Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

44. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan⁰

Washington, September 17, 1961, 2:29 p.m.

112. Presidential letter to King Zahir¹ being transmitted separately. In delivering letter, you should speak along following lines:

1. Despite thousands of miles of geographic separation, USG as King must know has consistently gone to considerable lengths to be friendly and helpful to Afghanistan and its people. USG in particular has recognized difficulties inherent in Afghanistan’s geographic isolation and has done its best to assist in establishment and maintenance of effective outlet to the sea.

2. Specifically, after unfortunate developments of 1955 had been resolved through statesmanship both in Kabul and Karachi, USG went to great trouble, diplomatically and financially, to assure permanent arrangements for Afghan trade and transit to and through Pakistan. Pak-Afghan transit agreement of May 29, 1958, was an historic achievement. USG subsequently supported this agreement with substantial sums to insure that port, rail and road facilities would be available to implement the agreement. USG sincerely hopes King and his government will agree that this great investment of effort and money will not be lightly brushed aside.

3. USG fully aware of fundamental political differences existing between Pakistan and Afghanistan but is convinced that trade and traffic between two countries can and should be continued with or without resolution of those fundamental differences. In this connection, we believe assurances USG has received from Pak authorities of their desire to maintain free flow of trade and traffic is hopeful element in otherwise bleak picture.

4. Afghans must know that Paks are no less sensitive to “political strings” on aid, or “pressures” from aid-giving countries, than are Afghans themselves. It is therefore unfair and unreasonable to expect USG because of its aid relationships to Pakistan to control Pakistan’s policies. We knew nothing in advance re GOP’s announcement re closure of Afghan consulates. We are, on other hand, gratified that we have at least been able to receive Pak assurances re upholding of transit agreement and transit arrangements.

5. We fully realize that Afghanistan can turn to north for immediate relief and its northern neighbor will be only too pleased to exploit Pak-Afghan impasse. We are convinced, however, that motivation for that northern cooperation would not be pure love for Afghans but ultimate political domination. We would like to believe that RGA and particularly Royal Family would appreciate unwisdom of over-dependence upon a ruthless neighbor whose historic designs on Afghanistan are now augmented by Communism’s imperialistic philosophy.

6. With foregoing as background, President has dispatched letter to King expressing his personal interest and engaging his personal attention to Afghanistan’s trade and transit problems. It is his sincere hope that his letter will provide element which RGA needs to reverse recent trend in its relationships with its Pakistan neighbor. U.S. President’s personal interest in this matter will we hope enable King and his government to feel sufficiently confident to permit prompt and normal restoration of Pak-Afghan traffic.

7. What “practical steps” might be taken is a question which is best determined by RGA authorities. Obviously both sides have publicly taken positions which must be taken into account and extreme demands by either side should be avoided. One possibility might be that at least for a beginning necessary documentation could be handled by Afghan bank officials in Pakistan. Another possibility might be third-country handling of documentation. RGA might itself have even better suggestions.

8. USG and its President sincerely hope King and his government will find means for reversing recent unfortunate trends. Our basic desire is to see Afghanistan remain free and develop prosperity. That is purpose of USG assistance programs, which, given a resolution of transit problem, will we trust become increasingly effective in months and years ahead.

In addition to oral presentation to King, you may wish to leave aide memoire containing foregoing. This might be particularly useful if Daub and Naim do not have benefit of your oral presentation. In aide memoire reference to Royal Family in para 5 should be omitted.

In transmitting letter, Dept recommends no publication. This is in line with USG belief that there has already been too much publicity both by Kabul and Karachi which reduces maneuverability both disputants. Dept believes resolution of transit problem can best be handled through confidential diplomacy

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/9-1761. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Meyer, cleared by Spielman and Deputy Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs David H. Henry II and by Komer in substance, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Karachi and Moscow.
1. See Document 45.