drafted by Stephen Palmer and Buffum of UNP and cleared by Tyler and Blue, but FE did not concur. A note on the source text indicates that Harlan Cleveland “presented these views to Sect’y orally.”
1. Not attached. A copy is ibid., 656.9813/11–1161.
2. Telegram 1096 to USUN, not attached, was also sent to Djakarta as telegram 468; see footnote 4, Document 200.
3. Tab C, not attached, was the Dutch draft resolution, U.N. Doc. A/L.354, October 9.
4. Tab D, not attached, was the draft U.S. compromise resolution. For text, see the attachment to Document 203.
5. Reported in telegram 1163 to USUN, November 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/11–861)
6. Reported in telegrams 1172 and 1191 to USUN, November 8 and 9, and telegram 1628 from USUN, November 14. (Ibid., and ibid., 656.9813/11–1461)
7. Not attached.