Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

114. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cambodia⁰

Washington, November 16, 1963, 2:25 p.m.

235. CINCPAC for POLAD. Re Prince Sihanouk’s threats and Khmer Serei, following are basic US objectives and initial courses of action approved by the Secretary.

US objectives:

1. Major objective is dissuade Sihanouk from carrying out his threat.

2. Allow time for moderating influences already at work in Phnom Penh seek bring Sihanouk around to more reasonable approach and make him aware of serious economic, financial and political implications of course of action he has threatened. Until situation further clarified, no representations should be made to RKG, either at Phnom Penh or Washington, lest Sihanouk be pushed into making further decisions that will make it more difficult, if not impossible, for him to retreat.

Initial actions:

1. Views should be exchanged with major allies, particularly with British and French.

2. Prudent measures regarding US economic and military aid should be taken, to prevent any avoidable expenditures or deliveries before December 31, as already agreed with DOD and AID. Should Cambodian officials raise questions concerning slowdown, Phnom Penh should counter with questions designed to elicit clarification of RKG intentions.

3. We should continue present efforts to discover location of offending transmitters.

4. In view evidence of support by Diem regime of Khmer Serei activities, we should approach new Saigon regime with view eliminating this support at once. Point out that Khmer Serei are few and ineffective and that if GVN cooperates on this issue they will be in stronger position seek RKG cooperation concerning Viet Cong border crossings. We should try persuade new GVN to overlook Sihanouk’s statements and make conciliatory gesture toward Cambodia.

5. In view Thai sensitivity regarding Khmer Serei activities, we should limit present action at Bangkok to seeking opportunities discuss problem in general terms, pointing out that Sihanouk appears be withdrawing from full extent of his threat but we remain convinced that if he carries out his threats he will endanger Thai security.

Messages following up on above objectives and actions follow.¹

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CAMB-S.VIET. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Arzac, cleared by Koren and U. Alexis Johnson, and approved by Rice. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Paris, Saigon, Vientiane, and CINCPAC.
1. In telegram 238 to Phnom Penh, November 16, the Department elaborated on possible action for the Embassy. The Department instructed the Embassy to postpone entering into new aid commitments or making avoidable aid expenditures prior to January 1, 1964. Defense and AID would similarly curtail their operations. Ambassador Sprouse could reconfirm the position that no agency of the U.S. Government was supporting the Khmer Serei. The Department concluded that it was “inconceivable to us that Cambodia should be led to commit national political suicide in response to the activities of a small dissident group that has no popular support in Cambodia and represents no threat to RKG, no matter how irritating its propaganda may.” If Cambodia wanted to terminate U.S. aid, the United States was prepared to do so, but Sihanouk should realize that turning to Chinese assistance would endanger Cambodia’s independence. (Ibid., AID (US) CAMB)