47. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State0
225. Audience with King, with Deputy Prime Minister Ali Mohammed as interpreter, lasted one and one-half hours, with King taking initiative prolong discussion. Presented personal message from President,1 stating that in presentation I also instructed to make certain remarks. I then presented contents Deptel 1122 orally, with Ali Mohammed interpreting, basing my remarks on text aide-memoire3 (being pouched). At end of presentation told King I would like add few personal remarks and gave him short summary status freight shipments [Page 105] and wastage being brought about by present situation. Had thought that perhaps he not fully informed these practical matters but it became apparent he was quite up-to-date.
His Majesty said his reply would be preliminary as he wished study carefully text of President’s letter before formal reply. He had one general thought however wished give me right away. He wanted express his appreciation for good intentions our President. This motivation on part our President was apparent not only in this crisis but in many others around world. He hoped I would express his appreciation for this sign personal interest of President.
He hoped President would understand that, in view present state of high feelings and emotions arising out of strained relations with Pakistan, practical aspects of movement of goods which we naturally considered so important. [sic]
King said he regretted that we could not be effective in compelling moderation on part of Pakistanis. Said this not only because recent Pakistan actions had been aimed at damage to Afghan, but because he thought policies of present military government of Pakistan would prove unbeneficial, not only for this area, but for people of Pakistan themselves. RGA looked upon recent premeditated (he indicated his intelligence quite good on this point) actions of Pakistan as designed divest Afghan of right of transit that existed for so many years. This unilateral act, aimed at what was an inherent right of Afghanistan, was such that they could not close their eyes and go to Pakistanis seeking new arrangements.
King then spoke bitterly of Pakistan decision close, as practical matter, their borders this year to nomadic tribes. This was inhumane act of great importance causing him great anxiety. It gave further proof of real intentions Pakistan and was significant added factor in total picture.
King said he had listened carefully to my remarks about their northern neighbor. He had only one thing to say in this regard. The most basic of all national policies of Afghan was to retain independence and Afghan would never sell that independence nor would any amount of pressure ever change that basic policy.
King said he would like talk to me as private person and not as King. He asked that I not take notes as his only reason was impress upon me depth of his feeling. He talked at some length on Pushtunistan issue, illustrating with frequent examples distortion he felt we received from general lack of knowledge of area and misinformation given us by Pakistan. The long history of tribal area could not be washed out by imposition of an artificial border. He spoke of an attempted revolution in northern Afghanistan many years ago. RGA, in time of his father, had practically no armed forces at all. Tribal elements from areas across what is now called Durand Line, came at great distances in middle of winter to help Afghanistanis put down this revolt. What was he now to say to [Page 106] people of Bajaur when they ask for Afghanistan help, and what was he to say to his own bodyguard which contained many sons of tribesmen who had once fought shoulder to shoulder with Afghanistanis? He wished we could take deeper look at what is actually going on. For instance, we probably believed over-simplification by Pakistanis in painting Bacha Gul as Afghan agent. If we really studied history of resistance of Bacha Gul’s father against British, and of Bacha Gul’s own efforts during years he attempted to work in close cooperation with Pakistanis and the Moslem League in an effort find solution Pushtunistan problem, we would find it a distortion to label him simply an Afghan agent.
However, of most importance he considered policies of Ayub dangerous in extreme, even to people of Pakistan itself. We should study more deeply what is happening even in areas as accessible to us as Peshawar area. There, people were being beaten by sticks, exiled and thrown into prison in manner almost unbelievable in present age. Effects of this on minds of people even in Pakistan were very unfortunate.
King wanted me to know that he personally felt their Pushtunistan policy was right one for Afghanistan to follow. He even felt we would agree in the end, as coming events would undoubtedly remove cover of secrecy over events in that area. Afghanistanis could not compel others to see things as they saw them, just as they could not always see things as others do. Even if Afghanistanis were suffering many losses at the moment this probably not as important in long run as losing a basic principle. However, he wanted me to report that the friendly relations between our countries, which included sentiments of the people themselves, were real; even if Afghanistanis complained to us at present he wanted me to know that this was not an important indication of real feelings of he and his people for America and Americans.
Comment: There nothing particularly new in substance of above. Had not of course expected, nor did I get, any indication of RGA relaxation its present policy. I was surprised King went to effort he did to show his personal feelings as being quite similar to those expressed by Daud. This perhaps designed put to rest any suspicion of exploitable differences between King, Daud and Naim. Also was impressed by his apparent sincerity in talking about mistakes Pakistanis are making in tribal areas. In this connection it interesting that British Ambassador told me yesterday that, while complete evidence lacking, he was beginning to feel Pakistanis headed for more trouble on their side of border than they had anticipated. We of course without information on which to form any judgment.
Would not anticipate reply from King to President’s message until King, Daud and Naim (returning from Moscow this evening) have made some very basic decisions.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/9-2061. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Karachi.↩
- See Document 45.↩
- Document 44.↩
- Not found.↩