Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

246. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo¹

Washington, June 10, 1962, 2:08 p.m.

2073. For Ambassador. Verbatim text.

We believe Gardiner’s current approach of commissions must be supplemented in order to result in early liquidation of secession and agreement on constitutional principles. Our purpose is to facilitate Gardiner’s task by supplying adequate support so as to assure the achievement of our objectives. An early solution is needed because of erosion of GOC both politically and financially. Immediate measures are required for currency stabilization. We are envisaging a plan to propose to United Nations and GOC whereby major new aid will be given the GOC provided it agrees to adequate controls over the utilization of foreign exchange and to a beginning of budgetary control.

Economic stabilization in the Congo is inseparable from a political solution.

As solution of political problem we propose a package including essential irrevocable steps to be implemented immediately affecting Katangan secession, which Adoula requires, and agreement on principles which two parties would agree they would support in drafting a new constitution which would assure Tshombe of reasonable autonomy. We consider that two parties should be asked to accept constitutional principles agreed to in London unless they can reach prompt mutual agreement on another basis. In this connection product of constitutional commission which has been working in Léopoldville since January, if agreed, might serve as a useful base.

The two parties in our judgement can be persuaded to agree to this package by the following measures:

A. Of interest to Adoula

1. Irreversible agreement on reunification of Katanga. Adoula would be informed that if Tshombe did not accept or implement agreement government of Belgium would withdraw its technicians from Katanga, and our two governments would support United Nations protection of customs collection by GOC at some point on railroad leading out of Katanga. The irreversible character would be assured by the immediate measures worked out in London with addition of following:

a. to ensure that Katanga gendermarie is not used in the future to reverse the agreement, Katanga would agree to immediate stationing of major elements of UNOC troops in Jadotville, Kolwezi, and Kipushi.

b. foreign exchange on all exports from Congo including Katanga will be paid to a technical organ which we propose be set up to control utilization of foreign exchange and eventually budget.

2. An additional fund would be established to support Congolese foreign exchange.

B. Of interest to Tshombe

1. The agreement on constitutional principles, the implementation of which we would do our utmost to ensure. We would link the donation of funds to support Congolese foreign exchange to the acceptance and implementation of the constitutional principles the two parties agree to support.

2. The reluctance of Tshombe to join his somewhat brighter economy to that of the rest of the Congo would be overcome by our insistence that the GOC agree to procedures assuring sound fiscal management along the lines of the attached paper.

Subheading

Policy envisaged with regard additional funds to support Congolese foreign exchange and measures to assure sound fiscal and foreign exchange management

1. Any further donations will only be given upon establishment of some satisfactory form of control.

2. Such control would include, among other things, foreign exchange control. Included in foreign exchange would be that generated in the Congo including provincial as well as central government and that donated by other governments or persons.

3. A further condition would be an arrangement to assure that internal expenditures would be not in excess or outside of the existing budget.

4. Control would be exercised through a semi-autonomous authority responsive to the Prime Minister and to the United Nations, and agreeable to the donors. This authority would not be immediately within jurisdiction of Prime Minister so as to avoid political consequences of denying improper requests. However, the authority should not be directly under United Nations either because that would deny too completely the sovereignty of the Congo.

5. The authority would not itself issue individual import and exchange licenses but would approve categories for which licenses might be issued. Authority would have right to audit licenses issued with understanding that funds could be withheld if individual licenses were improperly issued.

6. No new long-term economic aid would be provided unless the central government would accept the setting up of a new budget perhaps only for six months more reasonably balanced than the present one. Responsibility for review and coordination concerning the budget would be vested in the aforementioned authority.²

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/6–1062. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Vance, Williams, Hutchinson, and Spaak’s private secretary Viscount Etienne Davignon; cleared by MacArthur and McGhee, in draft by Wallner, and in substance by Hutchinson and Rusk; seen in draft by Rothschild; and approved by Williams. Repeated to Brussels, USUN, London, and Paris.
2. Telegram 2072 to Léopoldville, June 10, stated that Spaak and Rusk had agreed in principle on the package set forth in telegram 2073. It requested Gullion’s comments on the package, on the Congo’s economic and financial situation, and on the prospects for Adoula’s acceptance of the package. (Ibid.)