115. Memorandum Prepared by the Director of Operations for Politico-Military Affairs (Newman)0
SUBJECT
- Moroccan Bases
Since receipt of National Security Action Memorandum No. 34, April 5, 1961, the Department of State has been reviewing our present policy on Moroccan bases, particularly with a view towards developing answers to the questions posed in the aforementioned memorandum. It is evident that the complexities of the problems involved will require considerable consultation with the other agencies involved and makes possible only the submission of an interim report at this time. The Department of State is moving forward rapidly on the necessary consultations.
The Department of State’s memorandum of March 28, 1961,1 on Moroccan bases dealt primarily with the political problems that have arisen in our relations with Morocco as a result of the presence of our [Page 174] bases. While the memorandum points out the real political advantages which would accrue to the United States if certain actions were taken, it is evident that these actions could have serious military implications. These military considerations, revolving essentially around the relationship of the Moroccan bases to the totality of our national security posture, particularly the credibility of our nuclear deterrent and our strike capability, require discussion with Defense. The Department of State feels that it is essential that our recommendation to you reflect the proper balance of political and military considerations to the end that the actions proposed represent a net advantage to US national security.
With regard to the specific questions posed, it is possible at this time to provide some tentative answers which will be coordinated with other agencies during our consultations. On the timing of our withdrawal from Nouasseur and Kenitra and the retention of our communication facilities at Sidi Yahia, Bouknadel and Sidi Slimane, these are actively being discussed with the Pentagon to determine their general relationship and importance to over-all United States military posture. In connection with this appraisal, we will also wish to consider the relationship of US bases to our developing disarmament policy. This consideration might well affect the timing of withdrawal for we may wish to seek to gain something for such action through disarmament negotiations.
With respect to the role of United States assistance in converting those bases we proposed to relinquish to civilian use, we believe there is a real opportunity through this means to demonstrate our interest in Morocco. The possibilities involved in this line of action are actively being examined by the Department with Defense and ICA.
The question of associating ourselves with the goal of a denuclearized Africa is an extremely important but difficult problem which affects our policies in other areas. The pressures for a UN resolution establishing a denuclearized Africa require careful handling because Morocco is one of the sponsoring countries. Fortunately, the resolution for a denuclearized Africa has been carried over to the next session so that it is not necessary to come to an immediate decision on how we are to handle the matter. If military considerations relating to the utility of our installations in Morocco at the present time so dictate, these pressures should not be encouraged, though we should not adopt a public stance against this goal. There is the additional consideration that the adoption of the concept of a denuclearized zone would establish a precedent for the rest of the world. Undoubtedly, communist powers, as well as other nations, would seize upon this precedent to argue for the extension of this principle to other parts of the world which, if successful, could profoundly affect our overall military posture.
With regard to securing a commitment from the Moroccans to keep Soviet forces out of the surrendered bases, we have a commitment from [Page 175] the late King, which King Hassan has confirmed, that the bases will never be used against us. While the present commitment may not be as exact or as precise as we might desire, it is nevertheless adequate. It appears that this matter can be safely deferred until Ambassador Bonsal has had an opportunity to appraise US-Moroccan relationships generally. We can then determine if it is desirable to revive the question of securing a more definitive commitment from the King.
On the question of whether the surrendered bases should be made available to United States forces at a time of crisis, we believe that any negotiations to gain us this specific right would unduly complicate our relationships with Morocco. The reality of the situation is such that, if the Moroccans were with us in a time of crisis, they would probably permit the return of United States forces. In the event they were not sympathetic with our policies and objectives at that time, it is highly unlikely they would agree to the return of our forces. This, too, is a matter which we feel should be deferred until we have the advantage of Ambassador Bonsal’s appraisal.
The Department of State anticipates very shortly submitting its recommendations and the views of the other agencies concerned. If approved they will serve as the basis for instructions to be given to Ambassador Bonsal prior to his departure for Morocco.
- Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 34. Secret. Cleared (in substance) by Williams, Johnson, Gullion, Bell, and Bohlen. The Director of Operations administered a special component for politico-military affairs that served under Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson. This memorandum was transmitted under cover of a memorandum from Battle to Ralph Dungan at the White House which noted that NSAM No. 34 had directed the Department to explore recommendations for a new policy on the Moroccan bases and to seek the views of the Department of Defense, the CIA, and the ICA. Following preliminary discussions with Paul Nitze of Defense, the Department believed that further examination of the military considerations involved was needed before balanced recommendations taking into account political, military, and intelligence requirements could be made to the President. In the meantime, it was forwarding this interim memorandum on the subject, which had been cleared by Secretary Rusk. (Ibid.) Further documentation on the follow-up to NSAM No. 34 is ibid.↩
- Document 112.↩