114. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco 0

1529. Generally speaking, we are in full accord with Embassy’s advice that we must be sufficiently responsive to King’s desires to maintain good relations with him but must at same time avoid damaging our relations with his opponents.

Dept has carefully weighed proposal contained Embtel 18961 but considers dangers U.S. over-involvement with new King do not warrant pressing forward in supply of military items at this critical time, particularly in absence any indication from King he anxious U.S. should proceed.

His utilization Soviet technicians with MIGs despite his assurances to contrary, opposition criticism of him for acceptance this Soviet equipment, total absence of past cooperation with U.S. in field training assistance to make U.S. furnished equipment useful and still unresolved question of unloading charges all argue against probable success U.S. overtures of this sort now. Reasons for which GOM has in past withheld publicity U.S. aid still obtain.

U.S. programs of support for Morocco in existence prior to King’s death are continuing and are of sufficient magnitude to refute any allegations U.S. now withholding support from Morocco. King himself has Amb. Yost’s assurances our continuing willingness to be helpful. Furthermore, dramatic evidence this fact will come in next few days with signing FY 61 aid agreement and inauguration sizable famine and work relief programs.

On other hand, we agree (Embtel 1816)3 it preferable not give opposition grounds for believing we have sided with Monarch against it. Embassy has reported many friendly counsels U.S. avoid open support of King himself, as arms program would exemplify, as opposed to program for people of Morocco, i.e. economic aid and famine relief.

For foregoing reasons Dept considers it advisable next moves regarding U.S. arms program come from King. Arrival of new Ambassador will give King natural opportunity to do so if he so wishes. Fact of [Page 173] approaching end of our fiscal year does not justify moving forward with program if it is not really wanted by King and if under present circumstances it would result in strong opposition resentment. If, as he well may, King should indicate suddenly he desires U.S. proceed post haste with second slice arms program we would respond to best our ability.

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 771.5-MSP/3-2861. Secret. Drafted by McClintic, cleared by Junkermann, (DOD), and approved by Witman. Repeated to Paris, Madrid, and CINCEUR.
  2. Telegram 1896 from Rabat, March 28, had asked whether the Departments of State and Defense saw any objection to the Army Attache proceeding with discussion of the Royal Moroccan Army’s requirements for U.S. military assistance, without revealing the projected FY 1961 U.S. aid figures. (Ibid., 771.5-MSP/3-2861)
  3. Dated March 17. (Ibid., 611.71/3-1761)