183. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Australian Views Toward Settlement of West New Guinea Dispute
PARTICIPANTS
- Ambassador Beale of Australia
- Mr. D. J. Munro, Minister, Australian Embassy
- Mr. B. G. Dexter, First Secretary, Australian Embassy
- The Secretary
- Mr. James D. Bell, Director, Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs
- Mr. Edward C. Ingraham, Australian Desk Officer
Ambassador Beale said that he wished to present his government’s views toward the proposal we had recently advanced for a possible solution to the West New Guinea dispute (see Memorandum of Conversation between Mr. Munro and Mr. Bell, August 1, 1961).1 His [Page 413] government’s first concern was whether we intended to take the initiative in placing this proposal before the UN or whether we regarded it solely as a fallback proposal.
The Secretary replied that we considered the West New Guinea situation a dangerous one and that we believed the Dutch were seeking a way out. Under these circumstances, we believed that we should be prepared with a positive proposal for action. We would certainly regard the proposal as a fallback. We had not yet decided, however, whether to take the initiative ourselves of placing it before the UN at the next session.
Ambassador Beale observed that there was a good deal of difference between the two courses. If the proposal were to be used solely as a fallback proposal, Australia would be prepared to go along. If we intended to take the initiative of presenting it, however, his government would not be in accord. The West New Guinea dispute actually encompassed two separate problems, he continued, that of Indonesia’s intransigent demand for the territory and that of keeping the dispute from erupting into actual conflict. Regarding the first problem, Australia found it difficult to contemplate the United States acceding to Indonesia’s unreasonable demand. As to the latter problem, he said, Australia was genuinely interested in any feasible solution.
If the United States took the initiative of presenting this proposal to the UN, Ambassador Beale continued, Australia feared that the matter would quickly get out of hand and slip from our control. If the dispute reached the UN on the initiative of others, however, the proposal might serve as a satisfactory fallback.
The Secretary inquired as to how Australia would propose solving the West New Guinea dispute. Ambassador Beale [3 lines of source text not declassified] believed that his government would have no objection to a UN commission visiting New Guinea simply to gather facts, but he doubted that the commission should be given the authority to recommend a solution to the dispute, particularly as its membership was sure to include delegates from the African and Asian countries. [5 lines of source text not declassified]
The Secretary said that he doubted that the UN would simply brush aside the concept of self-determination in considering ways to solve the dispute. Ambassador Beale indicated his doubt that a really honest approach to the dispute could be expected from the UN.
The Secretary asked what Australia’s views would have been had West New Guinea been included within the Republic of Indonesia when the Republic was first established, as might well have occurred. Ambassador Beale replied that their attitude would have been the same, although probably less articulate. Australia was at the time—and still is—prepared to accept any disposition of West New Guinea freely [Page 414] agreed upon by the Dutch and the Indonesians. [6 lines of source text not declassified]
To sum up his government’s position, Ambassador Beale continued, Australia hoped that the United States would not take the initiative with our proposal. The Secretary said that we would certainly not do so without further consultation with the Australian government; the Australians could be sure that the proposal would not come up in the UN at our initiative unless they heard from us again on the matter. As to UN consideration of the proposal, the Secretary added, he did not believe that the question of self-determination would be ignored. He doubted that there would be solid Asian-African support for Indonesia’s position, and believed that certain of the Asian-African countries might well take a stance in favor of self-determination. Ambassador Beale agreed that this might occur, but said that he felt the great majority of the Asian-Africans would line up with Indonesia, as would, of course, the Soviet bloc.
The Secretary inquired whether Prime Minister Menzies would be attending the 16th UN General Assembly. Ambassador Beale said that he was certain the Prime Minister would not attend.
The Secretary asked if Australia had discussed the West New Guinea dispute and our proposal with the Dutch. Ambassador Beale said that his government had held conversations with the Dutch concerning the dispute but had not discussed that particular proposal.
He did not wish to emphasize the military aspects of the matter, Ambassador Beale continued, but his government was rather worried at the continuing buildup of Indonesia’s armed forces with Soviet support, when coupled with Indonesia’s belligerence in the dispute. At the same time, however, his government did not assess the chances of a military clash as any more imminent than a year ago. The Secretary asked whether we had made a recent assessment of the possibilities of such a clash. Mr. Bell replied that he believed the most recent assessment had been made about three months ago. The Secretary suggested that the time appeared ripe for another assessment. Mr. Bell said that he would ask for one.