116. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco0

1785. For Ambassador Bonsal: On your arrival Morocco you will face five major problems relating to US bases: (1) evacuation schedule for bases and eventual Moroccan utilization thereof; (2) threat to security of bases from presence of Soviet technicians who arrived with Soviet gift of MIGs; (3) question of post-1963 facilities; (4) US military assistance to Morocco; (5) Moroccan interest in increased use Nouasseur. You aware background these problems and fact there has been little or no forward [Page 176] motion since death King Mohamed V with consequent disruption Moroccan Government. You know that with regard to (1) we have outstanding request from new King to accelerate evacuation and to assist Morocco make appropriate use of base facilities (e.g. for civil aviation); (2) Soviet technicians remain in Morocco despite assurances from both late and present Kings there would be no jeopardy to our bases; (3) King knows we would like to retain communications facilities but has given us no commitment; (4) conditional standby authority to offer jets has not been used and we have not yet negotiated with Morocco second slice of military assistance program for RMA recommended by US Survey Team; (5) USAF authorized the USAF Commander to permit civil use of Nouasseur as weather alternate to Cazes within the limits of Nouasseur’s civil facilities but for security reasons have withheld authorization of any use by Soviet bloc civil aircraft.

Lapse of time since these questions last discussed with King and changes taking place in Moroccan internal political life indicate desirability your making fresh appraisal of situation and submitting to us your recommendations before we take further steps. Base agreement and military aid program were negotiated in 1959 with popular and respected King Mohamed V and Prime Minister Ibrahim,1 who also enjoyed wide popular support. Regime under Hassan with which we must now deal is much less popular and secure and to maintain itself in power will probably have to rely increasingly on Army and Police. This suggests we must walk narrow line between over identification with monarchy under attack from some of most dynamic segments population and antagonizing King to detriment our objectives as long as he is in power.

We hope you can utilize your first interviews with King and ministers to form judgment their intentions and prospects without being drawn into new commitments, but being careful to guard against giving any indication we intend to withdraw from existing ones. We particularly want to obtain your estimate of best way to retain essential facilities to end of 1963 and to lay ground for any possibility there may be of preserving some position after 1963. You should make recommendations regarding any specific gestures which would gain us concrete advantages in foregoing respects, such as training Moroccans in airport management and maintenance and early release of Nouasseur to Morocco with assistance in the development of civil terminal facilities. In same context, we would like your views on (1) when to proceed with second year of military assistance program, and (2) usefulness of providing planes (and whether jets or transports) to Moroccan Air Force.

[Page 177]

You will of course have to use your own discretion in determining best approach to King in initial encounters. To strike positive note you can perhaps express interest in King’s suggestions for future Moroccan utilization which he promised give us after Ramadan and say we are prepared, if King so wishes, to send experts to examine with GOM means by which bases might be made most beneficial to Morocco. You should emphasize need for careful planning to avoid interference with present military requirements at bases and to resolve many points of conflict that will arise in considering civil use.

Some discussion of King’s earlier request for accelerated evacuation is probably unavoidable. You may say this matter being considered at highest levels US Government but raises grave problems. World situation has not improved but worsened since base agreement reached in 1959 and importance of bases has therefore actually increased. While we consider departure 1963 firm obligation and orderly phase-out will require beginning of progressive withdrawal well before then, we are convinced that under present world conditions this arrangement will impair the security arrangements of the free world. We would appreciate learning King’s sentiments on this subject. US Government anxious to be as helpful as possible but at same time hopes for sympathetic understanding of its own responsibilities. You should indicate to King that it is our firm conviction, and one that we would hope he shares, that the strength of the free world must be preserved to assure the maintenance of peace. To weaken it not only increases the chances of Soviet moves toward general war but greatly augments the likelihood of Communist expansion by military or covert means leading to the takeover of smaller nations.

You may find occasion at this point to remind King of our interest in post-1963 communications facilities and to probe how far he seems willing to go by way of assurances in this regard.

You should leave King in no doubt about our continued concern over presence Soviet technicians in Morocco. You can refer to assurances which both King and his father gave Ambassador Yost and say you would like to ascertain for your government where this matter now stands. You should reiterate that we consider our bases insecure so long as there are Soviet pilots or instructors anywhere in Morocco.

Present tenuous situation in Morocco would seem to make it inadvisable to press arms or aircraft supply questions at this time. If, however, King shows interest in these questions, you can refer to earlier indications of our willingness to try to be of help and say you will report his suggestions promptly to Washington.

You may of course repeat assurances contained President’s letter conveyed by Ambassador Yost and emphasize importance which President attaches to continuing friendly relations which have extended over [Page 178] so many years. At this point, you should state your view that US economic assistance to Morocco over the past few years had been considerable, that you understand and fully expect to support this assistance in the future and look forward to examining ways in which it can be made even more beneficial to Morocco. Unless you think it would arouse excessive expectations you may find it useful to indicate you expect return Washington within few weeks to give your views on how US-Moroccan cooperation can best be enhanced.2

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.56311/5-2661. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by McClintic and Root; cleared by Bronez (DOD), Templeton (ICA), Brown, Bohlen, and Newman; and approved by Williams. Repeated to Paris and Madrid.
  2. For documentation on the negotiation of these agreements, see Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, vol. XIII, pp. 776800.
  3. On June 12, Battle sent a copy of telegram 1785 to Bundy at the White House under cover of a memorandum noting that the Department of State had concluded that an on-the-spot appraisal by Ambassador Bonsal was a necessary element of the review of U.S. policy toward Morocco requested by NSAM No. 34. The Department intended to submit its recommendations once it had received Bonsal’s views and consulted with other agencies. (Department of State, Central Files, 771.56311/6-1261)