Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

200. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, November 6, 1961.

SUBJECT

• West New Guinea

This memorandum represents an effort to bring you up to date on the West New Guinea question and to review where we ought to go from here.

Our General Posture

Our general posture during the last two or three weeks has been partly one of applying some pressure on the Indonesians to maintain a flexible approach and to seek to make use of the Dutch initiative in a constructive way. We have, so far as I can ascertain, never indicated to the Dutch that we considered their insistence upon self-determination something of a sham. We have never argued with them the need to take greater account of the Indonesian claim. We have constantly taken the position with them that their resolution is a considerable step forward. (Cleveland characterized it as “serious, ingenious and very forthright” in a recent talk with Van Roijen (Deptel 1056 to USUN).)¹

Our Immediate Tactics

In the past several weeks we have developed the theory of the two-stage or “two-bite” approach to the problem. The first stage would be relinquishment of Dutch sovereignty. Final fate of the territory would be left to a subsequent second-stage decision. We have argued that the Dutch proposal represented an advance because it clearly called for moving into the first stage.

To carry out such a two-stage approach we proposed to the Dutch on October 27 an alternative resolution (Deptel 1057 to USUN). Basically, the resolution is a variant of the proposal we floated several months ago with the Dutch and the Indonesians.² It would create a UN Committee to inquire into conditions in the territory and to recommend arrangements for an interim UN administration. As a concession to the Dutch point of view, the preamble affirmed the importance of respect for the principle of self-determination and stated as a “belief” that the future status of the territory should be determined in accordance with that principle. However, the operative part of the resolution left the future status of the territory open and stated that, during the period of interim UN administration, sovereignty would rest with the people in WNG.

The Dutch Cabinet considered this draft last week and insisted that the resolution, in both its preamble and in its operative section state that the people of WNG should make the decision as to its ultimate status. Van Roijen indicated to Cleveland that, with these changes, the resolution represented the “absolute ultimate fallback position” of the Netherlands and that the draft could not be revised in any essential respect by a UNGA bargaining process if it were to continue to be acceptable to them.³ The draft we initially showed the Dutch proposed Burma, Malaya, Sweden and Tunisia as the members of the UN Committee. Because of Dutch objection to Malaya, the composition of the committee has been left open in subsequent drafts. This question is clearly one over which there would be a serious struggle if our resolution is ever seriously considered. (The Dutch have suggested New Zealand, Tunisia, Sweden, Burma and Mexico, a group that could be expected to favor their approach.)

We redrafted the resolution to include the Dutch language in the preamble, but not in the operative section and sent it to Djakarta for Indonesian comment.⁴ On Friday we received Subandrio’s preliminary comments.⁵ His more definitive comments may be received today.⁶ (He is leaving Djakarta to come to New York to conduct the fight on WNG personally; he will see Sukarno en route.) Though he characterized the U.S. draft as a “substantial advance”, he was predictably unhappy with the fact that it ignored Indonesian identification with the territory and included the “essence” of self-determination in a manner which, he said, Indonesians would find difficult to accept. He also stated that he had received that afternoon a message from Bonn conveying Luns’ desire to meet him and to attempt to work out a mutually acceptable solution. This he characterized as a “three-fourths miracle”.

The Present Situation

I continue to be very troubled by our apparent lack of any clear idea of where we are going other than that general notion that what we want is a “mutually acceptable solution”. Where do we go if we can’t get one? Cleveland, in his last talk with Van Roijen, implied to the latter that we were engaged in a squeeze play directed against the Indonesians. He stated that “present circumstances may have built-in sanctions with regard to the nature of the Indonesian response to the current U.S. initiative.” He went on to explain that the “choice for the GOI increasingly is between trying to work out something on the basis of the U.S. draft and pushing the U.S. towards support of the first Dutch draft” (Deptel 1084 to USUN).⁷

At the same time, I am assured by the Indonesian Desk Officer that the Secretary is very clear that the U.S. will never vote for the Dutch resolution. (Presumably we would abstain.) Ambassador Jones went so far as to say that we recognized that any permanent solution must be one which is acceptable to the Indonesians (Djakarta 721).⁸ This statement was apparently the basis of the claim by the Dutch that Jones has assured the Indonesian Government that the U.S. would not accept any UN resolution to which Indonesia objected (Deptel 1084 to USUN). We replied that Jones had given no such assurance. The distinction is a rather subtle one and indicates something of the ambiguity of our position.

Meanwhile a recent telegram from USUN (No. 1432)⁹ suggests that our strategy should be one of strongly supporting and vigorously lobbying for the new proposed U.S. draft taking a “plague on both your houses” line in our argument.

The Dutch conservatively estimate fifty votes for their resolution and are fairly confident that the Indos cannot muster a blocking third. There are indications that the Indos may propose some third alternative, possibly a version of previous UN resolutions which called upon the two parties to engage in bilateral talks. (The Indos continue to prefer such talks despite little current evidence of any basis for agreement.)

