Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

116. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State⁰

Phnom Penh, November 17, 1963, 7 p.m.

370. CINCPAC for POLAD. Deptel 238.¹Sihanouk’s press conference reported Embtel 366² gives indication general course of action he hopes take re US aid programs. In light his statements and his evidently overwrought state of mind I recommend following courses be followed both at Washington and Phnom Penh at this stage.

1. We should adopt calm, non-vindictive attitude in all discussions with RKG officials and restrict public statements to minimum. We plan make no statement here and recommend Dept spokesmen’s statements be limited to comment we are seeking further clarification RKG position and problems US aid under study. We should keep in mind RKG desire be independent US aid is consistent with our ultimate objective in extending aid and that even if aid ended we would wish end it without recriminations or accompanying bitterness. Sihanouk has emphasized he expects continue policy neutrality and nonalignment and will not join Communist bloc. Even though this may be dream, we should not outwardly reject such possibility.

2. Without taking any position on aid matters I should approach Acting SecState Foreign Affairs explaining wish seek any further clarification RKG’s moves in present situation that might be useful to my government. At same time USAID Director would make similar approach to appropriate officials Ministry of Plan and Son Sann, seeking clarification on certain questions on which knowledge RKG position essential in connection with certain aspects aid program at this stage. My efforts over period several days see Acting SecState Foreign Affairs Phurissara, Nhiek Tioulong and Minister Commerce Touch Kim have been unsuccessful and USAID Director Champaigne has similarly found his Cambodian counterparts unavailable.

3. I do not believe we can or should wait for requests for explanation on slow downs or inaction on various aspects of military and economic aid projects as some explanation or request for clarification from RKG will be required in some cases at early date. Some actions will be required to avoid new commitments and avoidable expenditures which it may be desirable to explain in advance. To do otherwise would create unnecessary air of mystery and possibly inflame Sihanouk’s suspicions. We should be allowed flexibility here in this regard and I should be allowed take initiative in such discussions with RKG officials through USAID and MAAG when such action seems desirable. Concur we should seek centralize RKG replies on economic aid matters at responsible level and would hope do so in Ministry Plan and with Son Sann.

Concur we should not at this stage initiate discussions with RKG on transitional measures needed in event termination aid programs. This would be taken as threat to end aid and be counter-productive.

Our proposals for courses of action for MAAG and USAID at this stage were set forth in Embtel 364 and Toaid 501,³ and additional action regarding other aspects of program are being recommended in separate tels, rationale for which is explained in Embtel 365.⁴

4. Most important at this stage is to avoid actions or statements which will set Sihanouk off on another outburst [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has just sent one of her entourage to me this morning to express her concern and displeasure at Sihanouk’s statements, advising me to be calm in order to avoid other outbursts and informing me Queen trying to exert calming influence on him. In view Sihanouk’s present state of mind and strong need to avoid [sending] him off on another flurry of statements, I do not believe it desirable at this stage to use with SecState Fon Affrs arguments set forth in the Dept’s tel 238 as guidance for responses to RKG queries on US attitudes and actions. Even my call on Phurissara for clarification carries some element of risk in arousing Sihanouk as conversation would undoubtedly be reported to him, but I do not see how I can avoid seeking from SecState Foreign Affairs further clarification RKG position. I would hope that delicate points of any conversation I might have with Nhiek Tioulong, to whom I could [garble—pass?] on some points made in Deptel 238, would not be drawn to Sihanouk’s attention at this time. Basic to all our actions and statements at this stage is necessity of avoiding pushing Sihanouk farther out on limb and thus making his retreat more difficult. Too drastic actions by us in halting aid programs during cooling off period could defeat efforts being made to bring him to his senses.

5. In light latest Sihanouk statements, I believe Dept should call in Nong Kimny and, without taking any position on aid programs at this time and except for denials US complicity Khmer Serei activities without making points outlined Deptel 238 (which would likely be reported to Sihanouk), seek from him same clarification I expect seek from SecState FonAff here. To recall me for consultation at this stage would probably be too drastic a step and might keep Sihanouk on edge waiting for other shoe to drop.

For the long run, it is my preliminary view:

1. That we cannot accept continuation any form of military aid without presence of US military mission in some form.

2. That it is obviously impossible for us to accept as condition for continuation of aid cessation of Khmer Serei broadcasts. KS activities are not relevant to our aid programs and we are not responsible for or involved in them. To acquiesce in application such condition would leave us open to Sihanouk’s blackmail, if our aid should continue, on every occasion some action of RTG or GVN might displease him. We should, of course, as in past make clear we oppose and deplore KS activities and would do what we could to put an end to them insofar as it lay within our capabilities.

Department’s efforts to put an end to KS activities appreciated. Cessation KS broadcasts would at least give better hope of cooling Sihanouk off and thus allow moderating influences and sobering realities to begin to work on him.

Country Team concurs.

Sprouse

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) CAMB. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Paris, Saigon, CINCPAC, and Vientiane.
1. See footnote 1, Document 114.
2. In telegram 366, November 16; the Embassy reported that Sihanouk held a press conference on November 16 to “clear up confusion in the minds of Anglo-Saxon correspondents.” Sihanouk stated that as of December 31 U.S. aid would be terminated since Khmer Serei broadcasts had resumed from South Vietnam. Should the broadcasts stop and the United States wish to continue aid, Cambodia would accept “equipment aid” for such things as roads, bridges, schools, but no commercial, financial, or a military aid mission would be accepted. “Equipment aid” must be given without conditions. (Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) CAMB)
3. Both dated November 16. (Ibid.)
4. Dated November 16. (Ibid.)