Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

106. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State⁰

Phnom Penh, June 29, 1963, 11 a.m.

1017. Deptel 767.¹ Three major questions are posed by indication RKG intention revive neutrality proposals:

(1) What is motivation such move?

(2) Is it worthwhile for us, either together with French and British or alone, attempt influence form in which revised proposals will be put forward?

(3) If answer (2) positive, along what lines should we attempt influence RKG?

Re (1), believe most important feature influencing revival neutrality project is pessimistic RKG view of present situation Laos and recent developments involving Buddhists in SVN, both of which have increased RKG concern re future these two countries and eventual repercussions on Cambodia. Recent increase SVN border incidents may have served reinforce these RKG fears. Also, RKG has already received satisfactory replies from bloc but wishes obtain maximum possible assurances from free world, primarily US, for Cambodia’s survival before writing finis to neutrality project. This would presumably represent beginning of final effort bring project to fruition as well as continuation of negotiations, which Sihanouk has previously said would require considerable time (Embtel 517).² By revising draft to meet objections made known to him, Sihanouk may be seeking as many signatures as possible, although he may now consider Thai and SVN signatures unlikely and not really needed if assurances forthcoming from US and other free world powers.

Re (2), question is posed of what we would achieve by introducing counterproposal at this point. We tried steer project in right direction last year prior RKG presentation draft proposal but did not succeed in making any changes in two vital aspects: guarantees and elimination of provision for withdrawal MAAG. No reason believe advance efforts to steer project would meet any greater success. On other hand risk involved such effort might ensure revival of project; as matters now stand there is at least outside chance that such revival might not be undertaken despite Sambath’s statement.

In considering whether we should take initiative in this direction, account should be taken of extent of agreement among ourselves, British and French as to tactical situation, timing, and content of new proposals to be made. All three of us, to varying degree, consider ball now in Cambodian court: British PriMin Macmillan has suggested RKG designate representative to discuss matter with British Ambassador; de Gaulle has made certain comments on draft which, although publicly accepted in principle by Sihanouk, have not been embodied in new language; and US waiting for Cambodian response to approach made to Sihanouk (Embtel 648).³

In matter substance of approach, if one decided on, we seem have two principal alternatives. First is to put forward proposals as developed last year based essentially on bilaterals between Cambodia on one hand and Thais and Vietnamese on other. Advantages these proposals are (a) they provide machinery handle border questions and deal with incidents; (b) they do not involve USG in guarantees we are unwilling to give. Disadvantages are: (a) possible reluctance Thais and SVN accept these (as indicated last year when being drafted); (b) despite recently demonstrated ineffectiveness ICC Laos, RKG may still prefer ICC procedure subject Cambodian initiative as provided for in its proposal.

Second alternative is proposal by US (preferably with similar action by British and French) of text based on Laos Accords or on Sihanouk’s original proposals, to extent either can be suitably modified in desired direction, from which would have been omitted such objectionable features as guarantees, elimination of MAAG, border declarations, implication of Thai and Vietnamese guilt, and undertaking consultations jointly with other signatories in case of infractions. Consideration might be given to omission ICC procedure in favor general undertaking by countries in region seek establish modalities for settling border disputes and investigation alleged incidents, although in eyes RKG this might so water down project as to make it no more satisfactory than general assurances contained in President’s letter to Sihanouk September 2 [August 31], 1962.⁴ Advantages this type proposal would be:

(a) Possibility reaching agreement by all Geneva powers thus providing face-saving out for Sihanouk to obtain maximum he could hope to achieve from his initiative;

(b) Sihanouk may, if he is now convinced (as he should be) that he cannot obtain real guarantees in any case, be content settle for document endorsing his neutrality and expressing willingness signatory powers consult with RKG in event threats against it;

(c) He probably wishes to wring maximum possible commitments from non-bloc countries, primarily US, and this would offer him such opportunity;

(d) Although basically representing little more than gesture, such document might present minimum negotiating problems and thus make possible conclusion agreement and elimination this question from repertory of problems between Sihanouk and free world.

In any event we would presumably have gone as far as we could to meet Sihanouk’s wishes and will have made effort to provide him possible face-saving out if that is what he is seeking.

Foregoing presented as our evaluation this problem and for use in sounding out views French and British, subject, of course, to any further indications we may receive of Cambodian intentions.

Sprouse

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–13 CAMB. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, London, New Delhi, Paris, Saigon, USUN, CINCPAC, and Vientiane and pouched to Ottawa.
1. In telegram 767, June 22, the Department suggested that since Cambodian ideas on the neutrality proposal were not forthcoming it might be wise to pass on ideas that U.S. officials had been discussing with the French and British to Cambodian officials. (Ibid.)
2. Telegram 517, December 31, 1962, quotes a speech of Sihanouk as follows: “negotiations to obtain an international agreement on our country will be long, even very long, because this procedure that certain Western and neutralists have morally forced us to adopt.” The Embassy explained that Sihanouk was referring to the need for extended diplomatic correspondence instead of a conference. (Ibid., 651H.00/12–3162)
3. See footnote 2, Document 105.
4. See footnote 1, Document 89.