Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XX, Congo Crisis

235. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, May 16, 1962, 8 p.m.

4225. Congo Tripartite Talks. Immediate preceding telegram Embassy’s telegram 4218² gives changes in text aide-memoire suggested by Rothschild³ as agreed final meeting May 16.

At conclusion deliberations Ambassador Bruce said paper would be submitted to Department but meeting should not gloss over fact that two important elements of US position not covered. These are:

(1) Need to place pressures on private companies (Tanganyika Concessions and Union Miniere) in such manner they will cooperate and accept theses that their own positions would be gravely threatened in absence re-integration Congo; and

(2) Agreement by UK and Belgium to join with the US in supporting the UN mediation effort even at risk of incurring hostilities.

Ambassador said most improbable that Department would agree accept paper in absence these two points.

Dundee had made UK position clear previously and repeated that, in view of Britain, renewal of fighting worse than any possible alternative. Britain would veto any UN resolution which might lead to renewal hostilities and, if fighting started, would have to withdraw its support of UN operation including financial contribution. Dundee said in Britain’s view UN military in Congo had made great blunders and Britain did not wish see more. Dundee believed these questions should be referred to higher level and paper should be accepted and used as indication of common level of agreement. He did not believe meeting should pursue discussion objectives on which representatives could not agree.

Paragraph C, 2, d, suggesting “methods of coercion” in Belgian draft⁴ was natural casualty of tripartite considerations, given attitude Britain. Rothschild explained he had advanced proposal in hope of finding formula resolve differences between US and UK although he was advancing suggestion on his own and might have difficulty persuading Spaak. Rothschild said blockage of exports by stationing small UN units Dilolo and Sakania (near Ndola) meets need cited by US and is less dangerous than US tax collection scheme. Chances of actual fighting less than placing collectors in Elisabethville. Closing these two points would be effective pressure on Tshombe and Katanga gendarmerie would have difficulty in attacking in view distance from bases.

Rothschild stated he didn’t particularly like suggestion and third round highly repugnant to Spaak. Any further resort to force most disagreeable to Belgians. Delegations agreed suggestion would be reported various governments, studied and perhaps brought forward at later time.

Stevens again referred Linner suggestion for stationing UN forces Jadotville and Kolwezi with Tshombe’s agreement.

Rothschild expressed view Linner’s suggestion weak since, if Tshombe prepared settle financial division with Adoula, protection these points not necessary. If no financial agreement made, introduction UN troops would be required protect water supplies, power lines, and other widely disbursed installations.

Stevens made clear HMG would be opposed UN going in without Tshombe agreement and should make every effort try get division revenues through negotiations.

Reference was made failure Kitona agreement at one point discussion. Fredericks mentioned fact Adoula, not Tshombe, had been under pressure to sign. Dundee said, on contrary, UK information was that Gullion had “bullied” Tshombe into signing and Tshombe “has been vigorously protesting ever since.” Fredericks emphatically made clear Tshombe was neither bullied or pressured by Gullion.

Dundee also at first opposed suggestion for restrictions on Katanga gendarmerie saying such restrictions in agreement might indicate lack trust in Tshombe. Ambassador Bruce made point in reply that US doubted past actions taken by UN had been convincing to Tshombe. US has difficulty believing Tshombe has been convinced in past that steps of serious nature would be taken against him if he did not agree to return to Congo.

Comment: Delegation believes Department may wish consider giving Gardiner portions paper dealing constitutional principles and interim arrangements, but not section on pressures since this inadequate from our point of view.

Bruce

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/5–1662. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Brussels, Paris, USUN, and Léopoldville.
2. Dated May 16. (Ibid.)
3. The draft aide-memoire was submitted by Rothschild at the May 16 meeting; an informal translation was transmitted in telegram 4208, May 16. (Ibid.) For text as revised, see Document 236.
4. It reads as follows: “As a last resort methods of coercion would be envisioned principally in Katanga (blockage of exports, closing Dilolo and Ndola).”