Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

372. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Nassau, December 19, 1962, 6 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Congo

PARTICIPANTS

• US
  • The President
  • Secretary McNamara
  • Mr. Ball
  • Mr. Bundy
  • Ambassador Bruce
  • Mr. Tyler
• UK
  • The Prime Minister
  • Lord Home
  • Ambassador Ormsby Gore
  • Mr. Bligh, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
  • Mr. P. de Zulueta

The President outlined the concern of the United States about the Congo and the situation Adoula was in. There was a possibility he might collapse. The UN was running out of money. The Indian forces would be leaving the Congo in March. There existed a possibility of hostilities. Should Adoula fall, chaos would ensue, thus providing an opportunity for the Soviets to get back into the Congo by supporting Adoula’s successor. Tshombe would be opposed by a government supported by the Soviets, who would in turn obtain the support of local African governments. There would be lots of trouble ahead for the West and the question was: What should be done? One possibility would be to let the situation drift as it is now doing, the UN would withdraw and Adoula would collapse. Another course would be to support the UN effort as much as possible. This would mean making it clear to Tshombe that the UN stands solidly behind the reconciliation plan. This is the course that we have decided to be the right one. We realize it may bring on a military clash and we have therefore sent a military mission to the Congo to see what kind of support we might give to the UN there. Should things go wrong we would both be in an unfavorable position. The President said he was not concerned so much with the situation as it exists now in December, but rather as it might turn out to be in June, next year. He said that we do not have a vested interest in Adoula, but we feel that we must try to do something rather than sit by and see the UN destroyed. We have been working closely with Spaak to see what pressure can be effectively brought to bear on Tshombe.

The Prime Minister called on Lord Home to speak. Lord Home said that there was no easy answer to the problem before us. He did not think that either the US or the UK could be blamed. Lord Home then repeated at some length the familiar UK position which he set forth at the Bermuda Conference in December 1961,² and more recently in Paris at dinner with the Secretary of State on December 11.³ He said he thought that the present course would lead to the US having to occupy the Katanga, it would probably involve the destruction of that province’s mineral wealth. He felt that what was required was that the UN role should change from a military one to providing economic assistance and technical aid. The UN should not get involved in imposing a political pattern on a particular country. This is what Adoula was asking the UN to do. Should this work, what would the UN role be in relation to other comparable African problems? Would the UN, for example, insist on Nyasaland being kept by force in the Federation?

The President pointed out that Lord Home was invoking cases of a different nature. The situation we faced was that we were in the Congo now, and that we want to keep the Soviets out. We have no interest in the UN or ourselves extending our role further afield. Lord Home said that Tshombe had already agreed to pay revenues to the Monetary Council of the GOC. U Thant should now say that the financial aspect is now being settled, and that the other problem to be solved is that of the constitution. U Thant should take this opportunity to convert the UN’s role from a military one to that of economic assistance.

Mr. Ball said that our reading of the situation is a little different. The UMHK was unwilling to move ahead without Tshombe’s authorization, and Tshombe said he won’t move unless his conditions are met. Mr. Ball pointed out that we have looked into the Congo problem in depth and have considered all other possible solutions. He thought the Soviets would seize the opportunity to fish in troubled waters. If Adoula were to fall, any successor government would surely turn to the Soviets for help. He thought that in order to exert any effective pressure on Tshombe and Adoula we must make it clear to Tshombe that he is dealing with the United States as well as with the UN. We are considering putting an air squadron in Kamina. We think the chances are pretty good that we can achieve this without any fighting, and the UN feels confident of this.

Lord Home inquired dryly whether the United States Government was doing all this under any UN resolution. Mr. Ball said that we were taking this action under two requests: one from the UN for military equipment, such as armed cars, jeeps, trucks, etc. The other was a request from Adoula to all the UN participating powers for air support. This would be after Adoula had met our requirements and made the necessary concessions. Mr. Ball said that this course of action would be agreeable to the UN Secretary General, who felt that this was the right way of proceeding. Adoula would then prorogue Parliament and rule by decree.

