Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

251. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, June 27, 1962, 8:55 p.m.

3346. Re Congo. Léopoldville pass E’ville by pouch. In today’s meeting with Spaak on next phase Congo strategy you should take following line:

1. Breakdown in Adoula-Tshombe talks² without final agreed communique laying down basic agreement and establishing technical commission brings us to another critical juncture on Congo. In our judgment UN mediatory efforts must continue and new proposals for Gardiner are needed that have reasonable prospect stopping dangerous drift, bringing about early end to Katanga secession, and avoiding early Security Council meeting which we believe USSR and African nationalists will press for at early date. We agree with Spaak we must reaffirm our determination support UN in pressing forward with steps necessary to bring its mediation efforts to successful outcome.

2. In these circumstances, we believe it essential for US and Belgium together put forward new proposal to Thant and Gardiner which latter can present, after appropriate prior private consultations, to Adoula and Tshombe as UN’s considered judgment as to what is reasonable solution to present impasse. Our intention would be to help UN both publicly and privately to secure acceptance of Adoula and Tshombe such reasonable solution. Our proposal would involve renewed attempt by Gardiner to seek balanced agreement between Adoula and Tshombe on constitutional principles and on practical measures for achieving reintegration Katanga along lines London agreement (London’s 4208)³ and proposal agreed here with Spaak (Deptel 2073 Léopoldville, rptd USUN 3194).⁴ We would combine inducements and measures to secure agreement.

3. Proposal would encompass two parts designed (a) to get two parties to agree to constitutional arrangements and practical measures for resolution of major issues involved in Katanga reintegration and which have been mandated to four technical commissions, and (b) measures to secure agreement which would be divided into two parts, those that can be taken now by governments and by UN and those that are more likely to risk possible use of force and might require new Security Council mandate. Such Adoula-Tshombe agreement could become directive to four technical commissions to work out necessary details of implementation.

4. As first step, we envisage Gardiner seeking agreement of Adoula and then Tshombe to constitutional principles and to practical measures for bringing about Katanga integration into Congo. Constitutional principles would define redistribution of powers between Central Government and provinces which would give genuine local autonomy to latter but give essential powers to Central Government. Such powers would include foreign affairs, national defense (including integration of non-police functions of Katanga gendarmerie), customs, currency post and telecommunications, exchange control, national taxation and national and foreign commerce. This is distribution agreed on in London and should be acceptable to GOB as well as UK. Included in the practical, immediate measures for bringing about integration would be: (a) sharing of Katangan revenues on 50–50 basis; (b) Katanga agreement for gradual practical integration of its forces into national army under provisions to be worked out by technical commission; (c) Katangan agreement to stationing UN troops in Jadotville, Kolwezi, and Kipushi; (d) reopening of national route; (e) resumption interior trade and communications; (f) allocation to Katanga of some ministerial portfolios in Central Government. As previously discussed with Spaak, we believe above agreement would be facilitated by offer of financial support to GOC subject to establishment of controls that would ensure sound fiscal and foreign exchange management (see Deptel 2073 to Léopoldville marked “Subheading”).

5. Measures to secure agreement would be planned in two stages, with the second coming into play only if necessary and only after further consultations and agreement between US and GOB and UN.

a) Measures that can be taken under present mandate provided GOB, GOC and UN cooperate include the following and would be adopted as soon as possible and as needed to back up Gardiner mediation:

i) Seek GOB agreement withhold dividend payments UMHK shares belonging CSK portfolio holdings;

ii) Seek GOB agreement take measures freeze Katangan assets in Belgium and make outpayments subject to individual licensing;

(iii) US and GOB urge GOC to pass legislation on division of revenues which will make it illegal pay taxes and surrender export proceeds to GOK except as specified in legislation. Belgian Govt could collect import taxes on shipments to Congo in Belgian ports. Request GOB take supporting action bring Belgian trade with Katanga under fiscal control Léopoldville.

(iv) Seek GOC agreement to program for fiscal and foreign exchange controls to ensure sound and effective use external aid. UN, US, GOB and donor countries would concert soonest on working out such control scheme.

(v) Threat of GOB to withdraw its technicians from Katanga if Tshombe did not accept or implement agreement.

