Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

236. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, May 18, 1962, 6 p.m.

4263. Congo Tripartite Talks. Verbatim text. Embtel 4218.² Following is English text “aide-memoire on Congolese reconciliation” as prepared by Foreign Office. French text (which takes precedence) being pouched:

A Provisional Solution

It is impossible for Adoula to modify the Loi Fondamentale on his own initiative and without following due constitutional procedures. Mr. Tshombe no longer accepts the application of the Loi Fondamentale in its present form. The putting into effect of a new constitution will take too long. The situation is full of danger.

It is therefore necessary to consider a provisional solution calculated to ensure in an irrevocable manner the re-entry of Katanga into the Republic of the Congo while waiting for the promulgation of a new constitution providing for a more decentralized regime.

This provisional solution would provide for the putting into effect immediately of a certain number of practical measures and the setting out of principles which the constitution ought to contain and upon which undertakings will be entered into forthwith.

The practical measures will favour the aspirations of the Central Government whilst the setting out of principles and the undertakings to include them in the constitution will provide for Katanga the guarantees which it seeks.

I. Immediate practical measures

A) Sharing of the revenues of Katanga (50 percent) between the Katanga and the Central Government, including those in foreign currencies. To make this sharing easier the Central Government might be advised to increase taxes on the export of mineral products.

B) A tripartite committee should exercise joint control over the command of the gendarmerie, see to it, so far as the gendarmerie is concerned, that the provisional agreements are carried out, and prepare a plan for the integration of the gendarmerie into a reorganized ANC.

C) Reopening of the national route, including the reconstruction of the bridge over the Lubilash River.

D) Resumption of communications and of internal exchanges.

E) Assignment to Katanga of some ministerial portfolios in the Central Government.

II. Constitutional principles

Division of powers in such a way as to establish, under a central government, real local autonomy.

(The two lists which follow are not comprehensive).

Powers of central government:

• Foreign Affairs
• National Defence
• Customs
• Foreign trade
• Internal trade of national interest and communications
• Nationality and immigration
• Currency, exchange control and national finance, including national taxation
• University education.

Local powers:

• Provincial police
• Administrative organization of the provinces
• Teaching, etc.

III. Long term solution

The constitution will be drawn up around the constitutional principles envisaged for the provisional solution.

IV. Methods which should help in carrying out this policy

1. Inducements

A) Belgium might offer to the Republic of the Congo a convention on bilateral technical assistance the scale of which would be fixed at a higher level than at present.

B) A plan of multilateral financial aid might be drawn up with a view to improving, through the United Nations, the financial situation and to lead to an improvement of the general economic position. This plan would also have as its object the re-establishment of a single Congolese currency. There would also be an opportunity to consider there the enlargement of the control exercised at present by the monetary council and the extension of its work to Katanga.

C) The United Nations would begin to put into effect a plan for the reorganization and re-equipment of the ANC in which Belgium as well as other countries would be ready to participate.

D) The possibility of increasing taxes on the export of mineral products (see 1 (A) above).

2. Methods of exercising pressure

A) Belgium would be led by the force of circumstances to limit its technical assistance.

B) The establishment of a multilateral plan for financial aid would become impossible.

C) All other international aid would become more difficult to provide.

Bruce

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/5–1862. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 9:08 p.m. and repeated to Brussels, Paris, USUN, and Léopoldville.
2. See footnote 1, Document 235.