At this point Lord Home inquired with a note of incredulousness whether Mr. Ball meant to say that the United States Government would tell Adoula to dismiss the Congolese Parliament and rule by decree. Was the United States Government going to tell the world this? Personally speaking, he was all for the United States taking over a new African colony: “Best idea I have heard in years.”

The Prime Minister said that it was relatively easy to make financial arrangements, but the constitutional issue was more difficult. Mr. Ball pointed out that the first constitution was a monstrosity with nearly 250 articles. There should be an agreement on a series of provisions which would give Tshombe an appropriate measure of autonomy within the framework of the Congo. Sir David Ormsby Gore asked whether Mobutu, who controls the armed forces, would support Adoula. Mr. Ball said he thought there was a chance of his doing so, if he thought things would work. Lord Home said he thought there was a good chance of reaching a basis for agreement in the financial and economic field. Tshombe had asked for additional amounts of revenues, and this request could be handled. Mr. Ball said he was more pessimistic than Lord Home about the chances of success.

The President asked Lord Home what he would do.

Lord Home said we should get Tshombe to agree with the financial arrangements, and then get the UN out within the next few months. He saw no future in military operations which would involve the destruction of the UMHK. He thought that if things went on in the present way, Tshombe might get fed up with Léopoldville and make a deal with Northern Rhodesia. Mr. Ball said that reaching agreement on financial transactions was not in itself enough.

The Prime Minister said the US should take over the Congo and “make Tshombe into some kind of a Maharajah, with US support.” He was afraid that any military intervention would just get larger and larger and that the process would be difficult to reverse or to halt. Lord Home commented that it would really mean US occupation. Should things go wrong with the Spaak plan, he thought that there would be a second stage involving voluntary abstention from Katangese copper and cobalt. However, he did not feel that this would be effective, that economic pressures would not do the job.

The President asked Ambassador Thompson what his judgment was about the Soviets coming in.

Ambassador Thompson stressed the disadvantage and dangers of Soviet intervention. This would not consist of massive military action at first, but in the subversion and infiltration of the Congolese Government and administration. Mr. Ball then outlined the kind of deal which might be made with Tshombe on the basis of concessions by Adoula. Sir David Ormsby Gore asked what the United States would do should Tshombe turn such a deal down. He also asked what right the UN would have to take military action. Mr. Ball said that the UN was not proposing military action but to take the measures necessary to ensure freedom of movement throughout the Katanga. The Prime Minister said that if he were Tshombe, he certainly wouldn’t give up his two main cards, economic resources plus his army.

The President said that our more limited goal was to make it possible for the UN to get out. We wanted to establish an effective relationship with the GOC. We would like to try to make the economic plan work, with Spaak’s support and assistance. We were prepared to send someone to see Tshombe. Once the situation was stabilized the UN role could come to an end.

The Prime Minister repeated that Tshombe would not divest himself of both his instruments until and unless the nine points have been met.

The President said he thought the discussion had gone about as far as it could. We would do our best to get Tshombe to come to an agreement. Mr. Ball said that the UMHK would only make payments if there is full agreement between Tshombe and Adoula, because it feared the consequences for itself otherwise. The President said he would be glad if the UK Government could examine ways in which it might be helpful to us in our efforts.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 325.70G/12–1962. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and approved by the White House on December 31. The conversation was held at the Prime Minister’s house. For Macmillan’s recollections of the discussion of the Congo at Nassau, see At the End of the Day, 1961–1963, p. 283.
2. See Document 177.
3. Secto 6, December 13, reported Rusk’s discussions with Home during and after dinner on December 11. Concerning the Congo, Home expressed essentially the same views as he had a year earlier at the Bermuda conference. He expressed opposition to any form of sanctions, arguing that they would not be effective. He said he had sent a personal message to Tshombe encouraging him to authorize payments to the Congolese Government, but he was pessimistic as to the outcome. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 533, CF 2197)