Office of the Historian

378. Memorandum of Conversation1

Nassau, December 21, 1962, noon.

SUBJECT

  • The Congo

PARTICIPANTS

  • Great Britain:
    • The Prime Minister
    • Lord Home
    • Mr. Thorneycroft
    • Mr. Duncan Sandys
    • Lord Hood
    • Sir Robert Scott
  • United States:
    • The President
    • Under Secretary Ball
    • Ambassador Bruce
    • Mr. McGeorge Bundy
    • Ambassador Thompson
    • Mr. Paul H. Nitze
    • Mr. William R. Tyler

The President said that we were giving full support to Spaak’s plan. On the other hand, if the UN were militarily unable to carry out any additional [Page 775] action which might be required, the question was how we could get the UN out without this being a defeat. Mr. Ball said that we were putting additional military equipment into the Congo in support of the UN forces.

Lord Home restated the British position (see Memorandum of Conversation of December 20).2 Perhaps progress could be made by joint approach to the UMHK to get agreement for six months. A basis for this would be agreement on the division of revenue. Mr. Ball said the latter would not be enough. Lord Home said the problem was how to “bump Tshombe off his request for additional revenues”. Mr. Ball pointed out that the problem of secession was a major one. Until the GOC gets satisfied, it will turn anywhere it can for support.

Lord Home discounted the likelihood of Soviet intervention in the Congo. Mr. Ball reminded him of the recent Soviet demarche to U Thant.

In answer to a question by the President, Mr. Ball said that the UMHK will move only if there is agreement between Tshombe and Adoula.

Lord Home suggested that if Tshombe was told the UN would leave in six months time, he might play along. He said the UN had never paid attention to the main issue, which was to achieve an acceptable basis for reconciliation on the constitutional point.

The President said that the purpose of the Truman Mission to the Congo was to obtain military information. He said we would not want either to get into a fight or to have the UN run out of the Congo.

Lord Home said that to get the UN out would be the lesser of two evils. Mr. Ball expressed concern about the creation of a vacuum in the Congo, without the secession issue having been settled.

After some further inconclusive discussion, Lord Home said that the UK would send a message to Tshombe, after checking with Spaak, so as not to cross wires with anything that Spaak and McGhee might have worked out. He reiterated his worry about the US Military Mission.

Mr. Ball said we would tell Tshombe we were not out to destroy him. He said we are already sending a message to Adoula to bring pressure to bear on him.

Lord Home said that if Adoula were to dismiss the Parliament, perhaps this would be a good time for him to come to New York. He added that he now had an idea of what the US Government was trying to achieve, and repeated that the UK would send a message to Tshombe to try to get him to come along and to reassure him that the US is not trying [Page 776] to drive him out. He added that the UK could keep quiet until and unless a new resolution was introduced into the UN authorizing the use of force. He said the UK would have to vote against such a resolution. He suggested that a way might be found to give Tshombe some kind of substitute for six months, which would be equivalent to the 30% of the revenues which Tshombe would otherwise forfeit under the proposed arrangement.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 325.70G/12–1962. Secret. Drafted by Tyler. According to Kennedy’s appointment book, the conversation took place at the Prime Minister’s residence between 11:07 a.m. and 12:05 p.m. (Kennedy Library)↩
  2. Reference is apparently to Document 372. No record of any discussion of the Congo at Nassau on December 20 has been found.↩