400. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom1
3434. Under Secretary Ball called in Greenhill, Charge British Embassy, this morning to review Congo situation.2After reviewing present situation, including info we had that UN forces now in Jadotville, Ball recounted his Nassau discussion with Home on Congo.3 We recognized that withdrawal of UN from Congo without resolution of integration problem would mean prolonged civil war with practical certainty USSR would be invited to intervene on one side or the other. At the same time we knew of no way to seal off Congo. Ball anxious Home understand present developments not of our making. We had not wanted a military, but a political solution and had been fearful of an outbreak of fighting that could lead to prolonged conflict in which UN role would appear progressively more ambiguous. Once UN undertook military operations which on the available evidence appeared to have occurred in response Katanga provocation US believed action must be tightly controlled with the limited objective of depriving Tshombe of any other course of action but carrying out reconciliation plan. US “horrified” when UN forces moved towards Jadotville and had made strong representation to Thant. Ball indicated we had planned send Cleveland to Congo to appraise situation but had “postponed” trip when Thant raised objections and indicated he was sending Bunche. Ball said that info on Bunche visit was closely held at present and stressed that UK knowledge of his trip should not be divulged. Our impression is that UN is in “disarray” and that Thant wishes time to put his house in order. We have made clear to UN that we will support SYG but only if he gets his house in order. We believe Bunche may fire Kebede who appears to be ignoring New York instructions. We unclear on Gardiner role.
Greenhill welcomed this news and said UK view is that UN personnel in Congo regarded themselves individually as Nelsons turning blind eye to New York instructions.
Greenhill asked if US felt getting Tshombe to E’ville was “constructive”. He said UK felt that Tshombe’s presence was imperative since no substitute leader was in prospect. He indicated UK view that Tshombe in E’ville would make less mischief than elsewhere. He had no knowledge [Page 809] of Tshombe’s present whereabouts but believed he could be reached. (Earlier Greenhill indicated to Dept officer that Tshombe in Kolwezi.) Greenhill stated that UK would not permit Tshombe to return again to Northern Rhodesia.
Ball said US Government position is that Tshombe’s presence in Katanga is “necessary” to solution of situation since we likewise knew of no effective alternative leader with prestige necessary to maintain Katanga as going concern within a federated Congo. Said we favored ultimately constitutional arrangement giving some measure of local autonomy to Katanga within Congo federation. Greenhill asked if he could repeat to London US view that we favored return of Tshombe and Ball replied affirmatively. However this should be on basis that would assure no repetition of previous filibusters.
Ball did indicate we had one problem with Tshombe’s return to E’ville relating to his use of the three Consuls. We had instructed Dean that we did not approve Tshombe using Consuls as “bodyguards” but had no objection that if requested by UN Dean might be present at airport with other Consuls provided UN arranged protection satisfactory to Tshombe. Greenhill said their man not to be present at airport unless other Consuls there. He noted that UK had cooled considerably on idea of having its Consul escort Tshombe.
Ball informed Greenhill that we had offered to assist Belgians in draining flooded mines and getting other UMHK installations back into operation.
In conclusion, Greenhill said that the UK Government would welcome having UN operations brought under control and would be reassured at Under Secretary’s remarks regarding return of Tshombe.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/1–363. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Beaudry, Ball’s Special Assistant George S. Springsteen, Jr., and Ball and approved by Ball. Also sent to Léopoldville and Elisabethville and repeated to Brussels and USUN.↩
- A memorandum of conversation by Beaudry is ibid., 332.70G/1–363.↩
- See Documents 372 and 378.↩