Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

182. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia⁰

Washington, August 3, 1961, 9:53 a.m.

126. FYI. Over past few weeks Department, at Dutch initiative, has held series searching and candid exchanges with Netherlands Embassy regarding West New Guinea.

Premise our participation has been avoid role of direct stage manager or go-between while at same time demonstrating our deep concern over serious potentialities this dispute if left unresolved and our willingness encourage and assist indirectly in search for constructive solution.

Accordingly, we have not attempted obtain Dutch agreement to any specific formula or method of approach. We have reviewed with them various possibilities, including direct UN trusteeship, single or multination trusteeship and UN commission. We have told them that while trusteeship concept has many attractions we foresee certain obvious disadvantages such as difficulty of finding acceptable and willing administering powers and problem of financing. Preoccupation of SYG and delicacy his present position seem additional factors against direct UN trusteeship.

Our examination of problem, however, has led us believe that some degree of UN participation seems essential to satisfactory settlement and Dutch have been so advised. Although significant elements in both Indonesia and Netherlands might prefer direct negotiations, actual chances for such bi-lateral agreement now appear remote.

These considerations have led to development in Department of UN committee idea, in which five to seven nation body, appointed by GA, would visit WNG, examine prevailing situation and recommend means settlement to following GA. (Subsequent message contains draft of resolution which might serve introduce item to GA.¹ This draft resolution has not been shown Dutch and must not be disclosed Indos.)

Conversations have served considerably advance Dutch thinking by requiring them focus on specific aspects of problem. It now clear Dutch recognize their best interests lie in disengagement from WNG. They assert they will not transfer territory to Indo (Dept spokesman July 28 declined Dutch request we so inform GOI).² However, Dutch preparedness submit issue to GA treatment implies recognition that loss of sovereignty might be outcome. Dutch consistently express strong concern for welfare of Papuans and insist that Dutch stewardship cannot be relinquished without adequate provision for ascertaining Papuan desires re future political arrangements.

Having consulted with us (talks now in suspension although no decisions reached nor commitments made by either side), it believed Dutch now will quietly seek views of other selected nations, informing them that ideas have been exchanged with US but not identifying us with any specific concept or plan.

With this background, Dept believes time now ripe for similar talks with Indos. Basic objective will be to seek evidence and indication of extent of Indo flexibility and encourage them, by discussion and suggestion, as in case Dutch, to assess situation realistically. End FYI.

In view foregoing, Ambassador should seek earliest appropriate opportunity discuss WNG with Sukarno or Subandrio. Believe initial approach can effectively employ context of Sukarno visit Washington and subsequent exchange with President Kennedy. You should reiterate our deep desire help find an amicable solution but at same time make clear to them our belief that we can be most useful by avoiding role of direct intermediary. You may wish follow with review of our searching study of problem, briefly outlining concepts of direct and nationally administered trusteeships, and culminating with exposition of our present view that perhaps feasible approach to problem would be request to UNGA for establishment UN committee which would consider how dispute might be resolved in accordance with UN Charter. You should emphasize that we have reached no definite conclusions.

Believe statement along these lines will set appropriate stage for inquiring, possibly with observation that some months have passed since Washington discussions this subject, if recent Indo study of issue has produced conclusions or considerations which they might wish to discuss with us. (FYI. We hopeful this introduction will stimulate them to reply in other than general terms and possibly orient their thinking in direction serious consideration UN committee idea. End FYI.) If appropriate, Ambassador may wish refer to recent informal contacts with Dutch by Sukarno and Nasution as suggesting degree Indo flexibility.

If asked, you may state we have, at Dutch request, discussed problem with them in general terms but reached no conclusions or undertakings and made no commitments. Special effort should be made avoid any Indo impression we and Dutch have devised Western package.

GOI officials should be reminded of highly delicate position of US and urged in best interests all concerned maintain strictest secrecy.³

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/8–361. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Lindquist on July 31; cleared by McConaughy, Tyler, Buffum, U. Alexis Johnson, Bell, and Jenkins; and approved by Rusk. Repeated to The Hague, Canberra, London, New Delhi, and Rangoon for Bowles who was visiting the Far East.
1. Telegram 127 to Djakarta, August 3. (Ibid.) The draft resolution enclosed in telegram 127 was the same as the second attachment to Document 181.
2. In the conversation among Schiff, Tyler, and others on July 28; see footnote 1, Document 181.

3. Jones made this démarche on August 8 to Subandrio who described it as a “great step forward” and showed obvious gratification that the United States had taken the initiative. In a conversation later on August 8, Subandrio remarked that the U.S. suggestion was very timely because Sukarno, Nasution, he, and others were scheduled to meet on August 12 to discuss West New Guinea. Subandrio stated he was fighting the use of force and now he had better ammunition. (Telegrams 234 and 239 from Djakarta, August 8 and 9; Department of State, Central Files, 656.9813/8–861 and 656.9813/8–961)

   In a memorandum to Rostow, August 1, Robert Johnson attached what he described as a “bootleg” copy of telegram 126 and informed Rostow that “the Indonesian Desk Officer points out that these instructions should be helpful in preventing the Indonesians from taking a very harsh line, which they might otherwise be encouraged to take, at the Belgrade Conference of uncommitted states.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, West New Guinea, 6/61–8/61)