Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIII, Southeast Asia

100. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, December 6, 1962.

Cambodia

This is a follow up on our conversation yesterday about Sihanouk’s proposed declaration of neutrality.¹

I think our problem can be summed up as follows:

Sihanouk is terrified of Thailand and South Vietnam—and with some reason.

Sihanouk and the rest of the world consider that Sarit and Diem are “our boys”, that we can control them, but that we haven’t done so.

Sihanouk figures the more people he can get to underwrite his security, the better. He has therefore proposed a round robin declaration of neutrality to be signed by everyone he can think of which would, in effect, provide for (1) a guarantee of his borders and his neutrality by all the signers, including ourselves, the USSR, Red China, Thailand, and South Vietnam; and (2) withdrawal of all foreign military people except for a useless French presence.

We are having a great deal of difficulty as it is in keeping the Thais and the South Vietnamese from causing more trouble on the Cambodian borders. The Thais and the South Vietnamese will certainly refuse to sign a Laos-type declaration, since it would be an admission of wrong-doing. If we signed it anyway, our ability to control them would, if anything, be lessened. At the same time Red China would have an opportunity to intervene in the situation with or without Sihanouk’s invitation.

There are several things we could do, ranging all the way from simply ignoring the Cambodian proposal to accepting it with whatever modifications we can get. The course we are now most actively working on is an attempt to divert attention from Sihanouk’s Laos-type proposal to a suggestion for the establishment of an international border commission (a British idea) and a tri-partite declaration by Thailand, Cambodia and South Vietnam that each will respect the neutrality of the others. Such a declaration might be accepted by the Other nations who were members of the Laos Conference.

This is basically an attempt to stall and avoid the worst aspect in Sihanouk’s proposal which gives a lever to the Red Chinese with which they might pry their way into Cambodia.²

Mike

0. Source: Kennedy. Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cambodia, 12/5/62–12/13/62. Secret.
1. No other record of the Forrestal-Kennedy conversation has been found.
2. The Department of State on December 7 informed interested posts of its decision to accept the general aims of Sihanouk’s neutrality proposal “in principle,” but to “revise proposal radically to remove objectionable features such as guarantee.” (Circular telegram 1060, December 7; Department of State, Central Files, 651F.00/12–762)