Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

401. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo¹

Washington, January 3, 1963, 6:10 p.m.

1020. Eyes only for Ambassadors from Secretary. Following comments are for your information and guidance on several points connected with your heavy responsibilities in this moment of flux and crisis in Congo.

1. As you may have sensed, we may be faced with major constitutional issue within UN as between UNSYG and UN civilian and military representatives in Congo. Bunche’s imminent arrival is related to this issue. Nothing could discredit or destroy UN role in Congo more completely than refusal UN representatives to carry out loyally directives from SYG. It is one thing for such representatives to give SYG full benefit their views but quite another for them to fail to respond in letter and spirit to directives received from him. On this issue USG will fully support SYG by every possible means, otherwise responsibility UN and member governments vanishes and events are given over to those who represent no one. If SYG cannot control UN operations in Congo, we would have to review entire question US support for UN presence. If you are consulted by anyone on this point your advice should be that SYG’s directives are to be absolutely obeyed and that no UN representative has any authority to do otherwise.

2. Regarding threat of GOC breach of relations with United Kingdom, you should continue to put full weight of USG against any such petulant and irresponsible move. As you know we are closer to UK insistence upon prompt peaceful settlement than GOC apparently aware. I am concerned lest this gap in their understanding put us in bad faith position with respect both to London and Léopoldville, but perhaps next few days will clarify. In any event, a breach of relations with UK cannot be accepted by us without a basic review of our own attitude toward Adoula. It is not in his interest to force us to choose between himself and Britain over a senseless gesture on his part which would deeply embarrass those of us who have been trying to support him. You should not hesitate to be as rough as necessary to prevent any such move by Adoula, making it quite clear to him that such a step would seriously affect attitude of USG toward maturity of GOC and its ability to carry out its responsibilities for governing the Congo. We do not ask Adoula to agree in every respect with UK but a show of contempt for a great power which has contributed a great deal to the Congo (and has been and remains second largest financial contributor to UN Congo operation) is not acceptable. If necessary to invoke, you should inform Adoula that you have been instructed, in the event of GOC breach of relations with UK, to return to Washington pending a reconsideration by the USG of its own position.

3. Regarding our main objectives in Congo, they remain the accomplishment of a political settlement in framework of SYG’s reconciliation plan. We fully realize this requires major actions from the Katangan side but it also requires readiness GOC and UN to bring about same result. Prolonged UN military occupation and administration of Katanga is not possible, for many reasons. Nor can we look upon an attempted GOC administration of a hostile South Katanga as a feasible solution. Bomboko revealed part of the reasons in urging that an ANC battalion be brigaded with UN forces and be introduced to Katangans gradually over a period of time. Preferred solution still seems to us to be incorporation of South Katanga under its own leadership into a federal Congo. This is the Lincolnesque solution, a preferred alternative to the two decades of “reconstruction” which followed his death. Adoula’s New Year statement was most encouraging, if he means it as we assume he does. Burden is now on Tshombe to perform immediately if he expects to salvage any serious role in the Congo.

4. I appreciate your vigorous efforts to move the UMHK payments scheme along, and your success in getting Adoula to make statement with just the right statesmanlike tone—and the right Lincoln quote.²These are trying days of great difficulty for you and your staff. We are heavily depending on your continued capacity to keep your shirts on, your perspective broad, and your spirits high despite the frustrations which no doubt still lie ahead.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/1–363. Secret; Niact; No Other Distribution. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Cleveland, who also initialed for Williams. Repeated to USUN, London, and Brussels.
2. See footnote 1, Document 395. Telegram 1639 from Léopoldville reported that Adoula had quoted from Lincoln’s second inaugural address, beginning, “With malice toward none”.