Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan⁰

Washington, September 17, 1961, 2:31 p.m.

534. At earliest opportunity you should see Ayub and speak along following lines:

1. President deeply concerned by recent trend in Pak-Afghan relations and has followed closely reports of your conversations with Ayub. President welcomes Ayub’s assurances of Pakistan’s desire to maintain normal Pak-Afghan transit arrangements and considers this an element of hope in an otherwise bleak picture.

2. Mindful of Ayub’s agreeability to our informing Afghans of GOP’s readiness to maintain normal transit facilities, President is dispatching confidential letter to King Zahir¹ expressing his concern re recent developments, noting GOP wishes tocontinue normal flow of traffic, reiterating our willingness to provide good offices, calling attention to unfortunate repercussions interruption of traffic will have on Afghan development in general and our aid program in particular, and urging practical steps to restore normal traffic, including bilateral traffic, which could pave way to general improvement Pak-Afghan relations.

3. While we realize there some differences in Pak and USG views re tactics, we believe our aims vis-à-vis Afghanistan are identical, i.e., preservation of Afghan independence and forestalling of further Soviet penetration. While holding no brief for Afghan incitement of frontier USG believes continuation Pak-Afghan rupture can only defeat this common aim. Free World already facing major crisis with Communist bloc, centering on Berlin. These tensions likely to increase. At same time likelihood exists that Communists might find it useful to mount diversionary efforts in other areas. Alreadythere have been attempts to bluff Greece over NATO Checkmate maneuvers, to embarrass Turkey by publicly displaying CENTO documents in Soviet Consulate in Istanbul, and to intimidate Iran via strong diplomatic demarches re Iranian membership in CENTO. Little doubt Communists will welcome opportunity exploit Pak-Afghan impasse.

4. We realize element of exciting Americans may be included among Afghan motivations and we have taken this fully into account. Previous experience—e.g. 1955—shows Afghans for reasons of pride are fully capable of falling into the Soviet trap. We will strongly resist any efforts by Afghans or any others to drive wedge in Pak-U.S. relations. In our view, best means of achieving our objective is earliest possible finding of practical means to restore normal Pak-Afghan trade and transit. We of course hope Zahir’s reply may lead to steps in this direction which can be acceptable to both sides. It is President’s belief that Pak cooperation in this endeavor will prove best demonstration of unbreakable U.S.-Pak friendship.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/9-1761. Secret; Niact. Drafted and approved by Meyer and cleared by Weil, by Bowles in substance, and by Smith at the White House. Repeated to Kabul.
1. See Document 45.