Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

399. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium¹

Washington, January 3, 1963, 2:25 p.m.

976. Eyes only Ambassador from Secretary. Please see or telephone Spaak with this personal message from me:

“Dear Mr. Minister: I want you to know how distressed I am over the great difficulties which the events of the last day or two in the Katanga, particularly the reported slaying of two Belgian women by Indian troops advancing into Jadotville, have caused you.² I also want you to know that we did not approve the move to Jadotville and had, along with you, obtained the most categorical assurances from UN New York that such a move would not be made. It is clear that there has been a serious problem of discipline as between UN New York and UN authorities in the Congo and I personally have made the strongest representations to UN New York on this matter. Bunche leaves New York tonight for the Congo to assure either strict discipline or the dismissal of those who refuse to obey orders.

I have personally insisted to UN New York that Tshombe be given every opportunity for a prompt peaceful political settlement along the lines on which you and we have agreed.³ UN New York accepts this but the problem remains to get it carried out in the Congo.

I can understand that you may find it necessary to disassociate yourself from this latest move to Jadotville. We will not say anything to cut across your statement of concern but we hope you can stop short of what might be interpreted as a complete breach between you and U Thant. Under all the circumstances, we do not anticipate a public protest of the move to Jadotville partly because of our strong private pressures upon the UN and partly because we feel we should be in a position to help pick up the pieces and see what ought now to be done. I do hope that Tshombe and his backers will now see that there is no political or military solution available to them along the lines of secession and that common prudence requires them to accept the reasonable and minimum steps involved in the Thant reconciliation plan. We will do our best to ensure that the UN and Adoula keep this path open in order that Katanga can be a part of a federal Congo as a going concern.

With personal regards, Dean Rusk.”⁴

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/1–363. Secret; Niact. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by McGhee and Ball.
2. In a telephone conversation with Ball earlier that afternoon, McGhee stated that MacArthur had telephoned to tell him that two Belgian women had been killed by U.N. troops moving into Jadotville and that Spaak was “going to blast the UN in the morning.” McGhee told Ball that he was going to inform Rusk, because Spaak wanted him to know. (Record of telephone conversation on January 3, 12:45 p.m.; Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Congo) MacArthur reported Spaak’s views in more detail in telegram 952 from Brussels, January 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/1–363)
3. In a telephone conversation with Bunche that morning, Rusk stated that he had talked to the President by telephone and that “it continues to be very important for it to be known if Tshombe is ready to talk business everybody else is ready to talk business with him.” (Record of telephone conversation by Phyllis D. Bernau, January 3, 9:52 a.m.; ibid., Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls)
4. Telegram 959 from Brussels, January 4, transmitted a message from Spaak to Rusk stating that Thant’s latest communique had clarified the situation and that Spaak would be able to avoid a break with him. (Ibid., Central Files, 770G.00/1–463) A U.N. statement issued on January 3 stated that there had occurred in the Jadotville operation “a serious breakdown in effective communication and co-ordination” between U.N. Headquarters and Léopoldville. For text, see U.N. doc. S/5053/Add.14/Annex XXXIII; also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 918–919.