48. Letter From the Ambassador to India (Galbraith) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot)0
Dear Phil: Last night I had a long and exceedingly interesting conversation with Nehru about the arms aid to Pakistan, non-aggression and, less expectedly, Kashmir. In accordance with our arrangement on communications I am passing this on to you by letter with the understanding that you will inform the Secretary. I don’t need to persuade either of you of the importance of holding these matters closely for the time being and I hope I have persuaded the Indians of the need for doing so. I say Indians because I thought it wise to try the subject out first with Desai. He provides useful guidance on approach and, since he warns the Prime Minister, one is assured of a more stable reaction there.
I began by cautioning Nehru on the delicacy of the subject I was about to take up and the fact that were it to become public knowledge in any inconvenient way Washington would be at liberty to dismiss it as purely personal talk. I then said that we were far from satisfied with our present relations with the subcontinent and mentioned my recent talks with the President and Secretary. Our arms aid to Pakistan could doubtless be explained to Indian officialdom. We could not hope to explain it to the Indian public; the arming of the Muslims by the Americans would forever be a fertile breeding ground for anti-American agitation, something which did not please us for its own sake. The most plausible occasion for changing the policy would be a rapprochement between India and Pakistan—a declaration of non-aggression and of their common concern for the defense of the borders of the whole subcontinent. (These were my precise words; one needs to be very cautious about using such military terms as a mutual defense pact.) I added that this was no naive excursion nor were we searching the world for disputes to mediate. We were fully aware of the history and its rich yield of difficulty but our aid involved us inevitably in the problem. So long as things were wrong one should beware of the easy course which is to shut his eyes and say nothing can be accomplished. Finally I asked if there were any way of preventing the discussion from becoming immediately a discussion of Kashmir.
Nehru’s response was warm and sympathetic. He said it would be a mistake to assume that nothing could be done. But he said that as a practical matter, especially from the viewpoint of the Pakistanis, it was [Page 108] impossible to avoid Kashmir. One cannot think realistically of a settlement which puts aside the major subject of dispute. Then he talked in a relaxed and, indeed, rather amusing fashion of the history of the Kashmir dispute. Nothing, he said, has so taxed his pacifist spirit as sending soldiers into the Valley though he had found considerable moral support in the discovery that Gandhi was agreeable. There was a good deal more detail of this sort including discussion of the military campaign, much of it known, which brought him down to the present Indian position: the ceasefire line presents the only possible settlement. He has people who insist that Azad Kashmir is part of India. The Pakistanis lay their claim on all of Kashmir and Jammu. Neither side can dislodge the other; the only thing is to accept the line as it exists.
This, of course, leaves India in possession of the most desirable piece of real estate, namely, the Valley. I asked Nehru if he would be averse in the interest of a settlement to giving Pakistan rights in the Valley. I noted that after the Republic of Geneva had joined Switzerland a tributary area had been left in economic union with Switzerland but under the political administration of France and had so remained to this day. If the Valley were to remain under Indian administration, why not give both countries free trade with and population access to the Valley? This would mean that communications could again flow up the traditional route from Rawalpindi and the Muslim population of the Valley would have free intercourse with that of Pakistan. Nehru was not specifically averse to the idea. He asked if this would involve some control posts on their roads out of Kashmir to India; I pointed out that the French had them outside of the Zone. He also noted that there would be a danger of a heavy migration from Azad Kashmir and Pakistan to the Valley because of the higher standard of living there. But then he added: “If there were a general settlement we wouldn’t have to worry about troublemakers.”
After a little discussion of the possibilities of Pakistan acceptance of some such development we left the subject with the observation by the Prime Minister that to settle this problem would remove one of the worst causes of communalism in India. He noted, incidentally, that in his view Hindu communalism was more vehement and troublesome than the Muslim version.
I would very much appreciate your reaction to this conversation. You will see that I have moved at least a little in the way of a joint tenancy—hardly a condominium—in the Valley. I left the way open for another talk with Nehru with a view to firming up our thoughts prior to his trip to Washington and we should consider what might be said in Washington. It will occur to you that the conversation if it accomplished nothing else has substantially eased the way for anything that the President might wish to say on this subject.
[Page 109]Especially I would like your suggestion as to the next step. Much as I like Bill Rountree personally he is not committed to an escape from the military arrangements of which, indeed, he was one of the authors. Therefore, there is no chance that he would be a good avenue of approach to the Paks. It is my view moreover that this should be part of a much larger approach which includes the waterlogging and salinity problems—we say among other things that we are seeking a settlement which eases tensions between the two countries in order to concentrate resources on saving the Punjab. One possibility might be to get Dave Lilienthal, who did a good job on the Indus settlement, to try his hand again on this one. Or perhaps I might ask the President and Secretary to enlarge my charter in the region to see what could be worked out. Of course, if the Laos conference were ever to end Harriman would be the ideal man. Indeed I would rather trust it to him than anyone else. What is needed is someone who is a master of all the ingredients—our military commitment to the Paks, our needs there, the salinity and waterlogging problem, the need of India for a settlement and an imaginative view of the concessions she might make—who could work out a package that both could conceivably buy.
Yours faithfully,