Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

198. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara⁰

JCSM-725–61

Washington, October 13, 1961.

SUBJECT

• US Strategic Interest in Indonesia (U)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are increasingly concerned over the steadily deteriorating position of the United States vis-à-vis the Communist Bloc in Indonesia. Neither the short range objective of preventing communist control of Indonesia nor the long range objective of establishing a politically stable and economically viable nation friendly to the West is being accomplished, and there is no expectation that the US effort in its present scope will alter the deteriorating course of events.

2. Indonesia’s large population (sixth ranking in the world), wealth of natural resources, and strategic location constitute a major prize in the East-West struggle. All the major trade routes between the Far East and points west must pass through or near this massive island complex. The loss of Indonesia to the communists would gravely undermine the Free World military position in the Western Pacific.

3. Evidence is mounting that the Soviet Union is making a determined effort to win Indonesia for the Bloc. Internally, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) has become the largest communist party outside the Bloc. Externally, the Soviets have wooed the Indonesians by supporting the latter’s position on West New Guinea (WNG) and have plied them with massive economic and military aid. Soviet military aid commitments total $840 million, which places Indonesia second only to the UAR among non-Bloc recipients. A major Soviet objective appears to be the seduction of the one remaining pro-Western element in Indonesia—the Army.

4. Sukarno’s internal policy of coddling the PKI and his external pronouncements on world affairs indicate the degree of success the Soviets have thus far achieved.

5. US efforts have been handicapped by an apparent lack of determination to institute a broad and effective program that would insure the achievement of US objectives in Indonesia. Although US economic aid commitments ($500 million) are approximately equal to Soviet commitments, US military aid commitments total only $61.6 million—one-fourteenth the Soviet effort.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly believe that a communist or even a pro-communist Indonesia would be a tremendous asset to the Bloc. Communist military bases in Java, Sumatra, etc., would militarily outflank all the SEATO nations as well as the US strategic military position in Southeast Asia. It would clearly isolate Australia and New Zealand, serve as a communist launching area for covert and overt operations against the Philippines and the numerous islands of the South Pacific, and deny to the Free World countries the tremendous oil, tin, and rubber resources which the United States seeks to deny to the communists. In addition, the emotional and psychological impact of such a communist victory would have a major effect on the Free World military forces in Asia and their continued alignment with the United States. Communism as the “wave of the future” would be given alarming impetus, for there is no other country in the region which could serve communist military purposes so well, and few that are more vulnerable to communist penetration. The loss of Indonesia to the communists might well start a chain reaction that would culminate in the eventual relinquishment of the principal US military bases in the Far East, with consequent serious implications for the over-all US military posture in the Western Pacific.

7. On the other hand the strategic importance of Indonesia to the United States is such that a genuinely neutral or preferably pro-Western government would significantly enhance the US military position in Asia. Ultimately, Indonesia can be expected to exert a commanding influence on all the other non-communist Asian states. A politically stable, economically viable nation of one hundred million or more people producing, consuming, and trading with the community of free nations cannot fail to make a positive impact on the political, economic, and military complexion of this strategic region.

8. Accordingly, it is recommended that these views form the basis of a Department of Defense position, and that the matter be referred to the National Security Council for consideration on a priority basis. In recognition of the strategic importance of Indonesia to the United States, and the serious and determined efforts the communists are currently making, it is believed that the United States must undertake the following actions as a matter of utmost national urgency:

a. Exert a major effort in Indonesia to salvage it from the communists.

b. Enunciate US objectives in Indonesia and determine what specific actions the United States must take to insure the achievement of these broad US objectives. The following are typical areas in which decisions must be made and action taken:

(1) US position on the West New Guinea dispute.

(2) Extent of US support and encouragement of General Nasution and other pro-West military leaders.

(3) US attitude toward Sukarno.

(4) Amount and type of US military and economic aid to Indonesia.

c. Develop and execute a detailed and dynamic national plan to take the political, economic, and psychological offensive in Indonesia. Such a plan should include the provision of general guidance, the assignment of agency responsibilities, the appointment of a plan director, and the establishment of specific schedules for measuring the progress of plan fulfillment.

9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that one of the fundamental problems in connection with the erosion of our position in Indonesia stems from our partial failure to gain and maintain a pro-Western orientation of the other countries of Southeast Asia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to reaffirm the strategic importance they attach to all of the countries of this area. In arriving at any politico-military decisions with respect to Indonesia due regard must be given to their effect upon the rest of Southeast Asia. Conversely, any decisions pertinent to the rest of Southeast Asia should be considered in the light of their possible effect on Indonesia.¹

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

L.L. Lemnitzer
Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 66 A 3542, 091 Indonesia. Top Secret.
1. .In his October 24 reply to this memorandum, Secretary McNamara indicated he shared the Chiefs’ concern. He informed the Chiefs that “events in Indonesia have been the subject of continuing review at the highest levels of the government for the past several months, and the Department of State is currently preparing a new policy paper on Indonesia.” McNamara forwarded JCSM–725–61 to the Department of State and assured the Chiefs that they and Defense would get an opportunity to comment on the policy paper on Indonesia before it was approved. (Ibid.)