(vi) Increased economic assistance which would benefit entire Congo, including Katanga; such assistance being linked to agreement of two parties on constitutional principles.

b) If no effective progress made toward integration within reasonable period (30 days), US and GOB would consult with Thant about other measures and determine at time whether Security Council meeting required give mandate for such UN action. Measures that would be taken by UN with US and GOB support after agreement, could include some or all of following:

(i) Stationing of UN troops in three towns (if not achieved previously by agreement), to provide security at company installations and important economic facilities.

(ii) UN backing of GOC customs authorities who will halt shipments on which taxes not paid to protect them against Katangan attacks on Elisabethville perimeter and at such points along railroad as are feasible and effective. This would be basically military judgment depending on capabilities at time. Meanwhile, UN would proceed with contingency plans and preparations.

(iii) UK would require all mineral and copper exports to move from Katanga via Matadi after Lubilash bridge completed near end of August so that GOC could assert customs authority over such shipments.

(iv) If necessary, blockade would be established at border points leading to Angola and Rhodesia in order enforce (iii) above.

Above is to be regarded as broad outline of plan. Points we regard as essential are:

1. UN undertake new mediation effort (along lines Bunker model on issue of West New Guinea)⁵ in which formula for negotiation and pattern of ultimate agreement is developed and presented by mediator. We have results of London meeting and our discussions with Spaak in Washington earlier this month to guide us on acceptable and reasonable formula. At appropriate time this formula might be made public if such disclosure would be likely promote agreement.

2. Sequence would be: (a) get Belgian agreement; (b) secure Thant agreement by means joint US-Belgian demarche; (c) get Thant recall Gardiner for consultations to discuss our plan; (d) get Gardiner make proposal to Adoula emphasizing appropriate inducements, including fact our plan effectively reintegrates Katanga into the Congo, and that united Congo could expect increased economic assistance. Adoula would also be informed of inducements and other measures to secure agreement; (e) assuming Adoula agreement, proposal would be made to Tshombe stressing that constitutional arrangement would leave Katanga with substantial measure of autonomy with opportunity participate on national scene, and prospects of Katanga continuing retain equitable share Katanga revenue. Tshombe would also have to be made fully aware as to consequences his failure to agree; (f) UK would be kept informed throughout.

3. Constitutional arrangement should be viewed separately from measures to secure agreement on which we must be flexible and uncommitted in first phase.

4. Such measures in turn must be viewed as divided into two parts: those (mainly economic) which can be taken unilaterally and without further mandate since they involve limited risks; those that involve greater risks of force and which therefore broaden mandate on which Thant would judge he must go to Security Council.

5. We would like avoid latter since Security Council meeting unpredictable and may involve loss of control by responsible parties.

Comment on SYG’s Ideas

We hope SYG will keep situation fluid in CAC June 28 meeting and that in fact he will avoid discussion specific next step. While we are not sanguine as to its positive effects, we prepared, pursuant Thant’s request, to encourage Tshombe agree to participation of Conakats in Central Government and to accept offer of Vice Presidency. As to economic sanctions against Katanga suggested by Thant, you will note that his ideas have been incorporated as appropriate stages above plan. In particular, however, we wish you to note that freezing of assets by Belgians would contemplate as first stage measure which does not require broader mandate whereas other steps suggested by Thant properly belong in second stage enforcement measures.

Subject results your conversations, Dept plans on drafting above proposal in as precise terms as possible which might become document that Gardiner would present to Adoula.

Ball

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/6–2762. Confidential. Drafted by Sisco and Pelcovits; cleared by Cleveland, Burdett, Tasca, Ball, and Dungan; and approved by McGhee. Repeated to Brussels, London, Léopoldville, and Paris.
2. The Adoula–Tshombe talks ended early in the morning of June 26 without agreement on a joint communique The two sides had previously agreed to establish four commissions: military, monetary, transport and communications, and economic and fiscal. They had determined the terms of reference for the four commissions but had agreed that none of them would start to function until the final joint communique was signed. A statement issued to the press by Gardiner on June 26 (U.N. doc. S/5053/Add.10/Annex 46) is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 862–863.
3. Reference is to the paper transmitted in Document 236. Telegram 4208 transmitted a draft of that paper; see footnote 2, Document 235.
4. Document 246.
5. Former Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker was acting as mediator in negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands on this issue; documentation is printed in vol. XXIII, Documents 143 ff.