Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

105. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State⁰

Phnom Penh, May 17, 1963, noon.

866. Reference: Embassy’s telegram 851.¹ At conclusion my audience with Sihanouk May 8 he again, as he had done during my last audience with him March 5 (Embtel 648),² asked me to convey to the President an expression of his best wishes. It will be noted that except for card of Christmas greetings no Presidential message has been sent to Sihanouk since despatch of President’s reply dated December 6, 1962 regarding neutrality proposal (Deptel 393).³ During this same period Sihanouk has exchanged messages with various world leaders, including Khrushchev, Sukarno, Nasser, Tito, Liu Shao-chi, Ne Win, Chou Enlai, Ho Chi Minh, Novotny, Nehru and Nkrumah, and has had personal contact with other Chiefs of State during his visits to Colombo, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaya, Communist China and India (Burma en route to India), and visits to Cambodia of Novotny, King Laos, Liu Shao-chi, Chen Yi, Lee Kwan-yu and Chief State Singapore. Looming ahead are visits by Ho Chi Minh, Sukarno and Brezhnev and perhaps Tito and Ne Win. Sihanouk has had meager fare from Western world during this period, having received only message from de Gaulle in December regarding neutrality proposal and interim reply from Macmillan in February on same subject.

Foregoing situation is described in order show how heavily weighted on neutralist and bloc side have been attentions centered on Sihanouk which, because of his own temperament and susceptibility to such influences, have undoubtedly had effect on his thinking and attitudes. This situation presented with full awareness that we do not follow practice sending Presidential messages at drop of hat as seems to be possible with so many bloc and neutralist countries, particularly those aware of Sihanouk’s susceptibilities and desirous of courting his favor.

In light foregoing, unless Presidential reply in connection with neutrality proposal seems likely in foreseeable future, I recommend serious consideration be given to sending Sihanouk an appropriate letter from the President in the very near future; it could express appreciation of Sihanouk’s two oral expressions of good wishes mentioned above and could be tied to suitable occasion which should present itself in June and which is described below. Such message would not be expected be panacea for all ills, but it would at least be attempt redress in part balance which has swung so heavily away from Western world.

I informed Sihanouk May 8 that we wished make presentation to him and his principal advisers in early June, following USAID Director’s return from Washington, of our economic aid program for FY 63 along lines presentation made to him last year (Emb desp 368, June 4, 1962).⁴Sihanouk expressed immediate interest in such presentation and said he would later let me know date convenient for him. We anticipate presentation sometime after June 5. This would offer appropriate occasion for Presidential message which could logically be tied to our aid program and could be used to support our policy objectives in Cambodia. We believe message should include following points:

1. Purpose of American economic and military aid to Cambodia is to strengthen independence and promote progress and welfare of Cambodian people; these programs worked out in fruitful consultation between Cambodians and Americans and designed supplement great efforts being made by Cambodia itself.

2. United States accepts and understands Cambodia’s policy of neutrality as the USG has previously stated, and respects this country’s independence and territorial integrity.

3. Refer to President’s pleasure at having seen Sihanouk in 1961, thank Sihanouk for expression his best wishes conveyed orally by Ambassador, and express hope that if Sihanouk attends UNGA this year President will have pleasure of seeing him and exchanging views on problems mutual interest.

4. If we are willing to reopen neutrality project dialogue, we should add: in regard to neutrality proposals which were subject of exchange of letters last year the President looks forward to learning the reaction of Prince Sihanouk to the preliminary views of the USG on this subject which were conveyed to Sihanouk by the Ambassador on March 5 and which represented also the President’s views on this subject.

Pertinent to this recommendation and illustrative of Sihanouk’s sensitivity on subject proper regard for position Chief of State are:

1. Recent criticism by Sihanouk, voiced to very small luncheon group of which I was member, that UK Government has on various occasions failed treat him with courtesy and dignity due him, first as King and later as Chief of State. Among instances cited was extension of invitation to him for Princess Alexandra’s wedding through UK Ambassador rather than by Duchess of Kent herself.

2. Sihanouk’s statement to same group that, although he was opposed such conference, he had been unwilling reject Nkrumah’s invitation for Colombo-type conference in Accra on Sino-Indian conflict, which would have implied discourtesy (he added he had attempted discourage conference).

3. Sihanouk’s statement in 1961 Asia Society speech in New York that his reaction to unilateral Soviet abrogation of nuclear test ban moderated by personal letter from Khrushchev.

4. Sihanouk accepted de Gaulle’s request for removal guarantee provisions from neutrality proposal, apparently without any discussion or argument following receipt of de Gaulle’s letter containing that request.

5. Sihanouk has never acknowledged Macmillan’s letter late February proposing “UK Ambassador discuss these ideas (re neutrality proposal) with whatever RKG representative you (Sihanouk) may consider appropriate”. Nor did Sihanouk grant audience to UK Ambassador, who had raised with SecState FonAffairs question of reply and wished do likewise with Sihanouk, prior UK Ambassador’s departure on home leave late April.

Sihanouk’s susceptibility to attention and his sensitivity should be ever kept in mind, and they, in fact, argue for inclusion in Presidential message of reference to our preliminary views on neutrality proposal if, of course, Department willing reopen dialogue on neutrality project. I regret our preliminary views this subject conveyed to Sihanouk March 5 were not made subject Presidential message at that time since such vehicle would have increased likelihood its acceptability to Sihanouk (Embtel 637).⁵ We are entering difficult period when we must deal with delicate problems of MAAG’s future and questions arising out RKG acceptance MIGs. Even without reference to neutrality proposal, therefore, I recommend Presidential message as it can only be of assistance to us in difficult period ahead. For such message to have maximum effect we must be prepared have it published as is standard operating procedure here with such messages.⁶

Sprouse

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 CAMB. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution.
1. In telegram 851, May 10, Sprouse reported that in an audience with Sihanouk on May 8 he received the clear impression that Sihanouk was unwilling to discuss his neutrality proposal except with President Kennedy or Secretary Rusk. Sprouse suggested reopening the dialog with Sihanouk on his neutrality proposal by means of a letter from President Kennedy. (Ibid., POL 27–13 CAMB)
2. In telegram 648, March 5, Sprouse reported that he had told Sihanouk that the United States had given his neutrality proposals serious consideration. While the United States accepted the general concept of Cambodian neutrality, independence, and territorial integrity, the U.S. Government would like to suggest minor changes. (Ibid., 751H.00/3–363)
3. Document 99.
4. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 811.0051H/6–462)
5. Not printed. (Ibid., POL 27–13 CAMB)
6. In telegram 726, June 7, the Department of State agreed with the Embassy’s view of Sihanouk’s susceptibility to personal attention, and thought that a Presidential message might be advisable, but not for the occasions and reasons suggested by the Embassy. Of the four points recommended by Sprouse, only point 3, a possible Sihanouk visit to Washington in conjunction with the U.N. General Assembly meeting, seemed appropriate for a Presidential message at some time. (Ibid., POL 15–1 CAMB)