Office of the Historian

117. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Lemnitzer)0

Washington, June 28, 1961.

SUBJECT

  • Retention of US Communications Facilities in Morocco Beyond CY 1963

In your memorandum of 15 June 1961 (JCSM-409-61),1 it was recommended that the President be given a briefing on the need for retaining communications facilities in Morocco after 1963 and that we urge the State Department to pursue with increased vigor its efforts to obtain Moroccan concurrence to our continued use of the facilities.

I have no objection to a discussion of this matter with the President. He has displayed personal interest in examining the need for retention of our facilities in Morocco, in light of the political liabilities involved. It is suggested, however, that the Joint Chiefs may wish to review for clarity [Page 179] the presentation forwarded with your memorandum of 15 June 1961. Paragraph 7 of the presentation (as well as paragraph 2 of the memorandum itself) indicates that retention of the communications facilities in Morocco is essential. Paragraph 6 of the memorandum states that acceptable alternative means or sites have not yet been found. However, paragraph 5 of the presentation suggests that equivalent substitute facilities could be found through expansion of facilities in Spain and the establishment of new facilities in the Central Mediterranean area.

It would also be most useful to me to have clarification along these lines for any subsequent discussion of this problem with the Secretary of State. I have particularly in mind more precise information concerning the effect upon our Defense Communications System should the Moroccan facilities be lost after 1963 and what possible alternatives there may be, including their cost, the additional land requirements they entail in other countries, the minimum period of time required for their development once political arrangements are completed, and the specific extent, if any, to which they would not constitute equal substitute facilities. This information would be especially pertinent in evaluating what economic, military, political or other quid pro quo the United States should be prepared to offer to retain the Moroccan communications facilities after Ambassador Bonsal submits his appraisal as to what would be necessary to obtain Moroccan consent in this regard.

Since Ambassador Bonsal is expected to return on consultation in the relatively near future,2 I would appreciate receiving these clarifying materials as quickly as possible.

Roswell L. Gilpatric3
  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files:FRC 64 A 2382, Morocco, 680.1 Jan.-Aug. 1961. Secret. Drafted by Lang on June 23. Attached to a July 27 memorandum from Assistant Secretary of Defense NITZE to Secretary of Defense McNamara recommending that he sign the attached memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.↩
  2. Attached but not printed.↩
  3. On July 7, the Department of State sent a memorandum to Bundy at the White House noting that since Ambassador Bonsal’s arrival in Morocco on May 20 and presentation of his credentials to the King, he had had no opportunity to meet with him for further discussions, despite the Ambassador’s indications that he would like to do so. Thus, Bonsal was continuing his assessment, and once the King had made known his requirements for U.S. action regarding the bases, he would report promptly and return to Washington, if the situation warranted. (Department of State,S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 34)↩
  4. Printed from a copy that indicates Gilpatric signed the original.↩