There is a further element in this situation which, it seems to me, needs to be paid the closest attention. That is the economic situation in Indonesia. There has been a spate of intelligence reports recently indicating that the Government is very worried about its foreign exchange position. The Indonesian Desk Officer considers it possible that, as some evidence indicates, they have almost no uncommitted foreign exchange. It is a puzzle as to whether this concern will cause Indonesia to be more or less aggressive over WNG. Subandrio, who tends to talk in quite belligerent terms about WNG is reported to have stated that the economic situation is so desperate that a military attack on WNG is impossible [document number not declassified].¹⁰ On the other hand, while Sukarno is also said to be very worried by the economic and political situation, it is alleged that he is nonetheless prepared, despite this worry, to use force if necessary to solve the WNG problem and is trying to muster all political forces behind a new WNG campaign [document number not declassified]. Another report indicates that a full-scale assault will be mounted by June 1962 [document number not declassified].

While the reliability of this evidence is uncertain, it seems to me conceivable that Sukarno might at some stage in the foreseeable future throw all rationality to the winds and mount an all-out military attack which would be designed to unite all elements in Indonesia behind him in an effort to conclude the “anti-imperialist struggle”. Nasution and the army can be expected to continue, up to a point, to be a restraining influence. But a kind of Gotterdammerung climax for Sukarno’s career cannot be ruled out. An attack in the face of economic difficulties could create the gravest problems. Indonesia might be thrown into the arms of the Bloc for economic as well as military support. The resulting confusion and chaos and the concentration of the army’s attention on WNG rather than on the situation within Indonesia could create a situation most favorable to the Communists.

My guess is that the Indonesians are going to make a serious effort to reach an agreement, as Sukarno has indicated that they will, but that if they clearly fail, an attack can be expected despite economic difficulties.

Recommendation

So far as I can tell, State is not aware of a White House view on this question. While the situation is somewhat different from what it was when the question was discussed with the President three weeks ago, its basic elements remain the same and his advice to “lean gently on the Dutch” is still very applicable.¹¹ In the next week we are likely to be engaged in critical negotiations over our resolution. We have never put as much pressure on the Dutch as we have on the Indonesians. Pressure now could be crucial. I therefore recommend that the President’s view be passed on to State. I recommend that it be given to Harlan Cleveland and Walter McConaughy or, alternatively, to Alexis Johnson.

I do not see the point of an all-out effort behind our proposed draft if it proves unacceptable to both sides. That would accomplish nothing and alienate both. For reasons I have spelled out many times, I continue to believe that we should decide that we will not vote for a resolution which is unacceptable to the Indonesians, provided the latter are not completely unreasonable. I continue to believe that a discussion between the President and the Secretary of State would be useful at some early stage. I wonder whether we shouldn’t flag the issue with the State Department indicating that we want the President to have a chance to participate in any decision determining how we cast our own vote in the event that agreement between the Dutch and the Indonesians proves impossible.

RHJ

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, West New Guinea, 11/1/61–11/15/61. Secret. Also sent to Rostow.
1. In telegram 1056 to USUN, October 27, the Department summarized a conversation of that day between van Roijen and Cleveland. During the conversation, Cleveland handed van Roijen a draft resolution (the text is in telegram 1057 to USUN, October 27) and explained that the underlying concept to move toward establishment of a U.N. authority to take over administrative responsibility for West New Guinea was the first phase of a process of which the second phase would be an act of self-determination under U.N. auspices. Cleveland stated that at the beginning of the first phase sovereignty would pass to the people of West New Guinea and that the resolution avoided the question of sovereignty. The cable noted that there was no prospect for the United Nations solving the issue, so it was proposing to finesse it. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/10–2761)
2. See Documents 181 ff.
3. The conversation between Cleveland and van Roijen was reported in telegram 1084 to USUN, November 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/11–161)
4. Sent in telegram 468 to Djakarta, November 1. (Ibid.)
5. In telegram 830 from Djakarta, November 3. (Ibid., 656.9813/11–361)
6. In telegram 832 from Djakarta, November 4, Jones reported that Subandrio had “studied the resolution carefully,” acknowledged again it was a “real step forward,” but still found it unacceptable. (Ibid., 656.9813/11–461)
7. See footnote 3 above.
8. Document 199.
9. Dated November 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/11–161)
10. None of the intelligence reports has been found.
11. No record of this discussion with the President has been found, except that on October 19, Robert Johnson wrote McGeorge Bundy a memorandum asking if he “had a chance to talk with Harlan Cleveland about the President’s view that we keep gentle heat on the Dutch while at the same time attempting to avoid direct involvement?” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, West New Guinea, 10/16/61–10/31/61)