Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

252. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, June 28, 1962, 9 p.m.

4139. Congo.

1. Stevenson, Yost and Loridan (Belgium) met with SYG and Bunche this A.M. to review discussions between U.S. and Belgian reps yesterday (ourtel 4131).² Stevenson reported on conversations with Spaak: (a) Belgium willing to urge Katangan participation in central govt as Thant proposed Tues,³ (b) Belgium willing to withdraw technical personnel from Katanga as sanction if that necessary, (c) Belgium would cooperate with UK, U.S. and others in joint economic sanctions if they were undertaken jointly, (d) Belgium did not feel it could have much effect on UMHK re remittances to Katanga.

2. Loridan then reported on procedure he and Spaak had worked out fol yesterday’s talk with Stevenson. In first stage Belgian rep would tell Tshombe terms he has been offered by GOC with UN help are very good and should be accepted. In this connection Loridan said Belgium would need precise info on status of negots: fiscal terms, Katangan participation in govt, constitutional terms, etc., so that it would know precisely what Tshombe had been offered. Bunche said he felt latest report from Gardiner to SC (S/5053/Add.10)⁴ should provide most of info Belgians desired. Loridan said during first stage Belgian rep would tell Tshombe SC mtg imminent with probability of tougher mandate against Katanga being issued, that economic sanctions were likely and that Belgium would probably have to withdraw technical assistance (Loridan said this would mean particularly teachers).

3. If no change came in Katanga policy, second approach would be made in which specific sanctions would be spelled out. Stevenson asked why two-stage approach required. Talks so far had made no real progress. Time was running out. Loridan replied specific sanctions not yet agreed upon. First stage approach could be made right away and in meantime precise sanctions could be discussed.

4. Bunche confirmed Stevenson’s estimation that little progress had in fact been made in recent weeks. He said Kimba has recently been demanding UN get Katanga agreement for its administrative arrangements in Katanga; he mentioned specifically that Kimba has demanded Katanga clearance for financing of fuel UN bringing in from Rhodesia to use in movement of Baluba refugees. Bunche said UN has drawn line against this demand and refused any such authority to Katanga, a provincial govt. Thant noted Munongo and Kimba consider time on their side and seem to be stalling. Bunche added they are probably right since Katanga appears to be receiving about 65 million per year income from UMHK while in meantime danger grows that Adoula will fall.

5. Stevenson then asked Loridan if first stage approach to Tshombe could be taken next week. Loridan said Spaak would meet with Cabinet on Friday and soon thereafter instructions could probably be sent to Belgian rep in Katanga.

6. Discussions then turned to question of possible sanctions. Loridan noted financial burden for blockade of Katanga would be heavy. There was discussion of problem of getting UK support (it was considered impossible to get Portuguese support) for stoppage of Katanga exports. When Stevenson asked point blank whether any effective blockade enforceable, Thant said UK would not agree to complete shutoff of traffic through Angola; however, that was not required. His objective was to restore what he called “normal” traffic by which he meant that majority of Katanga exports should move via Matadi (as at time of independence) while some would flow through Angola.

7. Loridan’s response to Stevenson was that “we should not bluff” since for two years we have been telling Tshombe his time running short. His advisors “who are intelligent men” would tell him new threats were not real.

8. Bunche said he would like to inquire further about Spaak’s position that Belgian Govt could not have much effect on UMHK. Loridan said UMHK’s position was that if they took measures against Tshombe he would nationalize their property. Bunche and Thant both replied UN give protection immediately to UMHK and other major properties in such eventuality under UN mandate to maintain law and order. Bunche said only provisos would be UN force would need (a) some advance notice and (b) transport support (he mentioned 200 trucks). Thant added UMHK should be aware financial pressure on UN such that unless solution found soon new mandate would be required from SC.

9. Loridan replied UN action against Katanga nationalization could lead to fighting and that should be avoided. Thant replied it was necessary achieve objectives even if some use of force required.

10. Discussion then followed concerning fundamental question of kind of pressure could be organized, economic or military, and whether any effective pressure on Tshombe was possible without willingness ultimately to use force. Loridan took position that secession must be ended and that force should be avoided.

11. During conversation Bunche noted UN has now taken firm decision that Katanga must not bring additional troops into Eville for Independence Day parade. He said Katanga now talking about bringing in from 1000–3000 troops. Bunche also reported Gardiner feels we should stay in Leo for national independence celebration and therefore probably would not return to New York until Monday.⁵ In meanwhile, we understand Rikhye leaving tonight for Leo to act as counter-balance to Khiari who would otherwise be in charge during Gardiner’s absence.

Stevenson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/6–2862. Confidential. Repeated to Brussels, Léopoldville, Paris, and London.
2. Telegram 4131 from USUN, June 27, reported a meeting among Stevenson, Yost, Wallner, Spaak, and Loridan. (Ibid., 770G.00/6–2762)
3. June 26; see Document 250.
4. Dated June 27; it summarized the March 15–June 26 Adoula-Tshombe discussions. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 863–869.
5. July 2.