Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

199. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State⁰

Djakarta, October 18, 1961, 3 p.m.

721. Deptel 393.¹ President Sukarno assured me today when I saw him pursuant instructions reference telegram he already had instructed Foreign Minister Subandrio to work out possible compromise solution to WNG problem at UN rather than reject Dutch initiative out of hand.

Upon receipt reference telegram I asked to see President on urgent basis since, as Department aware, he is departing for Vienna tomorrow for treatment and probably surgery for kidney stones. He received me for few minutes morning of October 18, interrupting inner cabinet meeting at which he was presiding to do so.

In introducing the subject, I said my government had asked me to pass on some thoughts on WNG in connection with developing situation in the UN. Sakarno said at once: “you know my position. There is really nothing to talk about.” I countered by pointing out that it seemed to us situation in UN provided tactical milieu which Indonesia could utilize to advance its position if GOI maintained sufficient flexibility. I said we considered solution WNG problem had two phases: first, Dutch relinquishment of its claim to sovereignty and second, development of a formula leading to permanent solution.

I pointed out that although we had not taken sides in this dispute, we recognized clearly that any permanent solution must be one which was acceptable to the Indonesians.

The President interrupted at this point to inquire specifically what I had in mind. I said it seemed important to us that Indonesia preserve a flexible, constructive attitude at the UN and consider ways to modify Dutch resolution which I knew to be unsatisfactory to Indonesia. At this point, I emphasized that resolution in no way represented US/Dutch joint effort.

“That was instruction to Subandrio,” Sukarno replied. “I am willing to use the UN as an arm in this case in the transfer of the administration to Indonesia”. But, he emphasized, “this is as far as I can go,” indicating that he had already come down substantially from his original insistence on direct transfer of sovereignty to GOI.

I added that we hoped real progress could be made in this session of the UN in finding a formula which would solve the WNG problem and we felt that Indonesians had an opportunity here which could be exploited if they played their cards right.

The President who had listened to what I had to say, albeit with some impatience, stemming from kidney pains and interruption of cabinet meeting, indicated he must return to the cabinet meeting thus cutting off further discussion. As we were walking back to the cabinet meeting, I asked whether he expected to see Subandrio (who is expected to return to Djakarta October 22) in Vienna. He replied in the affirmative, saying Subandrio would fly to Vienna to meet him before returning here.

Comment: Although interview not wholly satisfactory due pressure of circumstances which could not be helped, I was able to get across main points and obtain some assurance from “horse’s mouth” that Indonesians would seek compromise formula at UN.

Jones

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/10–1861. Secret; Priority. Repeated to USUN, The Hague, London, and Canberra.
1. Telegram 393, October 18, instructed Jones to encourage Sukarno to be flexible. Jones should stress that Dutch willingness to relinquish sovereignty and shifting public attitudes in the Netherlands were positive elements that could be exploited if the Indonesians “played their cards right.” (Ibid., 656.9813/10–761)