Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

101. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman) to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, January 23, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Cambodian Neutrality Proposal

For the past few weeks we have been working on an adaptation of the Sihanouk Neutrality Proposal¹ in order to achieve a draft which will not only meet our requirements but be acceptable to the Thai and Vietnamese and hopefully also Sihanouk. We have endeavored to follow as far as possible the Cambodian proposal but there are obvious and significant differences. The major ones are as follows:

1. Structurally, the Cambodian proposals include three documents modeled in general after the Laos agreements, i.e., a Cambodian declaration of neutrality, a multilateral responsive declaration by the Geneva powers, and a multilateral protocol providing for enforcement by the International Control Commission. Our adaptation retains the two declarations (modified in several important respects) but eliminates the ICC Protocol and substitutes bilateral Amity Agreements between Cambodia and its neighbors Thailand and South Viet-Nam.

2. Whereas the Cambodian drafts would require the Geneva powers to guarantee Cambodian neutrality, independence and territorial integrity, we have substituted a commitment to consult in the event of a threat to Cambodia’s neutrality, etc. The French and British concur with us on this and we believe that Sihanouk may be prevailed upon to agree to it.

3. In lieu of providing for an ICC we have attempted to get at the root of Cambodia’s bilateral difficulties with its neighbors by substituting, for the Protocol, individual Agreements of Amity between Cambodia and Viet-Nam and Thailand, respectively. Recognizing that Thailand and Viet-Nam will never accept the Geneva Co-Chairmen and the Geneva signatory powers as arbiters of their differences with Cambodia, we have likewise eliminated the Co-Chairmen as appellate parties in our proposed bilateral Amity Agreements and we have substituted the UNSYG and a representative of a neutral nation to be named by mutual consent.

4. The Cambodian draft defined Cambodia’s borders with her neighbors. The borders have been a source of frequent friction between the three countries, and Thailand and Viet-Nam will never accept the unilateral Cambodian definition. Therefore, our draft Amity Agreements provide not only for a Mixed Boundary Commission (utilizing a neutral nation representative as chairman) to delimit and demarcate the respective borders but also a Border Inquiry Commission (utilizing a UNSYG representative together with representatives of each party) which would investigate border incidents and thereby reduce the source of much of the trouble between these three countries. Sihanouk has already indicated his willingness to drop the unilateral border definition from his drafts, but we do not know what reception he will give to our idea of bilateral Amity Agreements.

5. Finally, the Cambodian draft, following the Lao precedent, calls for the withdrawal of our military assistance and MAAG to Cambodia. We feel this would be inimical to the best interests of both countries and therefore eliminate this provision in our draft.

In developing our position we have been in close touch with interested U.S. Embassies, with the UK, and, to a lesser extent, with the French. Our Embassies approve of the draft as do also the British, although the latter have some reservations on certain points. We have only just sent the draft to the French in anticipation of tripartite talks in Paris starting February 4, which the French originally suggested and the British concur in. We anticipate that the French will probably not accept our draft as it now stands, particularly in view of the fact that de Gaulle in his original reply to Sihanouk said that France accepted the Cambodian draft as a basis for further discussions. Neither we nor the British did so. Although we neither expect nor require complete tripartite unanimity, we believe the talks will be advantageous in order to arrive at the closest possible alignment of our respective positions and also to persuade the French to use their considerable influence with Sihanouk to induce him to accept a proposal that will not be rejected outright by Thailand and Viet-Nam. In this connection, the talks will also be helpful in lining up the most effective tactical approach to the three countries primarily concerned. It will, of course, be understood that all discussions are ad referendum.

Mr. Czyzak of L and Mr. Koren of FE will represent the Department. They will have a day of preliminary talks with the British before going on to Paris.

Recommendation

It is requested that you approve the attached draft of a neutrality agreement and protocols for Cambodia as the basis for the U.S. position during talks to be held with the British and French.²

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651H.51K/1–2363. Drafted by Koren and Hannah and cleared in draft by Czyzak and William C. Burdett, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. Initialed by Harriman.
1. See footnote 1, Document 99.
2. The draft was attached but is not printed. Rusk initialed his approval on January 28. Tripartite talks began on February 4 in Paris and concluded on February 6. Although unable to agree on a joint text to be submitted to Sihanouk (either the attached U.S. text or a British compromise) Koren and Czyzak reported from Paris that the talks at least forced the French to focus on a problem that they had treated superficially up to that point. (Telegram 3146 from Paris, February 6; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–13 CAMB)